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Description: 
This thesis deals with the possible employment of nuclear weapons in the ongoing confrontation 
between India and Pakistan. 
After reviewing the nuclear capabilities of both Indian and Pakistan and assessing their possible 
delivery systems, this dissertation explores the emerging picture regarding the Indian and 
Pakistani nuclear doctrines. 
It is argued that, after exploring the current structure of the armed forces in both countries and 
after analyzing the theatres of operations, it is highly unlikely that either country seeks to employ 
nuclear weapons in a tactical, battlefield role. It is also argued that neither India or Pakistan is 
making an effort to evolve a nuclear war-fighting doctrine. Moreover, it is shown that nuclear 
weapons have simply led to a re-thinking of military tactics on the part of India so as to 
minimize the chance of a nuclear strike by limiting the aims and objectives of any Indian 
military action. 
In stark contrast, it is shown that South Asian cities present far more lucrative targets for nuclear 
strikes. As a result of this and the geographic and tactical limitations of South Asian battlefields, 
it is argued that both India and Pakistan have based their fledgling nuclear strategies around a 
'city-busting! concept. The existing command and control systems in both countries are examined 
and found to be adequate if both countries adopt a strict 'second-strike' approach to the 
employment of nuclear weapons. 
It is further argued that nuclear weapons, while limiting the scale of any future India-Pakistan 
war, will not play a major role in preventing a conflict between the two countries. Rather, the 
basic operational parity that exists between the two countries in terms of their conventional 
forces is responsible for preventing the outbreak of war. - 
The thesis also briefly explores the rationale behind the acquisition of nuclear weapons in both 
countries and on their basic security perceptions. The issue of confidence building measures and 
the international impact of nuclearization in South Asia are also examined. 
An epilogue is also included so as to deal with the implications of the May 1998 nuclear tests by 
India and Pakistan which took place as this thesis was being printed. 
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India and Pakistan have been rivals since their inception some fifty years ago. 
The two countries have fought three major war and to this day, routinely exchange 
artillery fire across the Line of Control in Kashmir while fighting an undeclared war in 
the inhospitable environment of the Siachen glacier. Moreover, the strained relationship 
between India and Pakistan is further complicated by India! s claims that Pakistan has 
aided and abetted terrorist groups operating against India, first in Punjab and now in 
Jammu and Kashmir. 
To this already tense situation must be added the nuclear factor. India and 
Pakistan are called 'threshold' nuclear weapons states. Perhaps a more accurate term 
would be 'undeclared' nuclear weapons states. Both countries have moved so far along 
the path to nuclear weaponization that it is very difficult to not consider them defacto 
nuclear weapons states. 
This thesis examines the nuclear aspect of the India-Pakistan conflict in the 
period up to early April 1998. It does not delve deeply into the proliferation implications 
of a nuclearized South Asia, nor does it seek to suggest that nuclear weapons are either 
necessary or unnecessary for South Asian security. Rather, this thesis accepts that India 
and Pakistan see nuclear weapons as an integral part of their legitimate security 
requirements. As might be expected, however, some of the weapons programs discussed 
in this thesis are ongoing projects and as such continue to evolve. This is particularly 
true regarding Indian and Pakistani programs for boosted'-fission and thermonuclear 
weapons and for ballistic missiles. 
The South Asian nuclear equation has been examined in many books and 
journal articles. ' However, this has often been done from the nuclear proliferation angle 
2 or as a study of the nuclear policies of India and Pakistan over a number of years. This 
thesis takes a somewhat different approach. 
The thesis has one underlying assumption - India and Pakistan have the 
capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and to deliver them. Neither country has 
shown any inclination to give up either their weapons capability or their delivery 
systems, and as such it can be assumed that they will continue work on both nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missiles. With this in mind, this thesis addresses one of the major 
questions that arises - how will India and Pakistan employ nuclear weapons ? It will be 
argued that India and Pakistan will most probably employ nuclear weapons as strategic 
counter-value rather than as tactical counter-force systems. By counter-force, it is meant 
that attacks will be mounted against opposing military assets rather than population or 
industrial centres, which would be considered counter-value targets. ' 
This argument will be supported by an analysis of the India-Pakistan theatres of 
military operations and the current tactics of both armies in addition to the limitations 
that terrain and troop deployment place of the effective employment of nuclear weapons 
on the battlefield. Moreover, the vulnerability of South Asian urban centres will be 
illustrated by assessing strategic air defences in both India and Pakistan as well as 
'A number of these are cited in this chapter and throughout the thesis. 
2 One 1996 PhD thesis by W. P. S. Sidhu of Carnbridge University dealt with the nuclear doctimes of India 
and Pakistan between 1947 and 1990 
' C. Campbell, Nuclear Facts: A Guide to Nuclear Weapon System and Strategy ( London: Hamlyn 
Publishing Group Limited, 1994 ), p. 186 
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showing the potential impact of a nuclear strike on the cities of the two countries. ' 
Pakistan and India form the most dangerous part of an Asian nuclear triangle. 
India and Pakistan have an intense rivalry over the region of Kashmir and have fought 
three major wars. The two South Asian rivals are also involved in an undeclared war 
over the inhospitable Siachen Glacier and routinely exchange artillery fire. ' The other 
country that plays a major role in this region is China. China and Pakistan have a long 
and well-established military relationship that extends into the nuclear and ballistic 
missile fields. On the other hand, China and India have a somewhat strained 
relationship. In 1962 the two countries fought a vicious border war and since then India 
has become increasingly alarmed at both China's own nuclear arsenal as well as the 
extensive help China has provided to Pakistan's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile 
capability. ' Moreover, the Sino-Indian border dispute has not been resolved, even 
though the tension along this border is much lower than along the Line of Control in 
Kashmir. India still harbours fears about China's intentions in South Asia has meant that 
India! s nuclear weapons and missile programs are aimed at providing a deterrent against 
China in addition to dealing with the more immediate threat of a nuclear armed 
Pakistan. ' 
" TNs will be discussed in Chapter Five 
-'E. W. Desmond, Var on I-Egh Ground in Time Intemadonal. July 17 1989, pp. 14-21 
' The Sino-Pakistan relationship with respect to nuclear weapons and ballistic viiissiles is discussed in 
Chapters Two and Tbree. 
7 This is discussed in KSubramanyarn, India! s Securijy Perspectives ( New Delhi: ABC Publishing 
House, 1982) 
A more recent view is found in V. K. Nair, Nuclear Indi ( New Delhi: Lancer International, 1992 
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As this thesis confines itself to the India-Pakistan conflict up to early April 
1998, China is mentioned as part of a discussion of India! s threat perceptions and for its 
role in assisting Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs. Moreover, while some 
mention will be made about South Asian nuclear debates, it must be remembered that 
this thesis goes beyond the proliferation debate and examines emerging trends for 
possible nuclear weapons employment. ' 
Chapter One of this thesis gives an outline of the place that nuclear weapons 
occupy in South Asian security perceptions. The chapter begins with an overview of the 
South Asian political situation and a brief discussion of 'nuclear nationalism', that is, the 
place that the nuclear option occupies in the political landscape of India and Pakistan. ' It 
further discusses the evolution of the Indian and Pakistani defence policy and explores 
the internal security preoccupations of both India and Pakistan by examining the forces 
deployed for these tasks. It also details the emergence of nuclear weapons in the South 
Asian scenario in 1987 after a major crisis between the two countries. In addition, the 
roles played by the Soviet Union and now Russia in aiding the Indian military and the 
roles played by China and the United States in assisting Pakistan will also be discussed. 
Chapters two and three deal with the nuclear weapons potential of India and 
Pakistan, and the capabilities of their delivery systems. It is shown that India has a very 
considerable nuclear weapons potential, with a large stockpile of fissile material and is 
working on advanced nuclear weapons, including boosted fission and thermonuclear 
' The South Asian nuclear debates are discussed later in the Introduction as well as in Chapter One. 
' The phrase ! nuclear-nationalism'is believed to be an invention of the author. However, since the 
concept has been around for some time, it is possible that the phrase has been used before. 
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weapons. Pakistan, on the other hand, has a somewhat smaller potential, but has made 
considerable progress, with Chinese assistance, towards improving its production 
capacity for nuclear weapons. 
With respect to delivery systems, both manned aircraft and ballistic missiles are 
discussed. India! s Integrated Guided Missile Development Program is analyzed in some 
detail as is the Indian satellite launch vehicle program. The links between the Indian 
missile program and its space program are dealt with in some detail, in addition to the 
performance and characteristics of the current missiles in service. Pakistan's much more 
limited missile program is discussed as well as Chinese assistance to Pakistan's ongoing 
projects. The quantity and quality of manned aircraft available for nuclear strikes are 
also discussed. 
Chapter four of this thesis argues that neither India nor Pakistan is working 
towards a tactical nuclear war-fighting doctrine. Both countries have significant nuclear 
and ballistic missile capabilities along with large and well-equipped air forces; however, 
there is no evidence that either country is moving towards developing the very-low yield 
devices that were a feature of the tactical nuclear arsenals of NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact during the Cold War. 10 
An assessment of the armies of both countries shows that there seems to be no 
move towards an integration of nuclear weapons into their armed forces tactical 
10 In the 1980s, for example, NATO deployed close to 6000 tactical nuclear warheads including 
approximately 2250 artillery shells for 155mm and 203mm self-propelled guns. The M422 shell for the 203mm 
gun carried the W-33 warhead with a yield of 2 Hotons. The advent of enhanced-radiation weapons saw the 
development of the M753 shell with the W-79 warhead with a yield of 0.7 kilotons. 
See: C. Campbell, Nuclear Facts pp. 131-13 5 
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doctrines and that passive defensive measures and training appear to be somewhat 
limited. A relatively detailed analysis of the battlefield zones of the India-Pakistan zone 
of conflict and a study of India! s new military doctrine shows that as far as the India- 
Pakistan conflict is concerned, nuclear weapons are of very dubious utility against 
military targets. 
Instead, both India and Pakistan seem to base their fledgling nuclear strategy on a 
'counter-value', or, more accurately, on acity-bustine strategyas will be shown in 
chapter five. " Looking at the strategic air defences in both countries, it will be seen that 
Pakistani targets are extremely vulnerable to Indian nuclear strikes, while Indian targets, 
though somewhat better protected by a potent air-defence network, present lucrative 
targets to a Pakistani nuclear strike. The effects of nuclear strikes on South Asian cities 
is also discussed in some detail, as is the inadequate civil defence network available to 
both countries, with India being used as the example. 
This thesis addresses the question of nuclear deterrence in the India-Pakistan 
context from a different angle. It is argued that the threat of nuclear strikes may not 
actually prevent war, but has led to a rc-orientation of India's military strategy. Instead 
of fighting a conventional war aimed at capturing territory, India has switched to a 
strategy of aiming to inflict maximum attrition on Pakistan's armed forces. Nuclear 
weapons would limit the objectives of a war, but have little to do with the risk of war 
starting. 
" The adoption of a 'city-bustine strategy is the one aspect that virtually all analysts of the India-Pakistan 
conflict agree on. Even nuclearhawks'such as Brigadier V. KNair, Nuclear India ( New DelW: Lancer, 1992 ) and 
General K Sundaýý Blind Men of Hindoostan ( New Deffý: UBS, 1994 ) have not even suggested the deployment 
of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons in the India-Pakistan context. 
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Rather, it is argued that a basic operational parity exists between India and 
Pakistan. Pakistan makes every encleavour to maintain this operational parity, even 
going to the extent of procuring ballistic missiles and their technology from China in 
order to match India! s own missile production capacity. It is this parity that maintains 
the'uneasy peace' in South Asia and any development that upsets this tenuous balance 
could lead to a full-scale conventional war. 
Chapter six deals with the political implications of a nuclear South Asia. This 
chapter explores the extent of public support for nuclear weapons in both India and 
Pakistan, with some interesting survey data being available for India. It also investigates 
the economic risks of nuclearization in South Asia since, any such move may well be 
followed by the imposition of sanctions by some countries. The chapter ends with an 
exploration of confidence building measures in South Asia and their failure to lead to a 
reduction in the tension between India and Pakistan. 
This is not a thesis about nuclear or ballistic missile proliferation, hor is it a 
thesis about deterrence theory. As explained earlier, it is a thesis that accepts that 
nuclear weapons are an integral part of the South Asian security landscape and 
endeavours to understand the possible size and composition of nuclear arsenals. This 
thesis also examines the possible use of these weapons in the event that the current 
tension between the two rivals leads to a full-scale war which might start out as a 
'conventional' conflict but which could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. 
The nuclearization of India and Pakistan comes at a time when the nuclear debate 
in the West is taking an interesting direction. Nuclear weapons, with the end of the Cold 
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War and the demise of the Soviet Union in 199 1, no longer occupy the place of 
importance in Western arsenals they once did. Both Russia and the United States are 
reducing their nuclear arms stockpiles under the START I and, eventually, the START 
2 treaties, while the United Kingdom has recently phased out the last of its nuclear 
gravity bombs. " The morality of nuclear weapons has long been questioned, but with 
the end of the Cold War, this debate has become even more prominent since the 
principal threat seems to have disappeared. 
Writing in InternationalAffairs in July 1993, Michael Quinlan, a former official 
of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, argued that there were five reasons for 
Western powers retaining a nuclear military capability, one of these being the need to 
deter threats by non-Westem nuclear weapons states. " Quinlan also argues that nuclear 
weapons proliferation should be kept to a minimum, but he does not advocate the 
abolition of all nuclear weapons. 
Professor Michael MccGwire takes a somewhat different view. Writing in April 
1994, MccGwire asks whether there is a future for nuclear weapons at all. 14 MccGwire 
systematically rebuts Quinlan's arguments in favour of the retention of nuclear weapons 
and argues that the difficulties of preventing proliferation in a world where five states, 
namely Russia, the United States, France, China and the United Kingdom, legitimize 
their possession of nuclear weapons are considerably increased. This has been a long- 
" See Air Forces Monthly: June 1998, p. 2 
" M. Quirdan, 7he Future of Nuclear Weapons', in InternationalAffairs., Vol 69, No. 3 July 1993, 
pp. 485-496 
"' M. MccGwire, 7s there a fiiture for Nuclear Weapons, InternafionalAffairs: Vol 70, No. 2 April 1994, 
pp. 211-228 
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standing complaint on the part of the Indian government and was the reason for India! s 
rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970. " MccGwire has, in the past, put 
forward arguments suggesting that deterrence was part of the problem and not the 
solution. 16 It should be pointed out that political scientist Kenneth Waltz, writing in 
Adelphi Paper 171, goes even further in suggesting that more nuclear powers may 
actually be better. " It would be most interesting to see if Waltz would change his views 
in the event of an overtly nuclear South Asia. 
Agreeing with Professor MccGwire on the need for the abolition of nuclear 
weapons is Jonathan Schell, a long-time writer for the New Yorker magazine. In 1998, 
Schell wrote The Gift of Time which outlined a well argued case for the complete 
abolition of nuclear weapons. " Towards the end of this book, Schell proposed turning 
the image of nuclear escalation upside down into a path to nuclear safety based on a de- 
escalatory process, leading to the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. '9 Schell's desire 
for a nuclear-free world has not found much favour among the political leadership of the 
five recognized nuclear powers. 
In a somewhat less passionate vein, Professor John Baylis continued the debate 
" For a discussion of India's position, one of the most detailed works available is A. Kapur, ladjLs 
Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making ( New York: Praeger, 1976 ) 
" RMccGwire, Deterrence: the problem - not the solution' in InternadonalAffairs. - Vol 62, No. I Winter 1986, pp. 55-70 
17 KWaltz, 'Me spread of Nuclear Weapons: More may be better' Adelphi Pager 171 (London: IISS, 
1981) 
" J-Schell, The Gift of Time: The Case for Abolishing Nuclear W-eA= (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 1998 ) 
"' ibid p. 220 
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between those advocating a nuclear weapons-free world and those who believe that 
nuclear weapons have a legitimate place in Western security interests. " Baylis points 
out that, despite the substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States 
and Russia, the nuclear framework of the Cold War would remain intact. He further 
points out that even the proposed end to the production of fissile material would have no 
effect on the existing nuclear powers who already have sufficient stockpiles. This 
explains why neither India nor Pakistan is particularly eager to participate in the talks 
for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty since such a treaty would effectively cap the 
fissile material stockpiles of the 'threshold' nuclear states while having virtually no 
impact on the massive stockpiles of the five nuclear powers. 
Baylis also draws attention to the concept of 'virtual deterrence', proposed in 
1984 by Jonathan Schell. This concept is based on the banning of completed nuclear 
weapons while allowing nations to keep the components of nuclear weapons in order to 
facilitate nuclear rearmament. McGeorge Bundy refered to this concept as 'existential 
deterrence'and ties in with George Perkovich's ideas about non-weaponized deterrence 
in South Asia. " Perkovich bases his views on his belief that neither India nor Pakistan 
has actually weaponized their nuclear capabilities. As this thesis will show, in the cases 
of India and Pakistan, the weaponization of nuclear capabilities can be accomplished on 
fairly short notice and as such it is somewhat questionable whether the term 'existential 
deterrence' accurately defines the current nuclear scenario in South Asia. 
20J. Bayfis, 'Me Future of Nuclear Weapons: Balancing Power and MorahtyinInternaiionalRelafions: 
Vol 13, No. 5 August 1997, pp. 1- 14 
" G-Perkovich, A Nuclear 71iird Way in South Asia!, in Foreign Policy. No. 91 Sununer 1993, pp. 85-104 
14 
In South Asia, the nuclear issue has been hotly debated by leading scholars and 
intellectuals, with those favouring overt nuclearization. or the continuing of the status 
quo greatly outnumbering those in favour of disarmament. ' In fact, the anti-nuclear 
lobbies in both India and Pakistan are, however, relatively small and ineffective in 
comparison to the vast campaigns waged by the disarmament lobbies in the Western 
world. In neither India nor Pakistan, for example, has there been anything to rival the 
massive protests undertaken by Greenpeace, and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND) first in the late 1950s and early 1960s and then again in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. The anti-nuclear activists of India and Pakistan, led by Praftil Bidwai and Achin 
Vanaik, do however share another thing with their bretheren in CND - they are often 
branded as traitors. " This is perhaps not surprising given the hostility between India and 
Pakistan and the prestige both countries have attached to their nuclear capabilities. 
The Indian and Pakistani anti-nuclear activists face formidable intellectual 
opposition. The nuclearhawks'of India are led by the extremely articulate ( and 
somewhat acerbic ) scholar Krishnaswamy Subramanyam. 24 Subramanyarn has 
consistently argued India's need for nuclear weapons in order to deter China and 
" llie debate in India regarding the India-Paldstan nuclear situation started in earnest in the 1980s. One 
of the first works on this subject was B. Sen Gupta, Nuclear Weanons ? Policy Olytions for Indi& ( New Deb: 
Sage Publications, 1983 ). 
In Pakistan, the quest for nuclear weapons was started by Z. A-Bhutto and outlined in his book If I am Assasinated. 
(New Delhi: Was Publishing House, 1979 ) 
2' CND activists were accused of being Soviet agents at the height of the Cold War- see 
C. Campbell, Disarmarnent Debates (London: MacDonald & Co. Publishers Ltd-, 1984 ), p. 43 
PraH Bidwai and Achin Vanaik are two left-wing scholars who have been vocal critics of India! s nuclear prograrm 
Both have received death threats as a result of their criticism. However, neither of them is backed by an institution 
as powerful as Greenpeace or CND. 
24 Krishnaswamy Subramanyarn is perhaps the best known strategic thinker in South Asia. He once 
headed India! s Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis and was a security advisor to the late Indian Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi. 
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Pakistan and has maintained that nuclear weapons can only be deterred by nuclear 
25 
weapons. In more recent time, Subramanyam has been joined by the former Chief of 
Army Staff, General Krishnaswamy Sundarji, and Air Commodore Jasj it Singh in 
articulating India! s position on nuclear weapons. 
While intellectuals in the West debate the utility of nuclear weapons in the post- 
Cold War era, India and Pakistan are only now beginning to evolve their own nuclear 
strategies since it is only recently that these two countries have accquired the werewithal 
to develop fairly sophisticate nuclear arsenals. It remains to be seen whether these two 
defacto members of the nuclear club emulate the nuclear stategies that governed the 
arsenals of the Cold War rivals, or whether unique concepts will evolve. It must be 
remembered that NATO and the former Warsaw Pact had decades to work out nuclear 
strategies and tactics. In South Asia, on the other hand, only the first trends of nuclear 
strategy are beginning to emerge. 
The political landscape of South Asia has changed. In India, the world's largest 
democracy, there has been a significant decline in the political fortunes of what was 
once India! s dominant political party, the Indian National Congress ( also known as the 
Congress party ). For years there was a certain continuity in Indian security policy in 
general and nuclear policy in particular, however, this has now changed. In India, the 
' K-Subrarnanyam, Implications of Nuclear Asymmetry', in Subramanyarn ed. Nuclear Myths an 
Realities (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1981 ), pp. 201-209. Anti-nuclear activists have occasionally 
countered that India could deploy conventional air forces to wreak the same havoc such as the United States did 
in the 1991 Gulf War. In an astounding display of naivete, the anti-nuclear activists completely ignore the vast 
costs of maintaining air forces of the size and technological sophistication of the USAF. Nuclear weapons costs, 
while hardly modest might actually be cheaper. 
See KBajpai, 'Abstaining: The Nonnuclear Option', in D. Cortright & A. Mattoo ed. India and the Bombe Public 
QVinion and Nuclear Options ( Notre Dame. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996 ), pp. 23-52. 
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pro-nuclear lobby has been strengthened by the rise to power of the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) and the corresponding demise of the Congress party. The BJP has moved 
away from being a political pariah in India and has supplemented the Congress party as 
a dominant force in Indian politics. This was somewhat unexpected since the author, in 
November 1993, had the opportunity to speak with Professor Milton Israel who teaches 
at the South Asian Studies Department of the University of Toronto, and was extremely 
doubtful when it was suggested that the BJP could ever rise to such heightS. 16 Indeed, 
when this discussion took place it did seem that the BJPs political fortunes were on the 
decline. However, three years later they emerged as the largest single political party in 
India and in 1998 were able to form a government. In Pakistan, the democratic process 
is less evolved and the political process is dominated between the power blocs 
controlled by the encumbent Prime Minister Nawaz Shariff and those of his rival, 
Benazir Bhutto. 
With respect to sources, the author was able to find a fair quantity of published 
material dealing with the subject. However, many deal with the subject from a 
proliferation or arms control perspective and their utility for this thesis was somewhat 
limited since they fail to address the issue of the integration of nuclear weapons into 
war-fighting doctrines. Most published sources tend to deal with nuclear weapons as a 
proliferation issue and many are replete with discussions about deterrence models for 
South Asia. There are, however, some works on the India-Pakistan conflict and on the 
' Of all Indian political parties, the BJP is unique in having a pennanent defence cell, which has studied 
various aspects of Indian defence policy. This cell is headed by Lt General JRR-Jacob who is in the odd position 
of being a Jew in a party often accused of being domintated by Hindu fascists. The BJP is also unique in that it has 
consistently called for India to develop and deploy nuclear weapons. 
17 
changes in the internal policies of India which provide interesting insights into various 
aspects of South Asian security. 
Sumit Ganguly's The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts 
since 1947 is the only book that provides a comparative study of the three India- 
Pakistan wars. " This work is significant because it explores the relevance of the 
colonial legacy and the numerous subnational factors, such as religion and ethnicity, to 
the causes of war in South Asia. Kanti Bajpai and Stephen Cohen provide a number of 
interesting perspectives on the post-Cold War South Asia in South, 4sia after the Cold 
War: International Perspectives. 28 
For a more detailed exploration of the changes in Indian policy, both in foreign 
affairs and defence, Shekar Gupta, writing in 1994 argued that India has moved away 
from the internationalist rhetoric that characterized the government of Jawaharlal Nehru 
and his successors and has adopted a policy that is guided by pragmatic concerns . 
21 It 
can be argued that India! s retention of its nuclear option is a continuation of this policy 
of pragmatism, since India! s security concerns outweigh any utopian desire for 
disarmament. However, it can also be argued that this is a rejection of this pragmatic 
policy and represents a desire to display Indian martial prowess with very little benefit 
for India. 
The Kashmir dispute has also generated some interesting literature in recent 
27 S. Ganguly. The Origins of War in South Asia: indo-Pakistani Conflicts since 1947 (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994 ) 
2' S. Cohen & KBajpaý ed. South Asia after the Cold War Intemafional Perspecfives (Boulder 
Westview Press, 1993 ) 
2'S. Gupta, India Redefines its Role'Adelphi Paper 293 (London: IISS, 1994) 
18 
years. Raju G. C. Thomas in Perspectives on Kashmir, provided a number of fresh 
perspectives of the problem in relation to the incomplete process of state and identity 
formation in South Asia. 'O Robert G. Wirsings India, Pakistan and the Kashmir 
Dispute, is one of the best policy oriented work on the Kashmir dispute, " while Major 
General Affir Karim provided a interesting military analysis of the Kashmir problem as 
part of the Indian Defence Review Research Team's publication, Kashmir., Ae 
Troubled Frontiers. 32 This work is particularly significant because it goes into, with 
some detail, the state of human and economic development, the geographic ethnic and 
religious breakdown and the political developments in the region. Major General 
Karim's work also assesses the military and political options open to the Indian 
government for a resolution of the Kashmir disupte. 
Interviews were both invaluable and difficult. Between mid- 1994 and May 1998, 
the author has communicated with a number of Indian military officers and scientists. 
While they were more than willing to talk in detail about modernization programs, 
missile development and military tactics, many of them were extremely reluctant to 
allow any infonnation disclosed to the author to be quoted in this thesis. Owing to the 
air of secrecy that pervades any security related matter in South Asia, this was fully 
anticipated by the author. In respect for their wishes, the author has limited the use of 
the information garnered in these communications to relatively minor items. 
"R. G. C. Tliomas, PersDecfives on Kashn-ýr The Roots of Conflict in South Asi (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1992 ) 
" R-G. Wirsing, India- Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute. ( New York: St MartWs Press, 1994 ) 
31 
-Gen. A-Karini, B. Vemia & KSingk ecL Kashmir The Troubled Frontiers (New Defli: Lancer, 1994) 
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The author decided on a policy of'qualiloV over'quantitiy' when dealing with 
interview sources. The author approached a mix of retired senior and middle-ranking 
off icers in both the army and air force in addition to journal ists and academics. Serving 
officers refused to answer any questions but a number of highly respected former 
officers were willing to meet, or correspond with, the author. The number of people 
interviewed may appear to be small, but between the seven military officers interviewed, 
the author came away with a very detailed insight into the Indian army and air force 
doctrines and force levels. A single retired scientist agreed to correspond with the author 
on the issue of passive defence against nuclear and chemical attack, but care was always 
taken to avoid direct discussion of nuclear weapons for security reasons. 
In attempting to do interviews on this subject, the author had a glimpse into the 
world in which the military and scientific establishments of South Asia operate. Many 
would not speak about any security related matter over the telephone since these were 
routinely monitored. Others were refused to communicate via e-mail since their 
accounts were not secure. In fact, on more than one occasion the author was asked 
Who are you spying for T, and this was not always in jest. Since nuclear weapons are 
an cxtremcly sensitivc subjcct, it is wholly understandablc that attcmpts from an 
outsider to obtain information on the subject would result in some suspicion. 
Much more published information is forthcoming on Indian programs than on 
those of Pakistan. India has a lively strategic thinking community that regularly 
publishes its opinions. Moreover, on issues relating to the armed forces, Indian sources 
were a bit clearer regarding modernization programs. This thesis, therefore, does have a 
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slightly more detailed discussion of Indian programs and theories than on those of 
Pakistan. 
Nuclear weapons have acquired a mystique all their own in South Asia and 
neither India nor Pakistan will move towards complete disarmament. However, in light 
of the current tensions between these two nations it is imperative that some 
understanding of how India and Pakistan intend to use nuclear weapons be reached. The 
costs of any nuclear exchange in South Asia will be staggering. However, war can only 
be averted by India and Pakistan talking to each other honestly on all issues - up to and 
including the nuclear issue. 
Postscrint- 
In May 1998 India and Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests that brought the 
nuclear weaponization of South Asia into the open. As this thesis deals with period only 
up to April 1998, the main body of this thesis does not deal with the tests. However, 
since the tests have a direct impact on the subject of this thesis, an epilogue has been 
added in order to deal with the nuclear tests and their immediate aftermath. 
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Chater One: Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons in South Asian Security 
Discussions about South Asian security are dominated by two issues - the issue 
of nuclear weapons and that of internal security. While these issues are very different in 
nature, they are in some ways linked since the quest for nuclear weapons in South Asia 
cannot be completely divorced from deteriorating internal security problems. 
There is no doubt that India and Pakistan face severe internal security problems 
and have experienced considerable difficulty in dealing with them. However, it is also 
true that both countries see nuclear weapons as crucial to their national security and that 
both countries have embarked on a major build-up of both their nuclear capabilities 
conventional military forces. Since India and Pakistan, as will be shown later in this 
chapter, routinely blame each other for their internal security problems, the current 
preoccupation with counter-insurgency and counter-tefforist operations does not 
eliminate the possibility of either nuclear or conventional war in South Asia. 
This chapter will explore a number of issues, including the place of nuclear 
weapons in the threat perceptions of the Indian and Pakistani ruling establishments and 
will show that in their thinking, the nuclear threat has not yet assumed a position of 
primary importance even though both countries continue to view each other as the 
principal potential nuclear adversary. An overview of the evolution of Indian and 
Pakistani defence policy, which defines the role of nuclear weapons is also included. 
The ability to inflict unacceptable ( and probably catastrophic ) damage on each other is 
seen as an ultimate guarantor of continued existence in the case of Pakistan and in the 
case of India is a safety-guard against nuclear blackmail from either China or Pakistan. 
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This chapter will also provide an overview of the internal security aspect of Indian and 
Pakistani security and will show that considerable assets are already being ploughed 
into this thankless task. The chapter will also deal briefly with the 1987 and 1990 crises 
between India and Pakistan and the role played by foreign powers in the nuclear and 
conventional arms build-up in the region. 
After the bloody aftermath of their birth, both India and Pakistan have been 
almost obsessed with preserving their existence as independent states! At one level, it 
seems that the two countries are still trying to justify their existence and have attached 
an extremely high priority to territorial integrity, hence India's passionate and 
determined efforts to keep its share of Kashmir under Indian control? 
This overwhelming concern about territorial integrity has shaped the military 
policies of both countries and this in part explains why India and Pakistan maintain two 
of the largest and most highly trained military establishments in the world. The political 
establishments in both countries, while appearing to be dithering and lacking direction 
at times, are deeply committed to the preservation of both India and Pakistan. 
At the core of the India-Pakistan confrontation is a deep ideological divide 
between an India believing in a secular, multi-religious democracy and a Pakistan 
carved out solely for the Muslim of the Indian subcontinent. Kashmir, the disputed 
' For an excellent account of the scale of the violence witnessed 
during the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan, see L. Collins & D. Lapierre, 
Freedom and Midnight ( London: Pan Books Ltd., 1977 ) 
-' The Indian obsession with national survival and territorial integrity 
is demonstrated in the frequent references by political leaders from all 
parts of the country about the necessity for the preservation of India's 
territorial integrity. See also M. Tully & Z. Masani, From Rai to Rali ( New 
Delhi: Universal Book Stall, 1989 ) 
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territory, has come to symbolize this divide. ' For Pakistan, Kashmir is a Muslim 
population under infidel domination and should be rightfully part of Pakistan. ' For 
India, Kashmir symbolizes its secular identity where a Muslim population exists as 
equal citizens with their compatriots from all religions. ' 
Pakistan has feared that India has never really accepted its right to exist as an 
independent entity. It has a constant fear of an Indian attack and as such has sought to 
build up military forces to safeguard its sovereignty. India has, of course, followed suit 
and built up large and powerful military forces of its own.. This has led to a downward 
spiral of deepening distrust, higher military expenditure and what seems to be a 
conditioned response by one country to the arms acquisitions of the other. 
Threat perceptions in Pakistan and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 
For Pakistan, faced with the massive Indian population, economy and military 
potential, nuclear weapons are seen, quite literally, as the sole guarantee of Pakistan's 
continued existence. While India may at times portray itself as an adherent to Mohandas 
Gandhi's policy of non-violence, Pakistan sees an India that possess a highly developed 
nuclear capability and a large and capable conventional military force which are directed 
' India's commitment to the principles of secularism and democracy stem 
from creation, since Independence in 1947, of institutions aimed at 
preserving democracy and from the drafting of a Constitution based on liberal 
democratic values. See J. M. Brown, Modern India: The Origins of an Asian 
Democragy ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1991 ) 
' P. Spear, A History of India: Volume 2( London: Penguin Books, 1990 
, pp. 241-242. This gives a concise account of the Kashmir situation in 1947, 
where a Hindu ruler presided over a Muslim majority state and acceded to 
India rather than Pakistan. 
" It is probable that Jawaharlal Nehru's Kashmiri origins also played a 
role in India's desire to retain Kashmir. See also, Collins & Lappierre, 
Freedom at Midnight, p. 407. 
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against the Pakistani state. 
Pakistan believes ( though reality may be somewhat different ) that India fully 
intended to destroy Pakistan utterly in the 1965 and 197 1, wars and was extremely 
alarmed by the expansion and modernization of the Indian armed forces during the 
1980s. ' Exercise 13rasstacks' with its potential for the bisection of Pakistan did nothing 
to assuage these fears. The bitter defeat of 1971 still looms large in Pakistan's military 
psyche. 
As the 1980s progressed, Pakistan became increasingly aware of its inability to 
physically match India! s conventional forces in numbers and was also worried about the 
increasing sophistication of the Indian armed forces. The nuclear option was therefore 
developed as a weapon of last resort to be used in the event of major Indian gains on the 
battlefield. Therefore, since the mid- I 970s - immediately after the Indian atomic test - 
Pakistan has actively pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program that came to 
fruition in the mid-1980s. 1 
6 For an excellent account of Indian military objectives in both the 
1965 and 1971 wars See Maj. General S. Singh, India's Wars Since Independencel 
Defence of the Western Border ( New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1981 ) 
This book clearly states that India had very limited war aims in both 1965 
and 1971. 
For a Pakistani perspective see Air Marshal A. Khan, The First Round, ( New 
Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1969 ) 
See also S. Salik, Witness to Surrender ( New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1979 ) 
7 Until recently, Pakistan's military officers had to swear that they 
would avenge the 1971 humiliation. It is not known if this practice 
continues. 
0 The Pakistani nuclear program started in 1972 - see chapter Two 
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Threat perceptions in India and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 
Central to India! s security is the fact that it is bordered by two countries with 
which it has serious border disputes. India has a volatile border with Pakistan and is 
wrestling with a Pakistani sponsored insurgency in India's part of the disputed Kashmir 
region. With China, the border dispute is not nearly as serious, though there is mutual 
distrust between the two countries and a substantial Indian troop presence has been 
maintained along the Sino-Indian border since the two countries fought a short but 
vicious war in 1962.9 
India has arranged its conventional and non-conventional forces to deal with 
perceived threats from both Pakistan and China. The bulk of India! s forces are arrayed 
against Pakistan, but a substantial troop presence is manitained against China. " The 
Sino-Pakistan strategic partnership has created significant concern in India since China 
has had few qualms about selling Pakistan missile technology and has possibly supplied 
Pakistan with reliable designs for atomic weapons. " It is the perceived threat of the 
Sino-Pakistan nexus that prompted India to continue with the development of its nuclear 
' Compared to the India-Pakistan border, the Sino-Indian border is a 
zone of tranquility. Daily artillery and machine gun duels errupt along the 
Line of Control in Kashmir, while along the Sino-Indian border, the biggest 
problem is the smuggling of contraband goods. This was discussed with Lt. 
General IGI in an interview with the author on 25 March 1998 in New Delhi. 
10 Interviews with Mr. 'C' between March 1996/April 1997 in London and 
New Delhi. A breakdown of the Indian army is given in Chapter Four. 
India maintains 6.5 divisions along the China border in peacetime. This can 
be doubled to 13 divisions in the event of war with China alongside large 
numbers of special forces and paramilitary troops. While the Sino-Indian 
border is not as tense as the India-Pakistan border, the author was informed 
that Indian does not consider this to be a permanent state of affairs and 
remains wary of Chinese intentions. 
11 In Chapter Three, China's involvement in selling M-11 missiles and 
manufacturing technology to Pakistan is discussed. 
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weapons capability and initiate work into ballistic missiles. " 
China is an established nuclear power, having detonated a nuclear weapon in 
1964. This provided the initial impetus to the Indian nuclear program - as is discussed 
later - and is still used as the primary justification for the 'Agni' Intermediate Range 
Ballistic Missile program. " Though India and China have not gone to war since 1962, 
and although India has dramatically improved its conventional military position against 
China, to the extent where India holds air superiority and virtually numerical parity in 
the Sino-Indian theatre, India still remains suspicious of Chinese intentions and 
perceives itself to be at least at a peripheral threat from Chinese nuclear weapons. 
With regards to Pakistan, the situation is somewhat different. Two major wars 
were fought, first in 1965 and then in 1971 where India scored a major victory over 
Pakistan's forces in what was then East Pakistan, but in neither war was India able to, 
nor did it really try to, decisively defeat Pakistan in the West. " 
Nuclear weapons became a major part of the India-Pakistan equation during the 
Winter of 1986/1987. "India long believed, with some justification, that Pakistan was, 
and still is, fomenting terrorism and insurgency in India since the mid-1980s. This was 
" This was the view of Lt. General IG' in an interview with the author 
on 25 March 1998 
13 According to Lt. General 'G',, India seems to think of China as a long 
term threat and believes that nuclear weapons and delivery systems need to be 
developed to counter this threat. Interview with Lt. General IG' - 25 March 
1998. This was also the view of Mr. 'C' - interviews between March 1996 & 
April 1997 and Air Marshal 'E' - interview in March 1998. 
14 See Lt. General S. Singh, India's Wars Since Inder)endence: The 
Liberation of Bangladesh & The Defence of the Western Border ( New Delhi: 
Vikas Publishing House, 1981 ) 
15 Details of this come in Chapter Two 
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particularly the case in Punjab, though there were some signs in the late-1980s of the 
emergence of the Kashmir insurgency. India believed that Pakistan soughtt the 
balkanization of India, or at the very least, to create such internal turmoil in India so as 
to facilitate a Pakistani territorial grab in Kashmir. " This was, and is still, used to justify 
the existence and continual modernization of India! s huge conventional military forces. 
The Indian conventional forces outnumber their Pakistani counterparts by a 
substantial margin. 17 Moreover, India also began experimenting with new tactics 
involving the use of massed armour and mechanized infantry formations and in 1986- 
87, conducted a series of military exercises that would facilitate the bisection of 
Pakistan. In response to this, Pakistan brought itself to the verge of nuclear 
weaponization so as to deter India. This, in turn, sparked a resurrection of India's own 
nuclear weapons program so as to prevent any nuclear blackmail on the part of Pakistan. 
The India-Pakistan nuclear race that started more than a decade ago has acquired 
a momentum all of its own with neither country trusting the other sufficiently to give up 
its nuclear option. Although China was the principal reason for India initiating a nuclear 
weapons program, Pakistan has now overtaken China in India! s nuclear and 
conventional threat perceptions owing to the rise in cross-border terrorism and tension 
over Kashmir. In fact, India has not vigorously pursued its nuclear deterrent against 
China as can be seen from the leisurely pace of theAgni'IRBM program and the slow 
16 India sees the hand of Pakistan's 'infamous' Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) behind almost all terrorist attacks in India. Recent 
operations in Kashmir have captured a number of ISI trained Afghan 
'mujaheddin' - interviews with Mr. 'Cl in January 1998 
"' Chapter Four provides details of the Indian and Pakistani armed 
forces. 
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pace of the nuclear weapons program immediately after the 1974 atomic test. However, 
the nuclear program and the 'Prithvil missile program have been accorded a high priority 
for possible use against Pakistan. " 
So where do nuclear weapons fit into India! s threat perceptions ? India views 
nuclear weapons as an ultimate deterrent against both conventional military threats and 
the fear of balkanization, from domestic insurgency sponsored by foreign powers as well 
as providing a deterrent against nuclear attack. " In one way, nuclear weapons are very 
much a part of India! s internal security apparatus. This does not mean that India would 
use a nuclear weapon against an insurgent group. Rather it serves to warn foreign 
powers - namely Pakistan and China - that India could, and would, inflict unacceptable 
damage on them should they attempt to balkanize India. 
The Evolution of India's Defence Poli 
The creation of a defence policy for an independent India dates back to 1945 
when the British colonial authorities in India began demobilising the 2.5 million strong 
Indian army of the Second World War. Most British and Indian military writers and 
analysts argued that a regional approach to Indian security should be adopted. 'o One 
proposal was for India to form the nucleus of a regional Commonwealth force. These 
'a See Chapter Three - section dealing with the Indian missile program 
" This was revealed to the author in an interview with Lt. General IGI 
on 25 May 1998 
20L. J. Kavic, India's Quest for Securitv, ( London: University of 
Cambridge Press, 1967 ), p. 19 For a concise, yet detailed account of the 
Indian army during the period 1945-1947, see C. C. Trench, The Indian Army and the Kina's Enemies: 1900-1947 ( London: Thames & Hudson, 1988 )This book 
provides details on the expanison of the Indian army in World War 2, its 
combat record and on its post-war demobilization. 
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proposals led to a re-assessment of the required size and strength of the armed forces. 
The Indian army was to be reduced from a size of 2.5 million to about ten 
infantry divisions, an armoured division, an airborne division, fIfty frontier-defence 
battalions and sixty-three internal security battalions . 
21 The Indian navy was to be built 
around a nucleus of three cruisers and the Indian air-force was to be doubled to a 
strength of twenty squadrons. ' This plan came to nought because of the turbulence in 
the Indian subcontinent. The armed forces were forced to commit themselves to the 
difficult task of protecting refugees and establishing relief camps. Moreover, the 
partition of British India into India and Pakistan had a direct impact on the Indian armed 
forces which were divided between India and Pakistan in the ratio 2: 1, effectively 
ending any attempts to initiate the reorganization plan mentioned above. India! s share 
amounted to 280,000 men in an army of four infantry divisions with some artillery and 
armour; a navy of 11,000 personnel with four sloops, two frigates and one corvette, and 
an air-force of seven fighter squadrons and a single transport squadron. 23 
The new Indian government, led by Jawaharlal Nehru, was unfamiliar with 
defence issues. Nehru, along with much of the leadership of the Indian National 
" ibid p. 20 & P. 239 
22 loc. cit. Kavic's work represents an extremely concise, but interesting account of the Indian military's immediate post-independence 
period. Kavic's work, though dating from 1967, is one of the few which deals 
with defence policy as well as the armed forces. 
There are a number of other more detailed accounts, some of them being 
written in the 1960s and 1970s. Many of these, however deal with the 1962 
Sino-Indian war and not, as such with the post-independence Indian military. 
See: Lt. General S. L. Menezes, The Indian Army, ( New Delhi: Viking, 1993 ) 
Maj. General D. K Palit, War in High Himalaya, (London: C. Hurst & Co. 1991) 
Lt. General L. P. Sen, Slender was the Threa_d (Hyderabad: Orient Longman 1969) 
Air Chief Marshal P. C. Lal, My years with the IAF ( New Delhi: Lancer, 1986 ) 
23 Kavic, India's Quest for Security, p. 41 
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Congress, had spent much of the Second World War in prison and played no role in 
formulating defence policy. 24 As a result, Indian defence policy in the post-war period 
was formulated by an inexperienced government. 
After independence, Prime Minister Nehru argued that India's peace and security 
could not be insured through alliance systems and military expansion. " Instead, Nehru 
proposed to build India's defence and foreign policies around the five principles of 
Tanchseel'. These five principles of peaceful co-existence with communist states were 
first embodied in the Sino-Indian Treaty of 1954 as Nehru's government was keen to 
establish good relations with China. 
India's policy of non-alignment had serious consequences for the Indian armed 
forces. The Indian military, unlike their Pakistani counterparts, was unable to obtain 
significant United States military aid because of India! s friendship with communist 
countries. A rather more serious effect of the Tanchsheel' policy was that India! s border 
with China was not adequately defended. While there was the purchase of some new 
equipment, ther&was no expansion of the Indian armed forces and defence budgets for 
essential maintenance and war wastage reserves were often savagely cut. '6 
India and Pakistan had fought a war over the disputed Kashmir region between 
24 In fact, the Indian goverment requested that the former Viceroy - 
Lord Louis Mountbatten - become Governor-General immediately after 
independence to lend his military expertise so that effective convoys for 
refugees could be organized. Even this task was beyond the existing expertise 
of the new Indian government. See Collins & Lapierre, Freedom at 
Midniahl, pp. 363-366 
25 R. G. C. Thomas, 'The Growth of India's Military Powerl, p. 39 in 
R. Babbage & S. Gordon ed., Indials Strategic Future (London: MacMillan, 1992) 
" Some new fighter aircraft and 250 Centurion tanks were purchased in 
the 1950s. For a useful summary of Indian military procurements in the 1950s 
and 1960s, see C. Smith, India's Ad Hoc Arsenal ( New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994 ) 
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1947 and 1949. As a result, almost all of India! s combat units and military infrastructure 
were designed to meet the Pakistani threat. India's defence plans assumed that Pakistan 
would initiate action in Kashmir, leading to an Indian counter-attack along other fronts. 
The Indian army was to concentrate its full strength against Pakistan, to defeat the 
Pakistani army and, if necessary, to occupy or destroy the Pakistani cities of Lahore and 
Sialkot. " 
The possible threat from the People's Republic of China was deliberately 
downplayed by the Indian government which was attempting to forge a friendly 
relationship with the then quasi-pariah communist regime. In fact, army units in Eastern 
India were either deployed for counter-insurgency duties in the troubled North-Eastern 
States or for the defence of Calcutta. The defence of the China border was entrusted to 
the lightly armed personnel of the Central Reserve Police Force. " Artillery and logistical 
support was non-existent and communications, both by radio and by road, were 
precarious at best. There were a number of air-force bases located in the vicinity of the 
North-Eastern border with China, but these lacked infrastructure and few combat 
aircraft were based at these locations. 29 
The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 came as a shock to the Indian government, 
though not really to the Indian military. Along the North-East frontier, Indian forces 
were defeated after a number of incorrect command decisions and the induction of 
poorly equipped reinforcements, none of whom were properly acclimatized, did nothing 
27 Kavic, India's Quest for Securit , p. 37 
ibid. p. 87 
29 Interview with Mr. 'Fl - 23 March 1998 
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to halt the Chinese advance. The government had earlier ignored demands by the army 
for the creation of dedicated mountain divisions and the building of suitable 
infrastructure to allow for a successful defence of the border with China. 30 
The exception to this general trend of humiliating defeats was the situation in 
Ladakh. Here, an anny brigade had been in position since 1959 and had devised a 
reasonably effective layered defence plan. Though some tactical withdrawals to 
secondary defensive positions occurred, Indian forces remained cohesive and effective 
combat units in the Ladakh sector. " 
The aftermath of the humiliating defeat suffered by India in this short but sharp 
border war saw a major reassessment of India! s defence policy. The Indian government 
recognized that it had to contend with both Pakistani and Chinese military threats and, 
as such, troops, equipment, defence plans and an effective defence policy had to be 
provided to deal adequately with the new strategic environment. This has remained the 
cornerstone of Indian defence policy ever since, the dual threats from Pakistan and 
China constantly being cited by the Indian leadership, though China is perceived to be a 
much less likely adversary. Moreover, one of the reasons for the massive military 
reorganization and modernization program that ensued was to ensure that the Indian 
government and its politicians would not have to face the fury of the Indian public, 
which was of course also the electorate, if another military defeat occurred. 
The post war period saw a dramatic increase in size and capability of the Indian 
Kavic, India's Quest for Security, p. 96 
31 ibid p. 176 
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armed forces. Although the expansion was comprehensive, it was still essentially 
defensive. The thrust of Indian defence policy was revolved around what R. G. C. Thomas 
calls therninimalist' perspective of being able to fight one'full'war and onehalf war. 32 
In military terms, this means that India was capable of fighting a war on land, sea and in 
the air against Pakistan while being able to fight a defensive border war with China. 
Unlike the situation in the 1980s and 1990s, China was seen as ultimately the 
most significant threat throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and although the 1965 and 
1971 wars with Pakistan proved that the Pakistani forces were still a substantial 
adversary, India's leadership viewed China! s increasing power with growing concern. To 
this end, despite the substantial growth in India! s naval capability and a widening gap in 
Indian air superiority, India has still confined itself to being able to fight a full-scale 
offensive war with Pakistan, while deploying sufficient forces to fight only a defensive 
war against China. 
Even the growth in India! s nuclear and missile capability, which has now reached 
the stage where India has a considerable ballistic missile potential and a large stock of 
fissile material, has to be seen in light of the fact that there has been no perceptible 
change in India! s basic strategy versus China and Pakistan. Nuclear weapons are an 
extension of thisone, and a half wars capability. No meaningful power projection 
doctrine has yet emerged in India. 
R. G. C. Thomas believes that India has moved on from this position to one where 
India has the capacity to fightone full and three half wars. This means that India would 
" Thomas, 'Growth of Indian Military Power', p. 43 
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be able to conduct a full war with Pakistan, conduct a defensive border war with China, 
combined with a latent nuclear weapons capability and the ability to intervene in 
neighbouring Indian Ocean islands. " This may be considered to be India's current 
strategic position. India may eventually deploy IRBMs and perhaps ICBMs openly, 
however, there seems to be no evidence of India shifting its basic threat perceptions in 
the near future. Pakistan and, to a lesser extent China, remain, in the view of the Indian 
government, the two major military threats faced by India and to this end, substantial 
conventional forces and a significant nuclear potential are seen to be vital to preserving 
India! s ability to deter an attack from either country. 
India has not yet attempted to deploy nuclear weapons in an attempt to give itself 
a higher profile - much to the chagrin India's vociferous pro-'bomb' lobby. However, the 
fact that India is a de-facto nuclear power ( of a sort at least ) needs to be taken into 
account by all foreign powers. As far as power projection is concerned, India is already 
the dominant power in South Asia and nuclear weapons merely serve to emphasize that 
point rather that carve out a new role for India. China and Japan are the major powers in 
East Asia and South East Asia, and India, even with nuclear weapons, would not really 
be able to assert its pre-eminence in these regions. 
The Evolution of Pakistan's Defence Polia 
Pakistan, unlike India, has only one major adversary - India. Since its inception, 
Pakistan has dedicated its defence policy to dealing with India by both conventional and 
33 ibid. p. 43-45 
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non-conventional means. To this end, Pakistan has a well developed military 
establishment with a highly professional army and an increasingly capable nuclear 
weapons production base. 
In the first decade after independence, Pakistan, like India, depended on the 
United Kingdom for its arms supplies. However, In 1954, Pakistan began a long and 
fruitful military relationship with the United States. In May 1954, Pakistan signed a 
Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States. " This led to a substantial 
influx of modem American weaponry into the Pakistani army and air force and to the 
eventual acquisition of Pakistan's ( and South Asia! s ) first submarine. " 
Pakistan's desire to incorporate the region of Kashmir has remained an important 
comerstone of Pakistani defence policy since 1947.1 In 1947-49,1965 and from the late 
1980s, Pakistan has attempted to wrest control of the state from India by means of 
formenting armed insurrection against Indian rule. " 
In 1965, India and Pakistan clashed along their entire border in an inconclusive 
conflict that was marked by tactical conservatism . 
3' The war ended with heavy losses to 
the Pakistani side in terms of both men and material, however, the good performance of 
34 I. Anthony, The Arms Trade and Medium Powers: Case Studies of India 
and Pakistan 1947-1990 ( Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992 )p. 71 
35 ibid pp. 195-200 
36 Kashmir, with a Muslim majority, technically should have gone to Pakistan at the time of partition. However, the region's Hindu ruler - after 
an invasion by Pakistani supported Pathan tribesmen - acceeded to India. 
17 While Pakistan continues to deny supplying arms to Kashmiri terrorist 
groups, there is substantial proof of Pakistani involvement upto and including the supply of weapons and the provision of training facilities 
39 See Lt. General H. Singh, War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965 
New Delhi: Lancer, 1991 ) 
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the army and air force led many in the Pakistani government to treat this unfavourable 
stalemate as a victory. " 
In 197 1, however, there was no doubt about the outcome. Pakistan lost one half 
of its territory and population along with large numbers of men and substantial 
quantities of equipment in a war that lasted only two weeks. 'O Pakistan's humiliation 
was further compounded by the fact that neither the United States nor China was able to 
prevent the loss of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. 
Out of this humiliation, and now forced to face the might of the Indian war 
machine along a single border, Pakistan realised the need for a nuclear deterrent and so 
the 1971 war with India led directly to the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. Since 
the 1971 war, Pakistan appears to have concentrated on matching India at the 
operational level in terms of conventional military forces, maintaining a nuclear 
deterrent against a full-scale Indian offensive while seeking to pursue its objectives in 
Kashmir by means of a proxy warý' 
Pakistan has one other major security concern - Afghanistan. " The turmoil that 
has plagued Afghanistan has led to an influx of refugees into Pakistan as well as to 
39 The Pakistani Air Force, in particular, has created many myths about 
its performance in the 1965 war with India. One Indian air historian has 
argued that this was partly responsible for Pakistani overconfidence in 
facing India in 1971. Interview with Mr. 1F1 in March 1998 
40 See Major K. C. Praval, The Indian Army after Independence, 
New Delhi: Lancer, 1993 ) for an excellent account of the war 
Five. 
" There is a greater discussion of Operational Parity after Chapter 
42 The author would like to differentiate between a 'security threat, 
and a 'security concern'. Pakistan feels threatened by India's military 
forces. In the case of Afghanistan, Pakistan is not threatened in the 
physical sense, but remains concerned about the turmoil on its northern 
border. 
37 
clashes along the Afghan-Pakistan border. However, with the rise of the Pakistani 
backed Taliban militia and their recent success, Pakistan must view Afghanistan with 
some satisfaction. " 
The relationship Pakistan has had with the United States has enabled Pakistan to 
procure a number of sophisticated weapons systems, including F- 16 fighters. However, 
it is China that has provided Pakistan with the bulk of its conventional weapons and 
weapons technology. ' This has enabled Pakistan to maintain military forces capable of 
providing a substantial defence in the event of an Indian offensive. 
In the mid- I 980s, as will be discussed in the next chapter, Pakistan achieved 
what might be termed an'initial operational capability with its nuclear deterrent. This 
effectively limited any kind of conventional military response that India could mount to 
deal with Pakistani support for insurgent groups within India. 
Pakistan has continued to support subversive activity in India, in spite of its 
vigorous claims to the contrary. " First in Punjab and now in Kashmir, Pakistan has 
succeeded in tying down a sizeable number of Indian troops, though perhaps not as 
16 
many as Pakistan might claim. Moreover, Pakistan has succeeded in alienating a large 
section of the Kashmiri muslim population from the Indian government. However, India 
43 The rise of the Taliban has been meteoric. See BBC World Service 
reports 1996-1998 at http: //www. bbc. co. uk 
44 Anthony, Arms Trade and Medium Powers, pp. 195-200 
45 The author has seen some photographic evidence of tangible Pakistani 
support for terrorist activity in India. 
"' Pakistan has, on occassion, alleged that 600,000 Indian troops are in 
Kashmir. The actual figure is closer to 250-300,000 and most of these are not 
assigned to counter-insurgency duties. This was revealed to the author in 
interviews with Mr. 'C' between May 1996 and February 1998. 
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has shown no inclination to relinquish its claim to Kashmir any more than has Pakistan. 
Intemal security concems 
It is well known that both India and Pakistan have quite severe internal security 
problems. India faces serious problems in its North Eastern States and in Kashmir and 
experiences some turmoil in states such as Bihar. Pakistan, on the other hand, faces 
major problems in its Sindh province and its North Western frontier is virtually 
ungovernable. It is outside the scope of this thesis to go into any detail on the internal 
security problems of India and Pakistan, even though there is a link between internal 
security and nuclear weapons. This section will give an outline of the considerable 
manpower and effort being used by these two countries to control their internal 
security. 
47 
India deploys paramilitary internal security forces numbering close to a million 
men under arms. While these forces are all armed, with a mixture of obsolete and 
relatively modem small arms, their standards of training and operations is very variable. 
Some forces, such as the Assam Rifles, the Border Security Force and the Indo-Tibetan 
Border Police, are very well equipped and, in the case of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police 
and, to a lesser extent the Assam Rifles, are highly trained. The Border Security Force, 
which is the world's largest paramilitary force, is reasonably well trained and has a fairly 
impressive combat record - although is guilty of numerous human rights violations in 
" For an excellent summary of India's internal security forces see 
R. G. C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986 )pp. 72-85 
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Kashmir. "' 
Other forces, such as the Central Reserve Police Force and the State Police 
commandos, are equipped with modem small arms and regarded as being quite effective 
by the Indian public. " However, the State Police forces, which deploy fbur hundred 
thousand paramilitary personnel and over a million police personnel, are poorly 
equipped and have a very variable, though usually poor, standard of training. " 
Despite these forces being available, and because of the inadequacies of the 
police forces, over a hundred thousand anny personnel were deployed on internal 
security operations of one kind or another. This presents a substantial drain on the 
Indian defence budget and has led to problems of morale amongst the troops deployed 
on these operations. " Iffie creation and deployment of a new force, the Rashtriya Rifles 
- which replaced over a third of the army personnel on internal security functions - has 
not proved to be as effective as hoped. " 
Pakistan's army has not been deployed as widely or as frequently for internal 
security duties, however they did spend several years unsuccessfully attempting to 
48 The BSF has a strength of 185,000 see: Govt. of India Ministry of Home 
Affairs Annual Report 1996-97, p. 28 
" The Assam Rifles, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Border Security Force, 
CRPF and police commandos carry weapons similar to those used by the Indian 
army. These include 7.62mm self-loading rifles and machine guns and some 
mortars. The BSF has 20 artillery groups with old artillery pieces phased out 
of regular army service. 
'0 The Indian police carry a mix of 0.303 bolt action rifles and aging 
submachine guns. Some light machine guns are also available. Some progress 
has been made with regards to issuing self-loading rifles to State Police 
forces. 
51 Interviews with Mr. 'Cl- March 1998 
52 There is a move to replace the Rashtriya Rifles with a dedicated COIN 
force equipped and trained to army standards with dedicated COIN officers. 
Interview with Mr. 'C' - January 1998 
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restore order in Karachi. 53 Pakistan's police forces, which are better equipped (although 
not necessarily better trained), than their Indian counterparts, have been even more 
unsuccessful in maintaining law and order in whole swathes of the Sindh and Punjab 
provinces. ' The difference between India and Pakistan is that violence in many areas of 
Pakistan is associated more with organized crime, while in India, numerous ethnic and 
religious factors come to play. 
Both India and Pakistan must therefore maintain, at great expense, substantial 
paramilitary forces that are used almost exclusively for internal security operations. 
India! s internal security forces have been stretched to their limits as India! s beleaguered 
police forces have found themselves incapable of dealing with frequent terrorist attacks 
or counter-insurgency operations. "In Pakistan, the internal security forces are caught in 
what seems to be an unwinable battle. They face terrorists, narcotics traffickers as well 
as the private armies of the various political and criminal factions in the country. " 
Neither country is in any immediate danger of disintegration, but the internal 
security issue does create an air of insecurity that does not help build trust between the 
two nations. When this is combined with the fact that the two countries routinely blame 
53 The author was told that the Pakistani army unilaterally decided to 
withdraw from Karachi. Interviews with Mr. 'C' - Jan. /March 1997 
54 Pakistan also deployed its paramilitary Rangers in Karachi. These are 
still performing internal security duties in the city with mixed results. 
55 Some Indian paramilitary units have been airlifted from one part of 
the country to the other as many as 33 times in a single year. This creates a 
substantial morale problem in the battalions of the paramilitary forces. 
Interview with Lt. General'G' - March 1998 
56 In Pakistan, the availability of sophisticated firearms to the 
general public is frightening. The author has seen photographs of women and 
children in Karachi toting assault rifles. - 
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each others' intelligence agencies ( with some truth ) for terrorist attacks, and the extent 
of the problem becomes distressingly clear. This lack of trust and the environment of 
mutual suspicion that this encourages provide the basis for an unstable security situation 
in South Asia. 
The Introduction of Nuclear Weapons into the India-Pakistan equation 
While India tested a nuclear device in 1974, nuclear weapons did not really enter 
the India-Pakistan security equation until after what appears to have been a major crisis 
in the winter of 1986-87. This crisis, which followed a series of massive Indian military 
manoeuvres, apparently brought both countries to the brink of war. It is not the purpose 
or intention of this thesis to explain 'Brasstacks'and the crisis that evolved around it in 
any great detail. However, it is useful to examine many aspects of the incident, 
including the coriftision and developments that resulted in the crisiS. 
57 
In the mid-1 980s, the Indian army began a program to increase its mechanised 
formations and to integrate annour, artillery and mechanised infantry into powerful 
striking forces capable of overpowering their Pakistani opponents. The exercise held in 
1986-87 was codenamedBrasstacks'and was the largest series of exercises ever held in 
South Asia, involving up to 150,000 troops. 
What sparked concern in Pakistan was not so much the size and scale of the 
exercises ( though there was significant concern about this as well ), but their location, 
57 An extremely detailed account of the 'Brasstacks' crisis can be found 
in K. Bajpai, P. Chari, P. Cheema, S. Cohen & S. Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond- 
PerceDtion and Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995) 
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Srasstacks' was held east of the Indira Gandhi Canal in Rajasthan. " At the time, this 
corresponded with new military thinking in the Indian army which held that Punjab, 
unlike in 1965 and 1971, would no longer be the chief theatre of operations. " India 
sought to adopt a defensive posture in Punjab and in Jammu and Kashmir and take 
advantage of India! s qualitative and quantitative superiority in annour in the Rajasthan- 
Sind general area. India believed that Pakistan would not be unduly concerned by the 
scale of 'Brasstacks' since a massive engineering operation would be needed to cross the 
Indira Gandhi Canal. However, Pakistan was increasingly worried since it was 
extremely sensitive to the threat of being bisected by an Indian offensive launched from 
this general area. Given the prevailing mistrust between the two countries and the 
sensitivity of the exercise area with respect to its proximity to the India-Pakistan border, 
it would have been expected that lines of communication between the civil and military 
leaderships in both countries would be kept open. This was not done. ' 
The Director Generals of Military Operations ( DGMOs ) of India and Pakistan 
are linked with a 'hotline". however, little information came from the Indian DGMO to 
61 his Pakistani counterpart and this served to significantly highten tensions. The 
Pakistanis were particularly concerned about reports that Indian troops were carrying 
first and second line live ammunition on the exercise. When asked, the Indian DGMO 
58 Bajpai, Cheema, Cohen, Chari & Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond, p. 25 
59 This was due to the construction of a system of linear defences in 
the Punjab sector. This is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 4. 
f'o Lt. Gen. A. M. Vohra, 'Lessons of Border Tensionlin The Tribune: IlFeb. 1987 
61 Bajpai, Cheema, Chari, Cohen & Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond, p. 54 
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professed ignorance about this fact. ' PakistaTfs requests for infonnation on the exercise 
were met, in September and October 1986, with curt and evasive answers from Indian 
Army Headquarters. " Naturally enough, Pakistan became increasingly suspicious of 
Indian intentions. " 
The Pakistanis responded with a series of countermoves that saw Army Reserve 
North (ARN) and Army Reserve South (ARS, ) deploying. These deployments 
theoretically enabled Pakistan to either capture a salient in Punjab or to attack Jammu 
and Punjab simultaneously. "' After some initial hesitation, India ordered its troops to 
man forward defensive positions and the two countries stood on the brink of war. 
However, after a hectic round of diplomatic activity, which saw American and Soviet 
moves to diffuse the crisis, both India and Pakistan began a phased withdrawal from the 
border areas. ' 
The relevance of the 1986-87 events to this thesis really lie in the impetus that 
the Brasstacks' crisis gave to the Pakistani nuclear program. It was soon after this crisis 
that Dr. A. Q. Khan in an interview with Yhe Observer of London, admitted that Pakistan 
was in possession of a nuclear weapon and was making enriched uranium at the Kahuta 
uranium enrichment plant. "' Soon after this interview, questions were raised in the 
6' ibid p. 55 
13 ibid P. 54 
61 The somewhat aggressive personality of India's Chief of Amy Staff, 
General Krishnaswamy Sundarji, did not help matters. 
" Chari, Cheema, Cohen, Bajpai & Ganguly, Brasstacks and Bevond, p. 32 
66 ibid pp33-36 
67 United Press International: February 28 1987 
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Indian parliament about Dr. Khan's statement and demands were made for a 
reconsideration of India! s nuclear policy. " Shortly after, Reuters news agency reported 
that Dr. Khan had told Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar that Pakistan did not need to 
conduct a'ground test' since testing could be done through simulations in a laboratory. " 
These statements and the subsequent Indian reaction, brought nuclear weapons into the 
South Asian conflict. 
One issue that arises out of the 'Brasstacks' crisis is that of Indian anny 
operational planning. The Brasstacks'plan has been used as the basis for numerous war 
scenarios, including those conjured up by the vaunted American RAND corporation. ' 
This is extremely misleading. The Indian army no longer believes theBrasstacks'model 
to be a realistic operational plan and with the demise of General Sundarji's 'Army Plan 
2000%, the Indian army has concentrated its efforts on being able to inflict heavy attrition 
on Pakistan's armed forces rather than on seeking any major territorial gain. " 
Western and Indian analysts continue to refer toArmy Plan 2000' and its 
operational doctrine, partly because it was extremely well publicized, and also because it 
60 A. Tarnowski, Reuters Ltd.: March 1 1987 
69 R. Bajpai, Reuters Ltd. : March 2 1987 
'0 This is exemplified in A. J. Tellis, Stability in South Asia, (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 1997). This is one of the worst assessments of the South Asian 
military that the author has ever read. Much of it is based on press reports 
on the state of the Indian military during the 1991-1992 period. No attempt 
seems to have been made to update information. When the author conducted 
independent research on the true state of the Indian army and air force, a 
very different picture emerged. 
71 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four 
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represents ahi-tech'mechanised method of warfare that is appealing to journalists. ' 
The fact is that the possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan has severely curtailed 
Indian objectives. Should Pakistan feel that it is at risk of being bisected or otherwise 
dismembered, there is no doubt in the minds of Indian planners that Pakistan would 
consider the use of nuclear weapons. ' Indian operations, therefore, have had to be 
planned with this in mind. ' 
As mentioned before, the Brasstacks' crisis brought the nuclear factor into the 
India-Pakistan equation. In 1990, however, another crisis erupted over Pakistani support 
to Kashmiri terrorist groups. Different versions of the events that followed are given. 
One scenario described byjournalist Seymour Hersh, talks of Pakistani F-16s being 
anned with nuclear weapons and ready for launch against India. " Others assert that 
there was no crisis at all in 1990 and that the mistakes of 1987 were not repeated. ' The 
author has noticed that Indian analysts tend to be of the view that no crisis occured, in 
72 The RAND report mentioned in footnote 32 is particularly bad in this 
regard. The report, which was prepared for the United States Army, does not 
mention the fact that 'Army Plan 20001 has been abandoned and bases all its 
conventional war scenarios on this obsolete model. 
73 Interviews with Mr. 1C1 -April/September 1997 and Lt. General 'G'-March 
1998 
14 Army Plan 2000 was therefore irrelevant. Moreover, the plan was also 
viewed as fundamentally unworkable. The author spoke to several Indian 
officers in 1996 and 1998 and it was said that the plan was far too costly 
and was unrealistic in several regards. 
75 S. Hersh, 'On the Nuclear Edge' pp. 56-73 - The New Yorker: March 29 
1993. Hersh based his article entirely on an interview with a former deputy- 
director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The report seemed to 
suggest that nuclear war was only averted by American intervention. The piece 
was fascinating reading, but sorely lacking in evidence. 
"6 See Bajpai, Chari, Cheema, Cohen & Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond, 
pp. 133-134 
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1990, while American journalists such as Seymour Hersh, seem to believe othenvim' 
What the crisis of 1987 and the events of 1990 suggest is that both countries are 
aware of each others'nuclear capabilities and that they are reluctant to pursue military 
objectives that would spark a nuclear response from the other. However, the two 
incidents also illustrate the extremely high degree of tension between India and 
Pakistan. 
In addition, these two incidents also indicate that there is an atmosphere of 
considerable mistrust and suspicion between the political and military elites of both 
countries. That an Indian military exercise almost led to a war in 1987 is both 
frightening and not wholly unexpected. So long as the two countries are reluctant to 
share the information necessary for reducing the level of mistrust between their political 
and military elites, it is not inconceivable that a repetition of the Brasstacks' crisis could 
occur. 
Foreitin Involvement -'Blind -Eyesand the 
Limits of Influence 
Indian and Pakistan nuclearized in front of the whole world. By a combination of 
neglecting legitimate security concerns and by tuming'blind-eyes', the influence of 
several foreign powers has been severely curtailed and their credibility damaged. 
Through much of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a supporter of India, while 
the United States and China supported Pakistan. As mentioned earlier, the United States 
and China provided, and continue to provide, Pakistan with substantial quantities of 
77 The author has learnt that in 1990 neither India nor Pakistan were in 
any position to go to war. Interviews with Mr. 'C' - Feb. 1998. 
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conventional military hardware, while the Soviet Union, and now Russia, supplied, and 
continue to supply, military equipment to India. However, in the case of China and the 
United States, there was something far more seriousr to their cooperation with Pakistan. 
As will be discussed in the next two chapters, China provided extensive 
assistance to the Pakistani nuclear and missile programs. However, the United States 
was responisble, for not of providing material assistance, but of turning a'blind eye'to 
the growing Pakistani nuclear prograrn. 
During the years of the Regan Administration, Pakistan was seen as a valuable 
and loyal ally in the fight against the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan. To this 
end, Pakistan received billions of dollars in American military and economic aid. It has 
been alleged that Pakistan used some of this money to make illegal purchases for its 
nuclear weapons program from suppliers in the United States, Germany and 
Switzerland. ' Not only did the Regan Administration not do anything to stop this, 
successive Republican Administrations continued to certify Pakistan as being'nuclear- 
free! in order to ensure a continuation in the flow of funds to Pakistan. " This amounted 
to bribing Pakistan for its continued assistance is supporting the war against Soviet 
forces in Afghanistan. What is even more surprising is that the Regan Administration's 
own intelligence analysts were warning about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. 
In 1990, the Bush Administration finally enforced American law and a total aid 
7' Hersh, 'On the Nuclear Edge' p. 57 
79 loc. cit 
Under Ammendments brought in by Larry Pressler and Stephen Solarz, the United 
States government was supposed to cut-off all aid to Pakistan for illegally 
obtaining nuclear-related materials from the United States and for possessing 
nuclear weapons. The Administration was siipposed to certify that Pakistan had 
no nuclear weapons to ensure the continuation of aid. 
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freeze was imposed on Pakistan. ' This left Pakistan betrayed and embittered and less 
willing to accept American calls for restraint on its nuclear weapons program. " In India, 
however, the years of American indifference were seen as evidence of complicity and as 
such India has never believed United States Administration claims that Pakistan 
possessed no nuclear weapons. 82 
In India! s case, while there is evidence, as will be seen in the next chapter, of 
heavy-water smuggling, there is no evidence that either the Soviet Union or Russia 
provided direct assistance to India! s nuclear weapons program. However, the assistance 
provided by China, and the'blind-eyes'tumed by the United States to the Pakistani 
nuclear weapons program has ensured that India views the intentions of both these 
countries with suspicion. 
Nuclear Presti2e 
It cannot be lost on either India or Pakistan that all five permanent members of 
the United Nations Security Council are nuclear powers. India, an aspiring power, sees 
nuclear weapons as the sole reason for the presence of the United Kingdom and France 
on the Security Council and feels particularly incensed that the possession of nuclear 
weapons by the five permanent members is legitimised, while India! s right to such 
These sanctions were then relaxed under the Brown Ammendment which 
was supported by the Clinton Administration. This was seen by some in India 
as continued American complicity in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program 
a' It must be said that it is unclear whether Pakistan ever heeded 
American calls for nuclear restraint. 
82 On March 18 1998, K. Subramanyam - one of India's leading 'hawks'- 
administered a stinging rebuke on Indian television to Professor Stephen 
Cohen for continuing to spout this line. 
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weapons is constantly questioned and doubted. " 
For decades, successive Indian governments have made repeated calls for 
universal nuclear disarmament and have consistently refused to sign the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty on the grounds that it legitimised nuclear weapons in the hands of a 
few nations while denying others that right. " However, India's and Pakistan's nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missile programs are as much about national pride and prestige as 
about security. Since the five 'legitimate' nuclear weapons states are given a great deal of 
influence over international security issues, India and Pakistan seek to translate their de 
facto nuclear status into greater international recognition. India, for example, wants a 
permanent berth on the United Nations Security Council. " 
Pakistan is the only Muslim state in the world with a nuclear program 
sufficiently advanced to produce nuclear weapons without warning. India and Israel 
have expressed fears that Pakistan would assist countries like Saudi Arabia in arming 
their ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. " Moreover, Pakistan apparently provided 
Iraq with significant assistance for Iraq's nuclear weapons progrmn which, like 
3 1989 
83 R. H. Munro, 'Superpower Rising', pp. 17-18 in Time International: April 
84 ibid p. 16 
In recent times, the late Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi put forward a 
comprehensive plan for disarmament. Like all other Indian disarmament 
initiatives, the plan was ignored by the five 'legitimate' nuclear powers. 
Rajiv Gandhi believed that India should be the prime mover towards a non- 
nuclear world. 
15 India is unlikely to ever get this wish. India, with its impeccable 
peacekeeping record and long democratic tradition is not supported by the 
United States or by the United Kingdom. Cynics might say that the United 
States is keen to fill the Security Council with cronies. 
Of' L. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions ( Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1990 ' p. 110 This is nightmare scenario for Israel since Saudi Missiles can 
reach all Israel with impunity. 




Pakistan's, was based on uranium-enrichment technology. " The ability of Pakistan to 
provide its assistance dramatically enhances its prestige in an increasingly anti-Western 
Islamic world. 
The continued possession of nuclear weapons by the five recognized powers 
virtually ensures that moves to dissuade India and Pakistan from pursuing nuclear 
weapons are doomed to fail. Moreover, as has been shown earlier in this chapter, the 
United States, which is potentially the most influential Power in the region, has lost a 
great deal of its credibility thanks to its somewhat inconsistent behaviour regarding 
Pakistatfs nuclear program. China, on the other hand, is a decidedly partizan player, 
providing technical and material assistance to the Pakistani weapons programs. 
Nuclear weapons are now a permanent feature of the India-Pakistan conflict. 
I Both states see these weapons as guarantors of territorial integrity and as the ultimate 
deterrent against an adversary launching a war of dismemberment. Neither side will 
relinquish the nuclear option under any foreseeable circumstance. Moreover, the 
continuing high tension between the two countries means that a war, cannot be ruled 
out. 
07 v Substance to Nuclear Allegations Against Iraq', p. 13 in MidEast 
Markets: December 11 1989 
With the demise of the Iraqi nuclear program following the 1991 war, it as 
yet somewhat unclear as to exactly where and how Pakistan provided 
assistance. 
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MAP# 1: Nuclear establishments in India and Pakistan. 
The Map includes power and research reactors as well as uranium enrichment sites. 
No distinction is made between safeguarded and unsafeguarded reactors. 
Source: D. Albright & T. Zamora, Indiaý Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: All the pieces in 
place', p. 23 in Bulletin of the, 4tomic Scientists., June 1989 
This source adapted the map from L. Spectoes, The Undeclared Bomb ( Cambridge, 
Mass: Ballinger 1988 ), pp. 110-115 & 149-151. 
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Chopkr- 2. - Nuclear CgRa 
Indian Nuclear Capability - Development & Infrastructure: 
India! s nuclear program can trace its ancestry to the creation of the Institute for 
Fundamental Research (IFR) in 1945. Led by a brilliant and enthusiastic Cambridge 
educated physicist - Dr. Homi J. Bhabha - who was to have an enormous influence on 
nuclear research for both military and civilian purposes! 
The IFR! s interest in nuclear energy found a receptive audience in Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru who saw nuclear energy as a source of power capable of fuelling 
India! s economic development and industrial progress. The peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy was emphasised by both Nehru and Bhabha. Bhabha declared that: 
When nuclear energy has been successfully applied for 
power production in, say, a couple of decades from now, India will not have to 
look abroad for its experts, but will find them ready at home? 
Self-reliance was the cornerstone of India! s nuclear program and Bhabha and his 
colleagues were tasked with developing a broad-based, predominantly self-reliant 
nuclear sector which would be the spearhead of technological development in other 
sectors of the Indian economy. ' One year after independence the Indian Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) was set up with a mandate to develop a comprehensive nuclear 
program for civilian purposes. 
' W. E. Burrows & R. Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for 
Sur)erweapons in a-Fracimentina World 
( New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994 ), p. 354 
' B-Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation: The US-Indian Conflict ( New 
Delhi: Orient Longman Ltd., 1993 ), p. 1 This statement outlines the goal that 
India has had with respect to nuclear power - complete self-reliance. 
ibid p. 2 
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Headed by Homi J. Bhabha, the AEC, was to become the linchpin of the current 
Indian nuclear infrastructure. The Indian government gave the AEC clear guidelines that 
self-reliance was to be the ultimate objective: 
India should be able to produce all the basic materials required for the 
utilization of atomic energy ... The special requirements of atomic energy, the 
newness of the field, the strategic nature of its activities and its international 
and political significance have to be borne in mind..! 
By emphasising the peaceful aspects of the nuclear program, Indian scientists 
were able to learn a great deal from Western countries, especially Canada, France and 
the United States of America. In 195 1, the French signed a nuclear cooperation 
agreement that provided for the training of Indian nuclear scientists in France. The 
Indian scientists were also instructed in the process of extracting plutonium from spent 
nuclear fuel -a process critical to the manufacture of atomic bombs with plutonium 
cores. 5 
The United States and Canada provided a great deal of training and equipment 
for Indian scientists, some of this assistance being provided under theAtoms for Peace' 
6 scheme of the Eisenhower administration. The United States began cooperating with 
India for the construction of two nuclear power reactors at Tarapur while the Canadians 
were responsible for the supply of fuel to the CIRUS reactor which was built in India 
with extensive Canadian assistance! These reactors were critical to the early stages of 
' Lod. cit. Quoted from the preamble to the Resolution of the Government 
of India creating the Atomic Energy Commission 1948 
5 Burrows & Windrem, Critical Mass, p. 355 
6 Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 1-8 
' ibid pp. 4-5 
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India! s nuclear program. 
India had the distinction of commissioning Asia! s first nuclear reactor outside the 
then Soviet Union. TheApsara! research reactor was indigenously built in India and 
started operating in 1956. ' Located at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, the reactor 
was a light-water/ medium-enriched uranium type which used uranium enriched to 20 - 
50% as a fuel source. 9 As India lacked any sort of uranium enrichment facility at that 
time, the United Kingdom supplied the fuel under a 1955 contract. ' 
The'Apsara! was followed by theCIRUS'40MW research reactor which paved 
the way for nuclear cooperation with both the United States and Canada. This reactor 
was constructed with considerable assistance from Canada, although the major part of 
the technical effort involved in the construction of'CIRUS'came from India. " As the 
reactor was a heavy-water/ natural uranium type, India initially needed external 
assistance for both the uranium fuel and the heavy-water coolant. 12 
Under a 1956 contract, Ottawa provided the initial requirement of fuel, but, §ince 
Canada had not yet fully developed its own heavy-water industry, the United States, 
under the auspices of President Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace'policy signed an 
agreement for the sale of 18.9 metric tonnes of heavy-water on March 16th. 1956.13 In 
a ibid p. 4 
' L. S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions: The Sgread of Nuclear WeaDons 1989- 
1=, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990 ), p. 86 
Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation, p. 4 fn. 10 
" ibid p. 5 
12 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 87 
13 Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 5-6 
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order to ensure that their assistance was not used for the development of nuclear 
weapons, both the United States and Canada obtained from India assurances that the 
heavy-water, the reactor, and the products obtained from it were to be used only for 
peaceful purposes. " There was, however, one very serious flaw- none of the 
agreements barred, either explicitly or implicitly, the use of the material in peaceful 
nuclear explosions (PNEs). 15 Dr. Bhabha consciously sought to avoid any agreements 
that would 'compromise, restrict or limit India! s complete control over the reactor and its 
OUtpUt. sJ6 
These developments were undertaken in India with the aim of establishing a 
viable and self-reliant civilian nuclear industry. Prime Minister Nehru remained 
committed to the principle of a peaceful non-nuclear role throughout his tenure as 
India! s leader. However, in the 1960s, his illusions were shattered by a Chinese invasion 
in 1962, and by China's detonation of a nuclear device in 1964. 
The Chinese invasion of 1962 was sudden and totally unexpected by India! s 
government. The Indian armed forces, suffering from years of neglect and from a 
fundamentally flawed forward deployment plan, was defeated in a series of bruising 
encounters in India's north-east and was under heavy pressure in the northernmost 
regions of the country. Nehru's government now began a major review of India! s defence 
requirements. This marked the begining of India! s quest for a nuclear weapons 
capability, though it would be more than a decade before India! s first nuclear test.. 
14 Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation, p. 6 
15 Loc. cit. 
16 ibid p. 7 
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Almost exactly two years later, on 16 October 1964, China tested a 20 kiloton 
atomic bomb. 17 This sent shockwaves through the Indian establishment and calls were 
made for the deployment of a nuclear arsenal. The panic generated forced Dr. Homi J. 
Bhabha to give public assurance that India could produce nuclear weapons within 18 
months of getting political clearance. " 
Nehru's successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, came under increasing pressure from 
Bhabha and the rest of the nuclear establishment to carry out an underground test in 
January 1965. Shastri successfully resisted such pressure, but, shortly after the Chinese 
test in 1964, he is believed to have given the go-ahead for a project to reduce the lead 
time for the production of nuclear weapons from 18 months to just six. " 
India! s technical capacity had increased to a point where, by June 1965, enough 
plutonium for an atomic bomb would have been produced. Moreover, India was not 
neglecting the production of materials needed for thermonuclear weapons. By 1970, 
India would have the technical capacity to manufacture a bomb per week. 'O This 
increasing capability was largely due to the early assistance of Canada and the United 
States and the capabilities of the CIRUS reactor. Moreover, by 1966, India had acquired 
the ability to reprocess plutonium from the CIRUS reactor in the form of a plutonium 
reprocessing plant constructed with assistance from the United States and which was 
17 SIPRI Yearbook 1974: Appendix 13G, p. 507 
K. Subramanyam, India and the Nuclear Challenge 
( New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986 ), p. 222 
19 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 64 
20 G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear DileM= 
( New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968 )F p. 176 
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then capable of reprocessing 30 metric tons of spent fuel per year. " 
The Indian military was rather more cautious about nuclear weapons, being fully 
occupied with a massive expansion and modernization of conventional military forces. 
However, some middle-ranking officers made fairly strident calls for tactical nuclear 
weapons to be deployed to thwart any Chinese attack on India's north-eastern frontiers. 
An extremely articulate and well-reasoned argument in favour of India 
developing nuclear weapons was made by Colonel R-D. Palsokar in 1966.22 Assuming a 
Chinese attack on India! s north-eastem regions, Palsokar creates a scenario where low- 
yield nuclear weapons are used by China to secure a tactical breakthrough. In this 
scenario, Palsokar argued that India would be unable to halt a Chinese advance and that 
huge tracts of territory would be lost. " To deal with this threat, he advocated the 
deployment of a limited number of nuclear weapons. 
Palsokar, along with many other retired military officers argued that a small 
minimum deterrent would easily be within India! s technical and economic reach. 
Quoting Major General D. Som Duttý Palsokar argued that a deterrent force of 50 
plutonium bombs, accrued at the rate of five per year and without an expensive missile- 
based delivery system would cost about $500 million over a ten year period. " Dr. Homi 
J. Bhabha argued that a stockpile of 50 two-megaton thermonuclear bombs would cost 
21 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 86 
22 Col. R. D. Palsokar, Minimum Deterrent: India's nuclear answer to China 
Bombay: Thacker & Co. Ltd., 1969 ), pp. 57-58 
23 ibid p. 59 
24 ibid P. 140 
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25 Rs. 150million. Dr. Sampooran Singh, director of the Terminal Ballistics Research 
Laboratory, went so far as to write: 
A nuclear bomb programme is technically feasible, politically highly desirable, 
strategically inescapable and economically, not only sustainable, but actually 
advantageous. The cost of a nuclear weapons programme would, instead of 
crushing the Indian economy, accelerate growth of industry and technology. 
This would provide 50,000 jobs for engineers, scientists and technicians. " 
However, throughout the 1960s, no action was taken by the Indian government. 
The nuclear program suffered severe setbacks when Prime Minister Shastri died in late 
1965, followed by Dr. Bhabha in an airline accident the following year. Shastri's 
successor, Indira Gandhi, was plagued with many internal and economic problems and 
so nuclear weapons had a low priority. Moreover, there was a decrease in tension 
between India and China and the initial panic had subsided. In addition, the military 
showed no major desire to possess nuclear weapons at that time. While there was no 
overt weaponization, the Indian government was extremely reluctant to relinquish its 
nuclear weapons option. The government of Indira Gandhi steadfastly refused to accede 
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which came into being in 
1970. 
The Indian government, and many intellectuals and military officers, regarded 
the treaty as an attempt by the nuclear powers to separate themselves from the rest of the 
world by monopolising nuclear arms. In view of India! s perceived threat from China, as 
well as the possible benefits of increased prestige from possessing nuclear weapons, 
S. Singh, India and the Nuclear Bomb, 
( New Delhi: S. Chand & Co. Ltd., 1971 ), p. 135 
26 ibid pp. 131-132 
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India refused to sign the N. P. T. India! s prestige was further enhanced by inflicting a 
crushing military defeat on its arch-rival Pakistan during the 1971 war. 
In the nuclear field, May 1972 saw the 'Purnima! research reactor become critical. 
This reactor provided the basic data regarding neutron multiplication factors, 
effectiveness of reflectors and critical mass assembly, all of which were essential to the 
development of a workable nuclear weapon. Key issues such as how to achieve the 
optimum explosive power and the dependence of this optimum explosive power on the 
first self-sustaining nuclear trigger were investigated through a series of simulations 
undertaken by BARC scientists. " The'Purnima! facility used reprocessed plutonium 
from the 40MW'Cirusreactor and was of enormous help in the design and construction 
of India! s first - and so far only - nuclear weapons test which took place on 18 May 1974 
at the Pokharan test site. 
The device tested at Pokharan had a yield of some 12 kilotons and usýd the 
implosion principle. It is not known exactly how much plutonium was used for the test, 
but, some informed Indian guesstimates indicated that it was about 10 kg - about one 
year's output from the 'Cirus' reactor . 
211 MiS figure includes some plutonium lost during 
the machining of the core of the bomb. This leaves about 6-8 kg in the device itself 
The Pokharan device was exploded at a depth of 107 metres after being placed in 
an L-shaped hole . 
21 It was long believed that the device tested was acrude'bomb. 
27 P. R. Chari, Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff: The Role of the United States, 
New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1995 ), p. 48 
28 D. Albright & M. Hibbs, 'India's Silent Bomb', Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists - September 1992, p. 29 
29 Chari, Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff, p. 49 
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However, in a 1994 magazine interview, the head of India! s Atomic Energy 
Commission, Dr. Rajagopala Chidambaram, stated that India was confident 
of the design prior to the test and almost boasted about how'good'the Indian'bomb' 
was. 
30 
It is interesting to note that Dr. Chidambaram, who was closely associated with 
designing the Pokharan device, used the wordborntý instead of the more widely used 
'device'. Moreover, some observers point out that the 1974 device was small enough to 
fit down a metal pipe and hence would be small enough to fit into a bomb casing. 31 It 
may therefore be argued that the 1974 test was more of weapon tha a mere device. 
The Indian civil nuclear program suffered from a series of sanctions and 
safeguards imposed after the 1974 test. India, having refused to sign the NPT and 
having no agreements with the United States or Canada barring the use of materials in 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions , which 
is what the Pokharan test was called, did not 
violate any laws. It is a moot point about how'Peaceful'a nuclear explosion could be, 
however, the United States did have a PNE program dating to the late 1950s under the 
name 'Ploughshare!. Nevertheless, the Indian test did violate the spirit, if not the letter, 
of the Indo-Canadian agreement. 32 
The impact on the Indian civil nuclear program was substantial and included the 
suspension, followed by the cancellation of Canadian assistance for the construction of 
30 R. Chengappa, 'Nuclear Dilemma', India Today: 30 April 1994, p. 50 
31 H. MacDonald, 'Destroyer of Worlds', Far Eastern Economic Review: 
April 30 1992, p. 23 
32 Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 5-6 
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two nuclear power plants in Rajasthan and the imposition of safeguards in 'perpetuity ý 
and 'pursuit' clauses upon the Rajasthan reactors for the supply of heavy water from the 
USSK31 
Moreover, the United States and France dramatically reduced supplies of 
enriched uranium for the Tarapur reactors and an Experimental Fast Breeder Test 
reactor at Kalpakkam near Madras. The Nuclear Suppliers Group ( London Club ) was 
established in 1974 as a direct result of the Indian test as was the 1978 passage of the 
US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. ' These measures are indicative of the alarm 
generated by India! s nuclear test. 
Between 1977 and 1980, the Janata coalition government held power in India. 
Little is known about the state of the nuclear weapons program during this time and 
some have argued that the nuclear weapons development program was allowed to 
stagnate. However, there is no clear evidence to suggest that this is the case, though it 
has been reported that the team that worked on the 1974 explosion was dispersed by the 
Janata government. 
35 
On Mrs. Gandhi's return to power in 1980, it has been suggested that work on 
nuclear weapons was resumed. Evidence emerged that Pakistan had made rapid progress 
in the development of nuclear weapons in the mid-1980s and this must have accelerated 
India! s nuclear weapons research. " Rumours; also circulated that India was prepared to 
Chari, Indo-Pak Muclear Standoff, pp-50-51 
34 Loc. Cit. 
35 'Shadow of an Indian H-bomb', Foreign Report Dec. 13 1984, p. 1 
36 Loc. cit. 
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conduct another test in 1984, but, once again, no firm evidence has been published to 
indicate that this was true. " 
Nonetheless, India! s nuclear infrastructure underwent a dramatic expansion 
during the 1980s. Several new power reactors were commissioned and a new research 
reactor was commissioned at BARC. Ilese, combined with existing plutonium 
reprocessing capabilities and the lack of international safeguards, substantially increased 
India's nuclear weapons design and production capabilities. India built up its potential 
weapons production capability from one per year in 1974 to a theoretical maximum of 
40 per year in 1989-1990, though the actual production was probably much lower. 
By 1990, four 235 MWe pressurized heavy-water reactors (PHWR) were 
commissioned - two each at Madras in South India and Narora in Uttar Pradesh. " in 
addition a 100 MW research reactor -'Dhruva! - was commissioned in 198 5 and, after 
numerous problems, reached full power by 1988. '9 The two Madras reactors were also 
plagued by operational problems that reduced their output by at least 50%. 40 HoWever I 
it 
now appears that they currently operate at around 75% capacity. 41 
The Narora reactors seem to have performed somewhat better, perhaps owing to 
better design and maintenance. However, reactor Unit I of the Narora Atomic Power 
37 Loc. cit. 
'a 'South Asia N-Weapon-Free Zone', p. 454. E. 2, in The Arms Control 
ReDorter 1993 ( Cambridge MA: Institute of Defence and Disarmament Studies 
1993 ) 
39 Loc. cit. 
40 Spectore Nuclear Ambitions, p. 72 
41 R. Chengappa'Cminous Incidents', India Today: 30 June 1994, p. 57 
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Plant was severely damaged by a fire caused by cracks in turbine blades. This led to the 
phased shut-down of all nuclear power plants, one at a time, in India for safety checks 
by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. ' The year 1995 showed a considerable 
improvement in the performance of India! s power reactors. All seven power reactors 
performed consistently well in 1995. Four reactors achieved a 100% availability rate. 43 
This was due to the efforts of the AERB and indicates that many problems have been 
overcome. 
In addition, there is considerable evidence to indicate that India indulged in 
large-scale hcavy-water smuggling to start these reactors. While the reports have been 
strenuously denied by the Indian authorities, others have also admitted that there was a 
significant shortfall in domestic heavy water production in the early 1980s - the period 
during which the 'Dhruva! research reactor and the two Madras power reactors were 
initially commissioned. ' It is widely assumed that this smuggling was done to avoid 
international safeguards on the plutonium produced from these reactors. It should be 
noted that India has apparently overcome its heavy-water production shortages and has 
managed to obtain a sizeable surplus. " In 1994, India obtained a contract to export 100 
tonnes of heavy water to South Korea. 46 
42 'South Asia N-Weapon-Free Zone', pp. 454. B. 182-183 in 
The Arms Control Renorter 1993 
43 'Record Generation by Nuclear Power Stations', The Hindu- 
International Edition: Sat. September 2 1995, p. 10 
4' Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, pp. 72-73 
's 'South Asia N-Weapon-Free Zonel, p. 454. B. 185, in The Arms Control 
Renorter 1993 
46 'South Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone', p. 454. B. 198 in 
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At present, India! s nuclear infrastructure consists of six unsafeguarded PHW 
reactors in the 235 MWe class and four safeguarded plants, two in Rajasthan and two at 
Tarapur. In addition, there are two major research reactors, 'Cirusand Dhruva!, and two 
plutonium reprocessing sites at Tarapur. Another major reprocessing site at Madras is 
undergoing fmal safety checks and should soon commence operations. " 
There are also a number of small research reactors and a Fast-Breeder Test 
Reactor (FBTR), as well as two uranium enrichment facilities, one at BARC and 
another larger unit at Mysore, which began producing enriched uranium in mid-1990 at 
the earliest. " India is also involved in constructing several other PHWRs at various 
locations to be completed in the late 1990s. 
These facilities provide India with a very substantial nuclear weapons production 
base. However, it is very difficult to estimate the exact plutonium production stockpile 
since the reprocessing plants rarely function at their design capacity and the 
unsafeguarded power reactors have had their share of problems which have signifidantly 
reduced their output. 
Nonetheless, some broad estimates can be made. When judging the output from 
the power reactors, some basic calculations have to be made. For the purposes of this 
study, Leonard Spector's assessment that a 235 MWe reactor can produce 60kg of 
plutonium per year in its spent fuel is being used. This is in theory enough for 12 basic 
,7 'South Asia N-Weapon-Free Zonel, p. 454. E. 2, in The Arms 
Control ReDorter 1993 
48 Albright & Hibbs, 'India's Silent Bomb', p. 29 
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20kt atomic devices - using Skg of plutonium per device! ' The output from the power 
reactors cannot be ignored as the reactors are continuously fuelled. 
Normally, refuelling of a power reactor only occurs when the uranium fuel has 
been exhausted. This is known as 'high burn-up'spent fuel. The plutonium produced 
from this fuel is usable in nuclear weapons, but contains more of the plutonium-240 
isotope than is desirable - this can lead to uncertainty in the yield of nuclear weapons. In 
contrast, continuously fuelled reactors are refuelled at a faster pace. These reactors, such 
as the six unsafeguarded Indian units, produce'low burn-up'spent fuel in which the 
plutonium is ideal for nuclear weapons. 'O Moreover, the design of the CANDU type 
reactors pennits for the refuelling of the reactors without actually having to shut down 
the reactors, nor is there any signature visible outside the reactor that indicates that the 
fuel rods are being changed. " 
In addition to the power reactors, the 'Cirus' and 'Dhruva! reactors are capable of 
producing substantial quantities of plutonium per year. 'Cirus'can produce about 9-10 
kg of plutonium annually, while the'Dhruva! can produce 25 kg. ' This combined total 
is sufficient for between five and seven nuclear weapons. When combined with the 
output from the power reactors, India! s weapons production capacity can be summarized 
as follows: 
" Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 71 
50 ibid, pp. 325-326 Note 58. Spector gives an excellent account on the 
difference between the two reactor types and the suitability of their 
plutonium for nuclear weapons. 
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Reactor Capacity Plutonium Output Weapons Potential 
Cirus 40 MW 9-10 kg/year 1-2/yr 
Dhruva 100 MW 20-25 kglyr 4-5/yr 
MAPP - Madras 2x 235 MWe 2x 60 kg/yr 2x 12 = 24/yr 
NAPP - Narora 2x 235 MWe 2x 60 kg/yr 2x 12 = 24/yr 
KAPP- Kakrapar 2x 235 MWe 2x 60 kg/yr 2x 12 = 24/yr 
T-01 Ii 389-395 kg/yr 77-79/yr 
Sourcesf Spector, Nuclear Ambitions. p. 5 1; Albright & Hibbs, India7s Silent Bomb', 
p. 28 & Arms Control Rel2grter 1993. p. B176 
It must be stressed that this represents the total possible plutonium production 
per year. It is highly improbable that this is the actual figure achieved. It has been 
mentioned before that the Madras reactors, in particular, were initially plagued with 
operating problems. These sorts of technical problems will affect the output of the 
reactors. The fire at Unit I of the Narora Atomic Power Plant, however, has led to a 
serious review of the operating record of the Indian nuclear industry. 
Estimating India! s existing plutonium stockpile is rather more difficult. David 
Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, in a 1993 SIPRI publication, estimated 
that by 1995, India would have about 425kg of weapons grade plutonium - enough for 
85 nuclear weapons - by the end of 199S. ' The breakdown is as follows: 
53 These tables were complied by the author from the three sources 
listed. 
54 S. Gordon, India's Rise to Power in the Twentieth Century and Beyond 
London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995 ), p. 93 
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Production in kgs 
Source 
Stockpile at end of 1991 in 
kgs 
Stockpile at end of 1995 in 
kgs 
Cirus reactor 245 280 
Dhruva reactor 100 190 
CANDU (First Discharges) 15 30 
Total Production 360 50Q 
Consumption in kgs 1991 in kgs 1995 in kgs 
1974 test 10 10 
Processing losses (3%) 10 15 
Fast reactor 50 50 
Total consumption 70 75 
TOTAL Stockpile 290 1 425 
Source: 'South Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone' in The An-ns Control Reporter 1993, 
p. 454. B. 176 
This estimate is the most widely quoted, but largely excludes the output from the 
Madras, Narora and Kakrapar power reactors. It was assumed by the authors of the 
SIPRI report that the plutonium obtained from these reactors was to be used as the core 
of an Indian Fast-Breeder reactor program. " However, it appears that the Indian Fast 
Breeder program is progressing extremely slowly and is plagued by financial 
problems. ' It is therefore unlikely that any of the plutonium from the power reactors 
will be needed in the near future. 
55 Loc. cit. 
" V. Menon, 'Moving at a Snail's Pace', India Today: November 30 1994, 
pp. 66-67 
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It is estimated that India! s power reactors have discharged spent fuel containing a 
staggering 4500 kgs of plutonium. 57 It is assumed that much of this fuel has not been 
reprocessed because of the enormous distances from many of the reactors and the Power 
Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant ( PREFRE ) at Tarapur. " However, it is known that 
fuel from the MAPP I reactor located in Madras has been reprocessed at Tarapur. " 
There is no reason why India cannot reprocess more of this spent fuel. 
It can perhaps be argued that the key point about India! s unsafeguarded nuclear 
program is not so much how much plutonium has already been reprocessed, but the 
capacity of the Indian program to rapidly increase the amount of plutonium reprocessed 
throughout the 1990s. 
It is estimated that PREFRE alone could separate between 500 and 1500 kg of 
reactor grade plutonium in the remainder of the 1990s. ' A new plant at Kalpakkam, 
which should be commissioned in 1996-97 would be capable of reprocessing 150 
tonnes of spent fuel per year, to give about 525kg of plutonium per year or 2625kg by 
the end of the century. 
The combined output from Kalpakkarn and PREFRE would give a total of at 
least 3000kg of plutonium by the end of the century, possibly as high as 4000kg. "' This 
57 A. Haniffa, 'Effect on India of Fissile Cutoff Treaty', India Abroad: 
February 23 1996, p. 26 
58 Loc. cit. 
5' Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 67 
60 Gordon, India's Rise to Power 
', p. 
94. It should be pointed out that 
7kg of reactor grade plutonium is needed for a 20kt atomic device - as 
against 5kg of weapons grade plutonium. See A. Haniffa, 'Effect on India of 
Fissile Cutoff Treatyl, p. 26. 
61 Loc. cit. 
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is potentially sufficient for several hundred 20kt yield atomic weapons. By the mid 
1990s, India could have the production and reprocessing capacity to manufacture 100 
atomic weapons per year. ' The continuous fuelling design of the Indian power reactors 
further enhances this significant capability. This does not mean that India will choose to 
manufacture such a large number of nuclear weapons. What it does mean is that India 
can field a very substantial nuclear arsenal should it choose to do so or if circumstances 
force the Indian govemment into a nuclear arms race. 
The estimates for India! s existing stockpile of atomic weapons, if any, depends 
very much on its plutonium stockpile. This stockpile, in turn, depends on how much 
spent fuel from the power reactors has actually been reprocessed. India, therefore, has a 
potential arsenal, of at least 85 weapons and possibly many more. 
In addition to the standard plutonium and enriched uranium routes, India has a 
third nuclear weapons manufacturing option. India could theoretically make use of U- 
233 for any nuclear weapons. U-233 is a fissile isotope of uranium and is potentially 
excellent for use in nuclear weapons, requiring as much material per bomb as plutonium 
- about 5 kg. 63 However, U-233 has not yet been used in nuclear weapons. 
India has the largest reserves of non-fissile thorium in the world. U-233 is 
produced by irradiating thorium in a reactor. India has already managed to obtain 
kilogram quantities of U-233 by irradiating thorium in theCirus, 'Dhruva'& MAPP 
reactors. ' India hopes to use U-233 as a fuel in power reactors in the future and attaches 
62 A. Haniffa, 'Effect on India of Fissile Cutoff Treatyl, p. 26 
63 Albright & Hibbs, 'India's Silent Bomb, p. 29 
64 Loc. cit. 
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very high priority to this objective. 
On October 29 1996, a 30 KW research reactor called Kamin V attained 
criticality. This reactor is unique in that it uses U-233, obtained from thorium as a fuel. " 
This indicates that India intends to continue with its U-233 program and will certainly 
produce more U-233 in the future. This will be used primarily for fuel in the power 
sector, but could no doubt be used for military purposes should India desire to do so. 
While India! s production capability is not in doubt, what types of nuclear 
weapons India might be able to construct is much less well known. It has always been 
assumed that any Indian nuclear arsenal would be limited to first generation fission 
bombs in the 20 kiloton yield. India, because of political considerations and 
international pressure is unlikely to be able to conduct another nuclear test. Any 
developments must, therefore, be made under this constraint. 66 
India is believed to have programs for both enhanced-fission and fusion 
weapons. However, a full-fledged thermonuclear arsenal would probably need at least 
one more nuclear test. Thermonuclear weapons differ substantially from either fission or 
enhanced fission weapons and as such are more difficult for India to simulate. Evidence 
for an Indian fusion weapon program is somewhat circumstantial, but is nonetheless 
substantial. 
According to some sources, India probably has all the basic scientific and 
technical expertise to build thermonuclear weapons and that should Pakistan conduct a 
" 'Kamini Reactor attains Critipality', The Hindu - International 
Edition: Saturday 9 November 1996, p. 12 
66 This is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 6 
71 
nuclear test, India would conduct a thermonuclear test within two months. " In addition, 
BARC engages in lithium 6 purification and production and has an extensive inertial 
confinement fusion ( ICF ) program. This facility would be useful in the study of high 
density physics associated with thermonuclear explosions, the improvement of elaborate 
computer codes and the development of sophisticated diagnostic techniques and 
instrumentation . 
6' According to a recent article in the International Defence Review, 
these inertial confinement fusion devices are critical to the development of the next 
generation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. " This means that India! s investment 
in ICF facilities should be seen as highly significant. 
In fact, onejournalist, W. P. S. Sidhu, made the claim that all the theoretical work 
on both fusion and enhanced fission weapons was completed by the middle of the 
1980s. " However, India would be unlikely to initiate the construction of thermonuclear 
weapons, which would be a very expensive undertaking, without ensuring the complete 
soundness of the design. This would be difficult, if not impossible, without at least one 
more nuclear test. 
While thermonuclear weapons may not appear in any possible Indian arsenal for 
some time, boosted or enhanced fission weapons are another story. These weapons use 
67 D. Albright & T. Zamora, 'India, Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: All the 
Pieces in Place', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: June 1989, p. 25 
68 Albright & Hibbs, 'India's Silent Bomb', p. 30 
69 F. Barnaby, 'Civil Science could drive tomorrows nukes', International 
Defence Review: 111997, p. 62 
70 W. P. S. Sidhu, 'Indials Nuclear Tests - Technical & Military 
Imperatives', in Jane's Intelligence Review: April 1996, p. 172 
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either lithium deuteride or tritium to enhance the yield of fission weapons, enabling 
major savings in weight. India manufactures tritium and its lithium-6 purification and 
production facilities enable it to produce the raw materials required for these weapons. 
Moreover, India! s production of beryllium metal enables the production of 
smaller, lighter and more advanced nuclear weapons. The production of beryllium metal 
began in the late 1980s after substantial quantities were imported. " There have been 
some reports of problems with the beryllium manufacturing plant, however, there is no 
doubt that the basic capabilities are present. 
Since a few grams of tritium mixed with roughly equal amounts of deuterium 
inside a warhead can boost the yield of a fission explosion by between five and ten 
times, India! s weapons potential is significantly enhanced by this technology. General 
K. Sundarji, one of India! s most influential Chiefs of Army Staff, speculated that India! s 
future arsenal should be composed of weapons in the 20-150 kiloton range. ' So-called 
'super-boosted' fission weapons would possess yields as high as ISO kt. " These 
weapons, if combined with a reasonably accurate missile delivery system, eliminate the 
need for the development of extremely expensive thermonuclear weapons for use 
against either counterforce or countervalue targets. In India! s context, fusion weapons 
" Albright & Hibbs, 'India's Silent Bombl, p. 30 
72 General K. Sundarji, Blind Men of Hindoostan: Indo-Pak Nuclear War(New 
Delhi: UBS Publishers' Distributors Ltd, 1993), p. 79 
" It is technically possible to build fission and 'boosted' fission 
weapons with yields of up to 500kT. The United States tested a 5OOkT fission 
bomb in 1952 as part of operation Ivy. See the Federation of American Website 
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are virtually unnecessary. ' 
The question remains, however, as to whether India can manufacture these 
enhanced fission weapons without conducting a nuclear test. It has long been assumed 
that Israel is capable of manufacturing these weapons and has already deployed them. " 
India! s nuclear infrastructure and scientific base is probably at least as well developed 
as Israel's, if not considerably more advanced, and is far more extensive. If Israel can 
develop these weapons, there is no reason why India cannot. India probably has the 
most advanced nuclear research and development program of any of the threshold 
nuclear states. The development of ICF devices indicates that Indian technology is 
reasonably advanced in the nuclear weapons field. Moreover, it must be remembered 
that India has been in the nuclear weapons business for close to thirty years. Much 
progress has been made during this time. 
The Indian goverment has also invested heavily in the field of parallel 
supercomputing and its related software. The Centre for Development of Advanced 
Computing (CDAC), in close association of the super-secret Advanced Numerical 
Research and Analysis Group (ANURAG) of the Defence Research and Development 
Organization (DRDO), has succeeded in developing a wide range of supercomputers, 
including, the 'Param' family with speeds of billions of floating operations per second 
has been the most successful. ' India is also known to have programs for the 
74 India's tritium production capacity is discussed in P. Hoodbhoy & 
M. Kalinowski, 'The Tritium Solution' in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
July August 1996. 
The fact that India is stockpiling tritium -possibly for use in 
nuclear weapons was disclosed in T. S. Gopi Rethinaraj, 'Tritium breakthrough 
brings India closer to an H-bomb arsenal' Jane's Intelligence Review: jan 1998 
75 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 162 
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development of parallel super-computers with speeds of teraflops, that is, trillions of 
floating operations per second. ' Combined with the other super-computers and India! s 
software skills, India possesses the basic requirements for the simulated testing of many 
types of nuclear weapons. Moreover, since the systems are indigenously produced, India 
has effectively managed to overcome the technology restrictions imposed on it by the 
United States. 
Since BARC has been closely linked to these organization, it is probable that 
BARC has obtained the best products of CDAC and ANURAG. India! s. skill in software 
design, combined with these supercomputers and parallel computers, should enable it to 
'cold test' any nuclear device. ' India has managed to achieve a relatively high degree of 
competence in both these fields. That India could avoid an overt nuclear test by 
resorting to computer simulation was virtually confirmed by a United News of India 
story in early April 1998. "1 
That India could manufacture enhanced-fission weapons without another nuclear 
test was confirmed by a high ranking BARC scientist to an Indian defence journalist - 
Pravin Sawhney. He was initially convinced that India needed to conduct another 
nuclear test until he was told by the scientist that India could readily manufacture either 
76 Gordon, India's Rige to Power, p. 37 PARAM 9000, for example, has a 
speed of 2.5 billion flops. PARAM 10000 has a speed of 100 billion flops 
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79 'Param 10000: India's Answer to nuclear ban' - UNI story in The Asian 
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fission or enhanced fission weapons without needing to conduct another test. " Another 
source also hinted that India could rapidly deploy a fairly sizeable number of enhanced 
fission weapons in the 50 to 100 kiloton range. " 
With India's very large plutonium stockpile, its manufacture of beryllium, tritium 
and lithium 6, India! s nuclear capability cannot be seen simply in terms of its ability to 
manufacture a number of low-yield first-generation fission devices. An Indian nuclear 
arsenal will, in all probability, include a sizeable number of enhanced fission weapons in 
the 100-150 kiloton yield as well as a larger number of smaller fission weapons in the 
20 kiloton yield. This arsenal can probably be constructed without further testing and 
deployed in a fairly short period of time. It is also likely that India has taken steps to 
design very large enhanced-fission weapons in the 500 kiloton range. 
Whether or not India has deployed such an arsenal or whether it will do so in the 
future cannot be clearly answered at present. Much will depend on India! s security 
perceptions in the future and on domestic Indian politics. The other thing that must be 
remembered is that India has not admitted to possessing nuclear weapons. It is not, 
therefore, beyond the realms of possibility that India might develop and deploy a small 
nuclear deterrent without making it public. The Indian militarys mania for security 
makes it difficult to predict exactly what will happen in the future. 
However, the capabilities that exist are very substantial indeed and give any 
Indian government a wide variety of options that may well be exercised in the years to 
80 P. Sawhney, 'The not-so-bright stars of the Republic Day', The Asian 
Age: 1 February 1996, p. 15 
"I S. P. Baranwal, Military Yearbook 1990-1991 ( New Delhi: Guide 
Publications, 1991 ), p. 157 
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come. The cryptic responses of Indian nuclear scientists might well become clearer. In 
the meantime, analysts, both Indian and Western, have to continue to make assumptions 
on the basis of statements that could be interpreted to mean almost anything. When 
asked whether or not India was still making bombs Dr. Rajagopala Chiclambaram made 
the following statement: 
Let me just say that we have built up an extraordinary range of knowhow and 
expertise on all aspects of nuclear technology ... There is now nothing India 
cannot do. " 
82 Chengappa, 'Nuclear Dilemma', p. 50 
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Pakistan's Nuclear Capabilily: - Development & Infrastructure 
One of the interesting contrasts between the Indian and Pakistani nuclear 
programs is the fact that the Pakistani program, while much smaller and less 
sophisticated than India! s mammoth effort, has, from the very outset, been almost totally 
military orientated. The program was initiated after Pakistan's most comprehensive 
military defeat and, to a great extent, has come to symbolize Pakistan's ability to prevent 
another military catastrophe. 
The Pakistani nuclear program was initiated after the countr. Vs crushing defeat in 
the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. "' In 1972, Pakistarfs Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 
apparently announced his plan to develop nuclear arms at a top secret meeting of 
PakistaWs top nuclear scientists in Multan. " Pakistan, at the time, faced Indian 
conventional military superiority as well as a significant, but then as yet 
undemonstrated, Indian nuclear capability. There is little doubt that India! s 1974 
Pokharan test gave a sense of urgency to the Pakistani program. 
From the early to mid- I 970s, it seems that Pakistan intended to follow India! s 
example and develop a nuclear weapons program based on the plutonium extraction 
route. To this end, Pakistan attempted to acquire a large plutonium reprocessing plant 
from France. Despite French insistence that the plant be placed under IAEA safeguards, 
suspicions were raised as Pakistan then had, as she still has, only one small natural 
83 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 90 
Weissman, S., & Krosney, H. The Islamic Bomb 
New York: Times Books, 1981 ), pp. 43-46 
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uranium fuelled power reactor. " Washington was so concerned about the possibility of 
the diversion of the plant to military purposes that the Ford and Carter Administrations 
offered Pakistan I 10 A-7 Corsair II attack aircraft if the deal was cancelle&' In 1977, 
however, France reversed its earlier position and suspended deliveries to the plant, 
apparently after the United States shared intelligence reports revealing Pakistani 
intentions. 97 
A major shift then occurred in Pakistani nuclear development. At the urging of 
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a German trained metallurgist Pakistan shifted its effort from 
plutonium reprocessing to uranium enrichment. This remains the major thrust of 
Pakistan's nuclear effort to this day, despite periodic attempts to revive the plutonium 
route. 
The uranium enrichment project was made autonomous from the Pakistani 
Atomic Energy Commission in 1976. This was probably to enhance security. The 
urgency attached to the project was evident from the fact that elements of the program 
were undertaken simultaneously. 88 The cornerstone of PakistaWs uranium enrichment 
program is the massive ultracentrifuge plant at Kahuta. This plant, capable of producing 
between 25-75 kilograms of weapons grade uranium per year, is virtually the sole basis 
85 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 90 & p. 114 
p. 106 
8" Gunston, B., Modern Military Aircraft (London: Salamander Books, 1977) 
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for Pakistan's current nuclear capability. " A smaller, probably experimental plant was 
constructed at Sihala. Construction of the Sihala plant started in 1978 and it was placed 
in operation the following year. Construction of the Kahuta, plant proceeded in parallel 
with the Sibala project. " 
As in the case of India, Pakistan indulged in large scale smuggling activities in 
order to accelerate the construction of the Kahuta plant. The Pakistani government 
employed a strategy whereby equipment and related items were obtained from Western 
countries, often in clear violation of export control laws. " The items and equipment 
obtained included design technology for gas centrifuges and vacuum pumps and other 
equipment for handling uranium hexafluoride gas. Some of the equipment was 
specifically designed to handle weapons grade material. ' In addition, Pakistan was able, 
with the help of a West German businessman, to procure an entire installation for 
converting natural uranium into uranium hexafluoride, the substance processed in 
enrichment plants. " There is no doubt that this smuggling activity enabled the 
Pakistanis to substantially accelerate the completion of the Kahuta, plant. 
Uranium enrichment is not the easiest method of obtaining weapons grade 
material. However, it was the only option left open to Pakistan. Pakistan has only a 
single pressurized heavy water power reactor located at Karachi ( KANUPP ). This 
Albright & Zamora, 'India, Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: 
All the Pieces in Place', p. 20 
90 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 91 
91 Loc. cit. 
92 ibid p. 34 
93 Loc. cit. 
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facility is currently operating under LAEA safeguards. " 
As discussed earlier, Pakistan's attempts to obtain a large plutonium reprocessing 
plant from France failed to materialize. However, a small plant called Wew Labs'at 
Rawalpindi is in existence. This plant is currently not actually under LAEA safeguards. 
The Wew Labs'plant can, in theory, separate 10-20kg of plutonium per year. It is not 
known, however, if the plant is operational or whether the theoretical capacity can be 
reached. " This is due to the fact that reprocessing plants seldom operate at their design 
potential. It is alleged that the West German firm NTG Nukleartechnik GmbH supplied 
Pakistan with the ability to design and construct a small pool-type nuclear reactor. This 
would give Pakistan the ability to construct a small reactor with an output of 50MW 
which would produce enough plutonium for two nuclear weapons a year. " These 
developments, while significant, clearly demonstrate that Pakistan has largely been 
prevented from following the plutonium route for nuclear weapons. With foreign 
assistance, however, Pakistan has managed to develop a very substantial uranium 
enrichment program. 
The Kahuta enrichment plant is, as was mentioned before, the cornerstone of 
Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability. The plant is designed to enrich natural uranium, 
which is composed of 99.3% U-238 and almost 0.7% U-235, until it is 93% U-235.97 
ibid p. 114 
95 Albright & Zamora, 'India, Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: All the Pieces 
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96 Loc. cit. 
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This highly enriched uranium can be used for nuclear weapons. 9' 
More enriched uranium is required to produce a 20kt nuclear weapon than 
plutonium. Between 15 to 25 kg of U-235 are needed for a fission device in the 15-20kt 
yield, compared to 4-8kg of Pu-239. " The IAEA, for its purposes, estimates that 25kg 
of highly-enriched uranium are needed. However, if Pakistan employed certain well- 
known design features, the figure of 15kg is possible. It is reported that Pakistan 
obtained a complete working design of a nuclear weapon derived from China! s fourth 
atmospheric nuclear test which used U-235 as the fissile material. '00 If this is true, then 
Pakistan would be in possession of a fairly advanced design, requiring less fissile 
material. 
The capacity of the Kahuta enrichment plant is somewhat uncertain. Senator 
Alan Cranston, in a presentation to the United States Senate in 1984, stated that the 
Kahuta plant had the capacity to produce 45kg of highly enriched uranium and was 
being expanded to an annual capacity of between 90-120kgs. This would theoretically 
give Pakistan the capacity to produce 5-6 Hiroshima sized nuclear weapons per year. "' 
However, Leonard Spector, writing in 1990, estimated the capacity of the Kahuta plant 
at about 50kg of highly enriched uranium annually. " Spector based his calculations on 
98 Low enriched uranium, which contains less than 20% U-235, is used as a 
nuclear fuel. Medium enriched uranium - 20- 50% U-235 - can be used for 
nuclear weapons, but very large quantities are needed. 
99 Chari, Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff, p. 46 
100 P. Sawhney, 'To Test or Not to Test: The Challenge to India's Nuclear 
Credibility', RUSI Journal: June 1996, p. 32 
101 ibid pp. 45-46 
102 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 114 
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the fact that a report, quoting U. S. officials, indicated that Pakistan, by the end of 1987, 
had acquired 100kg of highly-enriched uranium. Though the Kahuta plant started small- 
scale operations in 1984, it was not until early 1986 that weapons grade material was 
first produced. "' This would give an annual production capacity of 50 kg of highly 
enriched uranium per year, which is sufficient for about three fission weapons. 
Pakistan has been attempting to expand its nuclear enrichment facilities and is 
thought to be trying to expand the Kahuta. plant and to construct another facility at 
Golra. The status of these programs is not known. It is likely that some expansion of the 
Kahuta plant has taken place, but, the completion of the Golra plant has been 
substantially delayed. Pakistan can no longer rely on smuggling to obtain equipment. 
Pakistan has also indulged in smuggling to obtain other elements needed for the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons. In 1984, Canadian authorities intercepted fifty nuclear 
triggers - called krytrons - intended for Pakistan. " In 1988, the West German company 
Nuchern was caught shipping tritium and uranium hexafluoride to Pakistan. 'O' 
In fact the Pakistani nuclear program was heavily dependent on German 
assistance for most of its elements and many of its future plans. Six ongoing projects 
depended heavily on equipment and designs from the advanced nuclear states. These 
included the original Kahuta enrichment plant, the Dera Ghazi Khan uranium 
hexafluoride plant, a major expansion in enrichment capability, the designs of a reactor 
"' ibid p. 114 & p. 338 note 68 
ibid p. 92 
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that could be used for the production of tritium and a tritium purification plant. " 
Pakistan also made several attempts to obtain beryllium from West Germany and the 
United States. In some cases, Pakistan has succeeded. "7 
China has, in recent times, become Pakistan's major nuclear supplier. China has 
assisted Pakistan in the construction of a 30KW enriched uranium fuelled reactor and is 
planning the construction of a 300 MW power reactor at Chasma. "' China, however, 
claims that any nuclear cooperation with Pakistan is being conducted under the auspices 
of IAEA safeguards. '09 Whether the plant is safeguarded or not, it will be several years 
before its plutonium can be reprocessed for use in nuclear weapons. It takes up to two 
years for the radioactivity level of the plutonium produced to fall sufficiently to permit 
safe reprocessing. "' 
Perhaps more significantly, Pakistan admitted to the existence of a small research 
rcactor in the 50MW class which was built with Chinese assistance at Kushab in 
Punjab. "' The design of this reactor is probably based on that obtained from the West 
German firm NTG Nukleartechnik GmbH mentioned earlier. It is conceivable that 
plutonium from this reactor could be diverted to the nuclear weapons program, however, 
'c'6 Spector Nuclear Ambitions, p. 35 
"" Albright & Zamora, 'India, Pakistan's nuclear weapons: all the 
pieces in place', p. 22 
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it is uncertain whether this reactor is actually in service or not as construction only 
started in the mid- to late- I 980s. It should also be pointed out that Pakistan has not 
developed an indigenous nuclear power industrial base. Pakistan is not capable of 
designing its own power reactors and has needed considerable outside assistance for its 
research reactors. 
Pakistan is also reported to have sought China! s help in obtaining ring magnets 
for its centrifuges, though this was strenuously denied. In 1996, it was reported that 
China supplied some 5,000 ring magnets to the Abdul Qadeer Khan Research 
Laboratory at Kahuta - the site of Pakistan's main enrichment plant! 12 it is not clear 
what these ring magnets are going to be used for. They could either be used to expand 
the production of enriched uranium or may simply be used as spares since the 
enrichment process creates a great deal of stress in all components of the plant. 
Pakistan's relatively small nuclear infrastructure would probably be hard pressed to 
sustain the theoretical capacity of the Kahuta plant. If Pakistan began to produce 
weapons grade plutonium, it would be difficult to sustain as neither reactors nor 
reprocessing plants ever operate to their design capacity. Moreover, any plutonium 
produced would have to be left for up to two years to permit radioactivity to die down 
before reprocessing could start. "' Pakistan's existing nuclear infi-astructure can be 
summarized in the following table: 
112 A. Haniffa, 1U. S. in a bind over A-technology transfer to Pakistan', 
India Abroad: February 16 1996, p. 20 
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Type Location Capacity Comments 
Ultracentrifuge - Kahuta 50 kg or weapons Second plant 
uranium grade uranium per reported under 
enrichment plant year construction 
Plutonium Chasma 100-200 kg of Not finished. Work 
Reprocessing plant plutonium per year continuing - 
Chinese help 
Power Reactor Karachi 125 MWe Safeguarded 
Research Reactor Kushab 50 MWe Chinese assistance 
- start up date 
unknown but 
recent 
Power Reactor Chasma 300 MWe Proposed 
Source: Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, pp. 114-117 
T. Subramaniam, A guessing game' Frontline: 26 Januqjy 1996- p. 16 
Pakistan's nuclear program carried on with the full knowledge of the United 
States, and this has led to a great distrust of the United States by policy makers in India 
since Pakistan's nuclear program is directed solely at India. "' It was only in 1990 that 
the United States acted to curb Pakistan when it initiated a complete cut-off of all 
military and economic assistance. 
Pakistan has not given up its attempts to obtain plutonium on the international 
market. The break up of the Soviet Union in 1991 provided Pakistan with the perfect 
This was discussed in greater detail in Chapter One 
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opportunity. In August 1994, a German Justice Ministry spokesman in Munich listed 
Pakistan among the likely destinations for smuggled plutonium. "' In addition, in late 
1995 and early 1996, Pakistan, as was mentioned earlier, attempted to obtain both ring 
magnets from China for its enrichment plants and a plutonium producing reactor, 
ostensibly for power generation. 
This prompted a flurry of press reports and speculation in India. One extremely 
interesting interview was with Dr. Raja Ramanna -Tathee of the Indian bomb. When 
asked why Pakistan would try to obtain smuggled plutonium when it had opted for the 
U-235 route, he stated: 
My surmise is that if they had plenty of U-235, as they have been claiming for a 
long time, they wouldn't have gone in for plutonium. From our experience in 
using centrifuges to enrich uranium, we know that these are very difficult to 
maintain. And given the state of their industrial capacity, it is apparent that 
Pakistan's plant is working nowhere [near] to the capacity planned! 16 
Dr. Ramanna! s comments bring us to the most important question when dealing 
with the Pakistani nuclear program: how many nuclear weapons can Pakistan assemble 
and what types are these likely to be ? Unlike India, where a fair amount of data is 
available on the performance of the Indian reactors - though this data is far from 
comprehensive or necessarily accurate - this is not the case in Pakistan. As discussed 
earlier, no-one is even sure of the capacity of the Kahuta enrichment plant nor is anyone 
certain of Pakistan's plutonium production capability. 
In order to calculate the amount of weapons grade uranium and plutonium in 
115 S. Gupta, 'Nawaz Sharif's Bombshelll, p. 28 
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Pakistan's inventory, some estimates have to be made. The accuracy of these estimates 
is, of course, difficult to gauge. Nonetheless, the assumptions that will be made, are 
based on the best estimates made by Western experts, chief among them being Leonard 
Spector. Estimates made by S[PRI on the total amount of nuclear weapons materials 
have also been used. 
Even though Pakistan's Kahuta enrichment began operations in 1984, it is widely 
believed that weapons grade, that is, highly enriched - uranium was only produced in 
1986.1 17 As discussed earlier, American official and unofficial sources estimated that 
Pakistan possessed 100 kg of highly enriched uranium by the end of 1987. This 
indicates an annual production rate of 50kg U-235 which is enough for three nuclear 
weapons if 15kg U-235 per weapon is used as a standard. "' 
Using these calculations, and assuming that the plant operated %rithout 
disruption, Pakistan would have accumulated roughly 500kg of U-235 by the end of 
1996, enough for over thirty basic fission weapons. It is, however, highly unlikely that 
the Kahuta plant operates continuously. As Dr Ramanna mentioned, centrifuges are 
extremely difficult to maintain and sustain. Despite Pakistan's considerable experience 
in uranium enrichment, it is likely that Kahuta has experienced problems. 
In fact, some analysts, Leonard Spector among them, believe that the production 
of U-235 at the Kahuta, plant was temporarily suspended in 1989. " This was done 
under pressure from the United States and many American experts believe that Pakistan 
117 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 114 
11' ibid pp. 338-339 note 68 
"' ibid P. 114 
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suspended production of enriched uranium from 1990 till fairly recently and that the 
5,000 ring magnets was aimed at restoring production of U-235.120 India, of course, does 
not accept this assertion. 
With regards to plutonium, Pakistan's supplies of Pu-239 are as of now very 
limited. The Khushab reactor had only commenced construction in the late 1980s. This 
plant would not have been operational until the late 1990s at the earliest and given that 
it takes roughly two years for the material produced to be reprocessed, it is unlikely that 
weapons grade plutonium contributes much to Pakistan's fissile material stockpile. "' 
However, in the future, the Khushab reactor could produce enough plutonium for 
two nuclear weapons per year. 122 ne plant reportedly under construction at Chasma 
would produce considerably more, but, plutonium from this plant would not be available 
before the year 2000. 
Pakistan's sole power reactor at Karachi is under MEA safeguards. However, 
between September 1980 and March 1983, the LAEA was unable to certify that no 
diversion of spent fuel to the nuclear weapons program. 123 Again, it must be stressed 
that the plutonium contribution to Pakistan's nuclear weapons potential is still relatively 
insignificant. Nonetheless, it has the potential to substantially increase in the next 
120 A. Haniffa, 'Experts Dubious on Ring Magnet Sales', India Abroad: 
February 23 1996, p. 26 
121 It is still not clear if the Khushab reactor is fully operational. 
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decade. 
The most recent assessments of the nuclear weapons potential of Pakistan give a 
much lower figure than the theoretical maximum of over 30 weapons mentioned earlier. 
The RAND corporation estimated Pakistan's weapons potential at the end of 1995 at 
about 13 weapons. 124 This does not necessarily represent the number of nuclear weapons 
actually assembled, but rather the quantity of fissile material available for potential 
weapons use. The same study gave India the capability to produce 85 weapons at the 
end of 1995. 
With regard to future production levels, the RAND corporation study estimated 
that by the mid- I 990s, Pakistan would be capable of manufacturing two Hiroshima class 
fission bombs per year. "' Compare this to India! s 100 weapon per year manufacturing 
potential given in the same report. 
Pakistan's potential would come almost exclusively from U-235 production. As 
mentioned earlier, Pakistan's plutonium production and reprocessing facilities are 
unlikely to produce significant quantities of weapons grade material until the very late- 
1990s at the earliest and in all probability not before the beginnings of the 21 st century. 
Pakistan's nuclear production capacity and fissile material stockpile are much 
smaller than India! s. In addition, Pakistan, despite its apparent possession of a proven 
Chinese nuclear warhead design, lacks the infi-astructure to develop more advanced 
types of nuclear weapons. 
12' Haniffa, 'Effect on India of Fissile Cutoff Treaty', p. 26 
125 Loc. cit. 
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As mentioned earlier, Pakistan has attempted, and in some cases succeeded, to 
purchase beryllium and tritium, which are materials used in advanced nuclear weapons. 
Pakistan does not yet have the processing equipment needed for the separation of 
tritium from the deuterium used as a coolant and moderator in its Karachi nuclear 
reactor. Pakistan has also attempted to produce tritium by irradiating lithium-6 
targets. 126 The success of these efforts is not known. 
PakistaWs desire for tritium is most Puzzling. Pakistan, while possessing an 
effective design for a fission weapon, has never conducted a nuclear test and as such is 
short of data. Moreover, Pakistan lacks the computer infrastructure needed to simulate 
the characteristics of a thermonuclear or boosted fission weapon. Pakistan's attempts to 
obtain tritium may be an indication of its intention in case it decides to start testing. 127 
Whatever its shortcomings in the field of advanced nuclear weapons, there is no 
doubt that Pakistan is quite capable of manufacturing a first generation fission weapon 
without too much difficulty. It has been reported that China supplied Pakistan with 
details of its fourth nuclear test. However, regardless of China! s help, Pakistan has made 
considerable progress on its own. 
Pakistan has tested the non-nuclear high-explosive triggering or implosion 
package for a nuclear weapon. "' Using a core of natural or depleted uranium and using 
X-ray machines, which take split-second photographs of the warhead core, Pakistan 
12r' Albright & Zamora, 'India, Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: 
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could have simulated a nuclear blast without difficulty. 129 What is even more interesting 
is the report by the Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. A. Q. Khan, that Pakistan could 
simulate an atomic test in a laboratory. "O It may well be possible that Pakistan, during 
the heightened tension of 1986-87, took the opportunity to conduct a 'cold-test'a basic 
fission weapon. If Pakistan possesses a proven fission design, its nuclear problems are 
considerably simplified. All Pakistan would have to do is to obtain sufficient nuclear 
material necessary for the bomb core and to follow the 'assembly instructions'. The 
problem, however, is to miniaturize the design. 
The problem of miniaturization is particularly important for Pakistan since, as 
will be shown later, the maximum payload of Pakistan's missiles is 500 kg. It is known 
that the weapon produced from ChiiWs fourth nuclear test weighed 1250 kg. This 
problem is irrelevant if Pakistan was to rely solely on its strike aircraft as its nuclear 
delivery system. This aspect of Pakistatfs nuclear capability will be discussed later. 
Pakistan has a vibrant nuclear program which was bom out of the defeat of the 
1971 war. This program, after unsuccessful attempts to obtain plutonium reprocessing 
facilities, has embarked on an extensive uranium enrichment program - with 
considerable foreign assistance. Pakistarfs nuclear weapons potential is still confined to 
first generation fission weapons - for which a proven design may or may not be 
available. Some capability for laboratory testing of nuclear weapons exists which may 
eliminate the need for a test. 
"' ibid P. 22 
130 The Observer (London): March 1 1987 
92 
Pakistan's weapons potential is much smaller than that of India. Material for 
fewer than 20 fission devices exists and the manufacturing capacity is limited to two 
weapons per year. Nonetheless, Pakistan! s potential causes considerable concern in India 
and may be the reason for the acceleration of the Indian nuclear program in the 1980s. 
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Ch gRter Th ree. - Deliwa SMems - Missiles an dA lwyg 
India's Delivejy Systems: Part I- Missiles 
Since the late 1980s, the Indian missile and rocketry programs have attracted 
considerable attention inthe West. This chapter seeks to understand the rationale behind 
this program as well as the actual performance of the missiles themselves. In more 
recent times, efforts have been made under the Missile Technology Control Regime 
( M. T. C. R-) to restrict and hinder India! s advanced rocketry and missile programs. No 
study of the Indian missile program can ignore the Indian space program. Many, items of 
advanced technology were imported from Western countries for use in satellite launch 
vehicles and were then used in missiles. Moreover, many of the scientists involved in 
the missile program, including the project director, were trained in the West and later 
gave the initial impetus to the Indian space program and the later missile projects. 
This section will examine the development of the Indian rocketry program. The 
role of Western technology transfers will be examined in the development of advanced 
. Indian rockets. The emergence of a dedicated missile program in the 1980s will be seen 
in terms of a desire to achieve a degree of self sufficiency in missile design and 
production. The section will conclude with an assessment of the current state of the 
Indian missile program and on the 'Prithvi' and 'Agni' systems in particular and on the 
progress of the Indian space rocket program. The impact of the M. T. C. R. will be dealt 
with in relation to the missile program. 
India! s rocketry project really in the 1960s when the United States assisted the 
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Indian space program by launching a small scientific sounding rocket in 1963 in India! 
It also helped to design and build the Thumba test range from which over 350 
American, British, Soviet and French rockets were eventually launched! India! s first 
rockets were supplied by the French who sold India a production license for the 
'Centaure! sounding rocket from the late 1960s, this rocket is still used by India. 
During the 1960s, Indian engineers studied extensively in the United States. 
Among them was a man who has now become a minor celebrity in India, Dr. 
A. P. J. Abdul Kalam. Between 1963 and 1964, Dr. Abdul Kalarn spent four months in the 
United States studying at N. A. S. A. 's Langley Research Centre in Virginie This centre 
was the site for the development of an advanced satellite launching rocket, the'Scout'. 
Dr. Abdul Kalam was able to accumulate much material on the unclassified rocket and 
was able to observe the design and testing procedures involved. 514e was able to put this 
knowledge to good use in later years. 
India! s first foray into the field of missile design came in the 1970s. The little 
known Devil'project was initiated with the aim of producing a 130 krn range surface to 
surface missile. Since the early 1970s, India had been attempting to indigenise and 
modify the Soviet SA-2 surface to air missile so as to make it less vulnerable to 
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Feb. 28 1994, p. 58 extracted from 
Schuster Ltd., 1994) 
'Our God can Lick your God', India Today: 
Critical Mass( New York : Simon and 
Loc. cit. 
' G. Milhollin, 'India's Missiles - With a Little Help from Our 
Friends', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Nov. 1989, p. 32 ( Sounding 
Rockets fly straight into the atmosphere to conduct scientific experiments 
' Loc. cit. 
5 Burrows & Windrem, 'Our God can Lick Your God', p. 58 
95 
electronic counter measures. It is not known whether missiles were indigenously 
produced, but the existing Indian Air Force SA-2 squadrons were modernized to reduce 
their vulnerability to E. C. M. The SA-2 was also selected as the basis of the'Devil' 
project. Experiments were made with the propellant compounds of the SA-2 and 
missiles were actually successfully fired. However, the project was abruptly terminated 
when the Indian Air Force, the intended user of the missile, rejected the system. ' 
Throughout the late 1970s and the early 1980s, there was no coherent project for 
Indian missiles. However, the space program had ambitious plans for launching 
satellites and continued to acquire advanced technology from Western countries - 
namely France and West Gennany. The French contribution was principally in the field 
of liquid fuel propulsion. Under a license from France, India obtained the technology for 
the 'Viking' high-thrust liquid rocket engine. Indian engineers actually helped develop 
the 'Viking! during the mid- I 970s and then began building a version of its own - the 
'Vikas'. 
American and French assistance is supposed to have been dwarfed by the help 
provided by the West Germans to the Indian Space Research Organization ( ISRO ) 
Gary Milhollin, a long time critic of India, asserts that the Germans gave India vital 
assistance and technology in the fields of rocket guidance and testing and on the use of 
composite materials for heat shields and nozzles! 
6 R. Chengappa, 'The Missile Man', India Today: April 15 1994, p. 44 
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The West German aerospace agency, D. L. R., began training Indian personnel in 
rocket guidance from 1976. ' The first step was taken in 1978 when an Indian sounding 
rocket was tested with a German interferometer. The program was later expanded to 
include an on-board D. L. K microprocessor. An Indian version of the same 
interferometer was successfully tested in April 1982. 'o Milhollin also claims that the 
Germans later helped India develop an inertial navigation system, ostensibly for guiding 
satellites. " D. L. R- was supposed to have provided India with the technology for 
conducting high altitude rocket simulation tests and sold India large quantities of 
sophisticated electronics and computers for rocket payload guidance and software for 
satellite orbital analysis. 12 Finally, D. L. R. 's extensive collaboration with ISRO was 
allegedly rounded off with massive assistance in the development of carbon composites 
for use on rocket nozzles and on heat shields for re-entry vehicles. " This, Milhollin 
supposed gave India the necessary infi-astructure for an extensive and sophisticated 
guided missile program. These claims must be examined more closely as Milhollin's 
assertions, though widely quoted and accepted, are not wholly accurate. 
Professor Milhollin has overlooked the West Gennan governmenfs rebuttal of 
his claims. "' His arguments were dismissed as unproven suppositions by D. L. K. 
Loc. cit. 
0 Loc. cit. 
11 Burrows & Windrem, I Our God can lick your God I p. 60 
12 Loc. cit. 
13 Loc. cit. 
" Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation, P. 285 
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Milhollin overstates the importance of Western assistance to the Indian space and 
missile programs. For example, his assertion that the company APC-Rex with providing 
India with autonomous navigation technology for satellites, which he contends was later 
adapted for rockets, does not seem plausible. " APC-Rex was apparently a small 
program involving experiments with technical and scientific payloads produced by both 
Germany and India. It seems inconceivable that this could have been of any use in 
developing inertial guidance systems. " Moreover, Milhollin has also made several 
unsubstantiated claims. His comments regarding the 16-bit microprocessor is 
unsourced. Both the West Gennan goverment and D. L. R. have also strenuously denied 
that any of the India - Gennan space collabomtion could have been used to develop a 
ballistic missile. " 
Nonetheless, Milhollin does have a fairly interesting case. West German export 
controls on missile and rocket technology previously have been shown to be incredibly 
lax. Given the close cooperation between the Indian space program and the German 
space agencies, it is most likely that at least some technology necessary for the 
manufacture of missiles were obtained by India from the Germans. What is less clear is 
whether or not India intended to develop missiles using this technology when it initially 
entered into cooperation with the Germans. 
India scored its first rocketry success on July 18 1980 when the I. S. R. O. placed 
" ibid pp. 285-286 
" ibid p. 286 
17 Loc. cit. 
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into orbit an Indian satellite called the'Rohini'. " The launcher used was the S. L. VA, 
which was derived from the 1960s 'Scout' rocket - and theoretically gave India the 
capability to develop Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (I. R. B. M. s). The S. L. V. -3 
project was led by Dr. Abdul Kalam but, there is no evidence that India was seriously 
contemplating the development much less the deployment, of such missiles at that time. 
However, the Indian government was to sanction a full-fledged missile development 
program shortly afterwards. 
The Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) was approved 
by the Government of India in Fiscal Year 1983-1984 with the aim of developing a wide 
range of guided missiles. " The program was initiated in response to the reluctance of 
India's arms suppliers, including the Soviet Union, to supply more advanced missiles. 
The prohibitively high cost of advanced missiles was also an important factor. The 
Indian government decided that the indigenous missiles would not only incorporate the 
latest technology, but would also be independent of imported critical parts. " 
The IGMDP was placed under the control of the Defence Research and 
Development Laboratories ( DRDL ) headquarters at Hyderabad and its newly 
yalaM. 2 appointed director - none other than Dr. A. P. J. Abdul 1. 'The government also 
gave DRDL a rather unusual directive: the des ign-production-deployment cycle was to 
19 Vayu Aerospace Review: 11111992, p. 5 
19 1. Baneriie, 'The Integrated Guided Missile Development Program', 
Lt. Gen. M. Thomas ed. Indian Defence Review: July 1990, p. 99 
20 Loc. cit. 
21 Chengappa, 'The Missile Man', p. 44 
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be drastically shortened from the usual 10- 15 years to 8-10 years. 22 This entailed a far 
greater degree of organizational and technical innovation than had ever been displayed 
by an Indian defence development establishment. 
Kalarn anticipated that the Western countries would, sooner or later, impose 
strict controls on the supply of critical missile components to developing countries. The 
project staff at DRDL adopted a two-pronged strategy - to buy whatever they could 
immediately and develop the rest indigenously. " This gave the Indian missile program a 
head-start over the M. T. C. R. which came too late to seriously hinder the IGMDP. 
Five key technologies were identified for indigenous manufacture, including 
phase shifters for radars and sensors for guidance systems ?4 Many others, such as 
carbon composites for re-entry vehicles, were obtained from I. S. R. O. which, as 
discussed earlier, obtained the technology from Western countries. Kalam, with an 
I. S. RO. background, was able to obtain a great deal of technology and testing facilities 
for India! s missiles from India! s space program. In addition, he ensured that the Indian 
military was closely involved with the IGMDP from the outset. This ensured that the 
missiles were developed to meet the requirements of the armed forces, thus reducing the 
chance of rejection, the fate which befell the earlier 'Devil' project. 
The IGMDP initially concentrated on the design of four missile systems. The 
first two systems, a short range surface-to-air missile and a battlefield support missile, 
were selected because they did not require any great innovation in design or 
22 Banerjie, 'The Integrated Guided Missile Development Program', p. 99 
23 Chengappa, 'The Missile Man', p. 44 
24 Loc. cit. 
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construction. More time was allocated for the development of an advanced medium 
range S. A. M. and a state-of-the-art anti-tank missile which were to be extremely 
advanced and comparable to the latest technology available in the WeSt. 
25 Later, DRDL 
was assigned the task of designing and developing an I. R. B. M. class test vehicle? ' 
A mere two years after the initiation of the program, the first flight test of the 
27 7rishul'short range S. A. M. took place in September 1985. This was followed by the 
Trithvi' ballistic missile on February 25 1988. The launch of the Prithvi was not only 
seen as an achievement for the IGMDP but as a national achievement. The Indian 
Parliament interrupted its normal routine to receive news of the successful test. " 
However, this excitement paled in comparison which greeted the launch of DRDL: s 
I. R. B. M. test vehicle on the 22nd. of May 1989. 
The test of the I. R. B. M. 'Agni'was greeted vvith consternation in the West and 
jubilation in India. The system basically consisted of a Prithvi missile attached to the 
first stage of the SLV-3 rocket. " Since the SLV-3 was itself closely based on the U. S. 
'Scout', the test of theAgni'was a clear sign that the M. T. C. R. needed to be 
strengthened. Moreover, given India's active nuclear weapons program, theAgni'was 
seen as a potentially destabilizing development in the South Asian region. 
While the'Prithvi'was openly declared to be amilitary' missile, theAgni'was 
25 Banerjie, 'The Integrated Guided Missile Development Program', pp. 99- 
100 
26 Loc. cit. 
" ibid p. 101 
26 S. Gupta 'Shooting Ahead' India Today: March 31 1988, p. 96 
29 Burrows & Windrem, 'Our God can Lick Your God', p. 60 
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termed a lechnology demonstratoe. The latter program seems to have been accorded a 
much lower priority than the other missiles in the IGMDP since only three tests of the 
'Agni'have been made. These ballistic missile programs will be examined in more 
detail, but first, some mention should be made of the other three missiles currently under 
development. 
The two S. A. M. s under development, the Trishul'and theAkash', are slated for 
deployment from 1996, following the user trials currently underway. " The 7rishul'has 
a range of 9km. and is a low-level, quick reaction S. A. M. designed to replace Soviet- 
made SA-8 systems in service with the Indian armed forces. 
The Trishul'is a self-contained, mobile system with an on-board fire-control 
radar. The system has four guidance options, which are, active and semi-active radar 
homing, infra-red and a sophisticated home-on-jam (HOJ) option. " The'Akash' is a 
much larger system with a similar range of guidance options. However, the missile is 
tied to a phased-array radar capable of tracking 64 targets at up to 601an and the system 
is capable of tracking and engaging ballistic missiles as well as aircraft. ' Both systems 
are claimed to be highly resistant to electronic counter measures. 
The final system under development is the Wag! anti-tank missile. Designed to 
defeat the heaviest armour at ranges of up to 5km, the 'Nae has an advanced guidance 
system that incorporates a passive infra-red seeker in addition to an active millimetric- 
30 A. Singh, 'Akash, Trishul set for trials', Hindustan Times: May 29 
1994, p. 1 
31 J. Baranwal, SP's Military Yearbook 1992-1993, p. 413 
( New Delhi: Guide Publications, 1993 ) 
32 Chengappa, 'The Missile Man', p. 43 
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wave seeker. 33 This gives the missile a formidable'fire and forget! capability. 
These programs have not attracted the kind of attention given to thePrithvi'and 
'Agni'projects. Like the ballistic missile programs of other developing countries, these 
two Indian systems have become linked to the Indian nuclear weapons program and the 
United States has made some efforts to pressure India not to deploy the missiles. 
However, no Indian government can be seen to give in to American pressure on these 
missile programs since the program seems to have become a symbol of national pride. 
The 'Prithvi' is a mobile heavy battlefield support system with a range of 150- 
350km and a payload of 500kg to 1000kg. ' The system is mounted on an 8x8 wheeled 
transporter-erector-launcher ( T. E. L. ), based on a Czechoslovak TATRA truck 
chassis. " The utility of these tactical S. S. M. s depends on the nature of the payload 
carried and on the accuracy. The'Prithvi'has a payload sufficient for a nuclear, 
biological or chemical warhead, but, based on all the information published so far, India 
is currently deploying the system only with conventional warheads. 
Five interchangeable warhead types are to be fitted to the 'Prithvi', including a 
high explosive ( H. E. ) monolith, a pre-fragmentcd anti-personnel warhead, cluster 
submunition. bomblets for use against artnour and theType 77'fuel-air explosive ( 
F. A. E. ). " The missile is supposed to be able to manoeuvre up to 15 degrees in flight as 
33 A, Dixito 'Indian Defence Industry Programmes', Military Technology: 
1211994, p. 23 
3' D. Lennox, 'Ballistic Missiles hit new heights', Jane's Defence 
Weekly: 30 April 1994, p. 24 
35 Banerjie, 'The Integrated Guided Missile Development Program', p. 104 
36 Gordon, Indialp Rise to Power, p. 86 
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well as beinghighly accurate. " Published figures give the C. E. P. of thePrithvi'as less 
than 250m. at maximum range; ` however, other estimates in fairly authoritative sources, 
give the C. E. P. as 100m. " The discrepancy in these two figures has not been fully 
explained. It should be pointed out, however, that in the early years of the flight test 
program, many skeptical analysts had a tendency to downplay India! s abilities in the 
missile field. It is unfortunate that these tendencies still continue, in some Western 
circles, at any rate, to this day in spite of evidence to the contrary. Another more 
interesting report from the last two tests of the 'Prithvi' gave the C. E. P. of the missile as 
an incredible I Om! ' The latter figure was achieved at a range of 67km after the missiles 
were fired from pre-surveyed sites. If the system is fired ftom an unsurveyed site, the 
accuracy is estimated at 150m at a range of I SOkm. Whatever the actual figure, the 
'Prithvi' is considered to be quite accurate. 
A more advanced version of the basic Trithvihas recently been tested. On 27 
January 1996, the'Prithvi-ll'was tested. This has a range of 250-350km and a payload 
of between 500 and 1000kg. " Of even greater significance is that its C. E. P. is estimated 
at a mere 50m at maximum range. This could be due to the fact that a terminal guidance 
37 Loc. cit. 
38 C. V. Gole, 'The "Prithvill - Facts and Fancies', 
Vayu Aerospace Review IV11994, p. 26 
39 S. Bhaduri, 'Weapons Overview - "Prithvi" SS-1501, Maj. Gen. A. Karim 
ed. Indian Defence Review: October 1992, p. 101 
40 P. Sawhney, 'Whether the US likes it or not, the race has begun in 
South Asia', The Asian Age: 23 March 1995, p. 13 
These missiles were launched from a pre-surveyed site at a target 67km 
away. 
41 R. Chengappa, 'Boosting the Arsenallv India Today: 29 Feb. 1996v p. 98 
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system is being developed for this version of the'PrithvO' This terminal guidance 
systcm is similar to the onc cuffcntly bcing dcvcloped for thcAgni'IRBM. 
These guidance systems significantly enhance accuracy. 
The'Agni'is a much larger system with a range of 2500km and a payload of 
1000kg. " However, it is not at all certain that the 'Agni' is a military missile or a 
'technology demonstrator', as claimed by Indian officials. As mentioned earlier, the 
'Agni'is an amalgam of the Trithviand the SLV-3. It is highly possible that theAgni'is 
a cheap test vehicle for re-entry and guidance technology for use on a more advanced 
platform. ' 
The last test of theAgni', which took place on 19 February 1994, appeared to be 
a major technical breakthrough for India. The system tested included a maneuverable re- 
entry vehicle for increased accuracy vith terminal guidance. " This terminal guidance 
system is reported to be comprised of a scanning correlation optical system based on a 
scanning focal plane homing head in the infrared and millimetric wavelengths of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. 46 
Dr. Abdul Kalam states that the missile can be f 47 ully deployed within two years. 
42 Loc. cit 
43 Gordon, India's Rise to Power, p. 87 
" ibid p. 88 
45 Chengappa, 'The Missile Manl, p. 40. While there were reports in 1993 
that were highly sceptical of India's ability to test such a system, there 
have been none since the actual test. 
" Sawhney, 'Standing Alone', p. 28 This system would be 
difficult, though not impossible, to evaluate over water. 
47 Chengappa, 'The Missile Man' p. 42 
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Kalam also asserts that theAgniis ready for serial production while some simultaneous 
development flights aimed at achieving a much greater performance are undertaken. " 
Kalarn claims that no ftirther test flights are necessary for the basic 'Agni' system and 
that it is ready for production. More flights would be necessary only to improve the 
design - anAgni Mark Il. 
Having overcome these technical problems, India could be in a position to deploy 
a fully developed missile system based on the guidance technology of theAgni'and on 
the booster technology of India! s Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) - successfully 
tested in October 1994.49 Since the Indian missile program has in the past drawn heavily 
from the technology of the Indian space program. There is no reason why this will not 
happen in the future. It should be noted that a missile based on the PSLV will have the 
range and payload of a powerful I. C. B. M. 
The Indian space program has recently scored a number of successes which may 
be relevant to the missile program in the future. The space program has also attracted 
the attention of the United States because of its attempts to acquire cryogenic rocket 
engines from Russia. 
Between 1992 and 1994, India successfully tested two satellite launch vehicles. 
On 20 May 1992, and again on May 4 1994, a boosted version of the SLV-3, the 
Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV), was successfully launched. " This was 
'a 'Indigenous Missile Development Program to Continue', India Abroad: 
August 30 1996, p. 21 
Gordon, India's Rise to Power, p. 91 
50 Vayu Aerospace Review iirli994, p. 7 
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followed by the launch of the 283 ton PSLV, mentioned earlier, on 15 October 1994. 
The PSLV launch confirmed all the technologies needed to produce a ballistic missile 
with a range of tens of thousands of kilometres. " It may be of interest to note that the 
second stage of the PSLV is powered by the 'Vikas'engine - the Indian version of the 
French 'Viking!. 
In 1992, the United States government imposed sanctions on ISRO afler a 
contract was signed with the Russian Glavkosmos space agency for the supply of 
cryogenic engines and the technology for their manufacture in India. " The American 
government claimed that the deal violated the terms of the MrCR and that the cryogenic 
engines would be used for military purposes. Unfortunately for the Americans, delaying 
India! s cryogenic project is not going to halt the missile program. 
The satellite launch vehicles could be used as the basis for much longer range 
ballistic missiles. The ASLV, in particular, which is in effect an SLV-3 with boosters, 
could, without any difficulty ( or necessarily any testing) be used to enhance the range 
of theAgni'IRBM to a range of close to 50001un. The GSLV, despite the claims of 
many Western analysts, is unlikely to be used as a missile. Should India decide to 
develop an ICBM, then the PSLV would be the basis of any such missile. The 
characteristics of possible ballistic missiles based on the ASLV and PSLV with the 
existing'Agni'and Trithvi'are shown below: 
51 V. Singh, 'Making a Mark', Flight International 16-22 Nov. 1994, p. 29 
52 Vayu Aerospace Review 1111992, p. 4 
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System Range Payload Status 
Prithvi I 150km 1000kg In service 
Prithvi H 250km 750-1000kg 2 successful tests 
Prithvi M 350km 750kg Development 
Agni 1500-25001an 1000kg 3 test flights -2 
successful - Tested 
to 1450 km 
ASLV 45001an + 1000kg 2 successful flights 
PSLV 80001an+ 1000kg+ 2 successful flights 
Source: CDISS website -www. cdiss. org: 80/countrya. htm#INDIA 
At the time of writing, the 'Prithvi' is the only ballistic missile entering, or in 
service. In 1993, an initial deployment of the system was made with II Corps of the 
Indian army. 53 While India continues to assert that the missile is not yet deployed or in 
production, there is clear evidence that missiles are being deployed but away from the 
border in central India. This enables India to say that the missiles are not 'operational. ' 
Command, control and targeting are essential or the use of ballistic missiles 
against military targets. While India possesses limited satellite reconnaissance capability 
for targeting area targets for long range IRBMS, tactical targeting for the Trithvi'will be 
done with Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles and similar Indian types. 55 As of now, 32 
53 v "Prithvi" missile inducted into Army 1, Hindustan Times: May 22 
1993, P. 1 
51 'A Quiet Launch', India Today: June 30 1994, p. 93 
55 R. Bedi, I India to buy pilotless Israeli spy planes by end of '94 
The Asian Age: September 16 1994, p. 4 
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'Searchee UAVs have been obtained pending the introduction of the Indian developed 
Nishant'UAV. " 
The initial user of the Trithvi'is the Indian Artillery Corps with the 333 Missile 
Group being the first unit to receive the type. 57 Tbe group consists of three SSM sub- 
groups, each with four launchers and a support sub-group with warhead change vehicles 
and missile reloads. Survey and meterological sections are also attached. 
It is not known how many reloads will be allocated per launcher. This will only 
be known by the Corps and Army commanders. The numbers will, of course depend on 
the roles assigned to the Trithvi'in Indian army service. Although the Indian army has 
issued manuals on the deployment of the Trithvi, its use has not been made clear. It is 
clear, however, that the Indian army believes the'Prithvi'to be a viable tactical weapon. 
The Regiment of Artillery has started training personnel to operate the system and has 
developed a sophisticated simulator to assist in this task. Nonetheless, there are some 
major concerns regarding the availability of adequate storage space for the missiles 
already produced. 
Currently stationed at Secunderabad and now part of 30 Artillery Division, 333 
Missile Group, and the proposed 444 and the planned 555 Missile Groups, have the 
following organization: " 
56 S. Unnithan, 'India may buy Israeli Missile' in Indian Express: 6 
January 1997 
57 P. Sawhney, I Army raises Prithvi Group 1, The Asian Age: 29-30 April 
1995, P. 1 
50 P. Sawhney, 'Indials Artillery is a Force in its own right' Jane's 
Defence Weekly: 9 October 1996, p. 35 
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Missile Group Headquarters 
Meterological Survey Communications 
Troop Troop Battery 
I 
Support Sub-Group 
- Missile Reloads 
- Warhead Change Vehicles 
1 
3* SSM Sub-Group 










How this tactical organization will work on the battlefield has not been released. 
More importantly, there is no clear indication of who will have the authority to deploy 
and employ thc'Prithvi' in combat. " This may not be particularly significant if the 
missile is to be deployed with solely conventional warheads, but is extremely important 
in the event that'Prithvi'is seen as a nuclear weapons delivery system. 
In the case of theAgni'there is even less information available as to how it will 
be controlled. It is not clear as to which service will operate a missile system based on 
the'Agni', though an Indian Air Force Strategic Air Command has been mentioned. The 
'Agni'presents a whole variety of new problems and requires an entirely new and more 
5' There are some indications that the authority will lie with Army 
Headquarters. 
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developed C31 network than currently exists. . 
The development and production of the'Prithvi'and the development work 
conducted on the 'Agni' provide India with the potential to deploy nuclear armed 
missiles. As mentioned in the section on nuclear capabilities, India has the ability to 
manufacture smaller and lighter nuclear warheads which can be fitted onto ballistic 
missiles. The development of enhanced-fission weapons adds a new dimension to any 
missile based deterrent. Should India choose to develop ICBMs, based on the PSLV, 
these could conceivably be deployed with warheads in the 100- 150 kiloton range. India 
is also known to be conducting research into multiple warheads which could see the 
eventual deployment of ICBMs and IRBMs with MIRVs. 60 
One question remains unresolved. Both the'Prithviand theAgni'are capable of 
carrying weapons of mass destruction. 'Prithvi' regiments may be placed under the 
control of the Corps commanders and missiles based on theAgni'may come under the 
Indian air force. Is the Indian government going to give sole control of such weapons to 
the military? T'he Indian political establishment has a very distant, and at times strained, 
relationship with the military. The military, in turn, is held in extremely high esteem by 
the Indian populace and istrusted'a lot more than the political establishment. It should 
also be pointed out that the un-elected Indian President is Commander-in-Chief of the 
Indian armed forces and not the elected Prime Minister. 
The Indian missile program has made considerable progress since its initiation. It 
has been shown that foreign technology may have been instrumental in giving India the 
60 Gordon, India's Rise to Power, p. 90 
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basic infi-astructure needed. The Indian missile program has effectively defeated the 
MTCR and rendered it ineffective. Whether India will move to deploy IRBMs or 
ICBMs with nuclear warheads has become increasingly dependent on political 
decisions rather than capability, and any moves in this direction will be closely watched 
by India! s neighbours and the wider international community. The missile program has 
become a symbol of national pride and will not be halted. 
Dr. Abdul Kalam, the founder and chief advocate of India! s missile program once 
said: 'now no embargo can do anything to us. The MTCR has been rendered harmless. It 
can't even scratch us leave alone throttle our program. 61 This quote summarizes both the 
rationale and the success of the Indian missile program. India has achieved a high 
degee of self-sufficiency in missile design and production and in so doing has rendered 
the MTCR virtually useless as far as India is concerned. 
61 Chengappa, 'The Missile Man', p. 42 
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Delivery Systems: Part 2- Aircraft 
It is widely known that India operates large numbers of nuclear capable strike 
aircraft. However, when discussing possible systems, aircraft are too often mentioned 
only in passing. In the India-Pakistan context, it is possible that aircraft, and not 
missiles, will be the primary delivery system. The Indian Air Force, currently the fourth 
largest in the world, operates no fewer than sixteen squadrons of nuclear capable strike 
aircraft. These comprise five Jaguar squadrons, eight MiG-27M squadrons and three 
MiG-23BN squadrons - numbering well over three hundred aircraft. ' 
The MiG-23BN squadrons are probably earmarked for the Offensive Air Support 
(OAS) role and can thus probably be discounted for the nuclear strike role. Some of the 
MiG-27 squadrons are also earmarked for the OAS task, however, the Indian MiG- 
27Ms are fitted with a RSBN-6S navigation system which is associated with the nuclear 
strike role . 
63 Mikoyan has openly acknowledged that the MiG-27 is nuclear capable. ' 
The Jaguars are also known to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Thetoss-up' 
tcchniquc uscd to delivcr nuclcar wcapons was practiccd by IAF aircraft during excreisc 
'Hammerblow' in 1988. " Given India's ability to manufacture smaller nuclear weapons, 
" This figure is a composite from available sources, one of the best 
being C. V. Gole 'The IAF in 20011 in Vayu Aerospace: 111994, p. 42 However, in 
the early 1990s, two squadrons converted to the MiG-27, including one from 
MiG-23BNs. MiG-27 squadrons are Nos. 2,9,10,18,20,22,29 & 222. MiG-23BN sqns. 
are Nos. 31,220 & 221. Jaguars operate with Nos. 5,6,14,16 and 27 sqns. 
6' D. Donald & J. Lake, Encvclor)aedia of World Military Aircraft: Volume 
Two (London: Aerospace Publishing Ltd., 1994)p. 305 
64 ibid p. 305. Nuclear Weapons were listed between 500kg bombs and 
napalm canisters! 
65 R. Rikhye, P. Singh & P. Steinemann, Fiza'Ya: Psyche of the Pakistan Air 
Force ( New Delhi: S. A. S., 1991), pp. 163-164 
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India! s strike aircraft assume an even greater importance. 
It is likely that a few squadrons will be earmarked for an emergency nuclear role 
rather than a permanent nuclear alert system with its requirements for a sophisticated 
command structure. Given the Indian army's need for air support, plus interdiction and 
attacks against special targets, the MiG-23/-27 squadrons are likely to be fully occupied. 
It is, therefore, probable that the main nuclear strike aircraft will be the Jaguar, with 
support from whatever MiG-27Ms that can be spared. It should be noted that even the 
vast fleet of Indian MiG-21 combat aircraft can theoretically be used for nuclear strike 
role. These aircraft would have a very limited range and payload and as such cannot be 
seriously considered as candidates for this very demanding and sensitive role. The 
ongoing, and very comprehensive, upgrade program for the MiG-21bis aircraft of the 
Indian Air Force will add little to their ability to deliver nuclear weapons. The Mirage 
2000 fleet of the Indian Air Force could also be diverted for the nuclear strike role, but 
these have air-superiority as a major role. 
The recent purchase of Sukhoi Su-30MK (1) aircraft and the technology transfer 
agreement to enable their manufacture in India is highly significant. ' However, since 
the Su-30 was originally designed as a long-range interceptor, it is unclear as to how the 
Indian Air Force intends to use them. The Su-30 can, however, carry a very heavy 
weapons load - including nuclear weapons - over a very long range. 
The strike aircraft available to the Indian Air Force have combat radii of up to 
66 The Sukhois were purchased in 1996 and an agreement in principle has 
been signed to permit manufacture in India. The terms of the manufacturing 
agreement have not yet been finalised and probably will not be finalised 
until the final production variant - Su-30MKI emerges. See Vayu Aerospace 
Review: 11/1997, p. 5 
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850km. The Jaguars are the longest ranging aircraft in the IAF inventory while the 
MiG-23/-27 family are most useful at shorter ranges. All three aircraft types are 
equipped with sophisticated weapons aiming and delivery avionics and can carry 
substantial weapons payloads at supersonic speeds at low level. The characteristics of 
the three major types of Indian strike aircraft can be outlined below. 
Aircraft Quantity Weapons Payload Combat Radius 
Type aiming systems 
SEPECAT 5 sqns DARIN - all 2* R-550 8521an on hi- 
'Jaguar' =110 weather attack Magic' AAMs lo-hi mission 
& ranging + on internal fuel 
system. - 537krn on to- 
4500kg ext. lo-lo mission 
stores with int. fuel. 
MiG-271, 8 sqns PrNK-23 2* R-60 AAMs 540km on lo- 
'Flogger-Y 200 weapons + lo-lo mission 
aiming & with ext. fuel - 
release system 4000kg ext. 225km on lo- 
+ RSBN-6S stores lo-lo mission 




MiG-23BN 3 sqns PrNK-23 2* R-60 AAMs 400krn on lo- 
Tlogger-IT 70 nav/attack + lo-lo mission 
system. with ext. fuel 
3000kg ext. 
stores 
TOTAL Number of Strike Aircraft 380 
Sources . 67 B. Gunston, The Osl2rgy Engycloi2edia of Russian Aircraft: 1875-1995 
(London: Osprey, 1995 )&D. Donald & J. Lake, Engyclopedia of World-Militaly 
Aircraft (London: Aerospace, 1994) 
" This table was compiled from the sources listed by the author. 
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When looking at the characteristics of any strike aircraft, a number of very 
important factors must be taken into account. The combat radius of any combat aircraft 
can be significantly expanded by the use of external fuel tanks or by reducing the 
weapons load, or by a combination of the two. Two air-to-air missiles are usually carried 
for self-defence. 
The above aircraft can carry and deliver nuclear weapons and, at least in the case 
of the MiG-27 & Jaguar, there is some shielding of the aircraft navigation and attack 
systems against the Electro-Magnetic Pulse ( EMP ) effect that is produced by the 
detonation of a nuclear weapon. " The fact that both the Jaguar and MiG-27 had 
important nuclear roles in ther countries of origin lends credibility to the assertion that 
these two aircraft types will form the backbone of any Indian aircraft based nuclear 
strike component. 
India's MiG-27 fleet also carries a comprehensive range of computer managed 
internal ECM equipment to increase its chances of penetrating hostile airspace. " The 
Jaguars also have some ECM equipment, but this is currently being enhanced with the 
68 The RSBN-6S fitted to the MiG-27 is optimised for and associated with 
the nuclear strike role. The DARIN system in the Jaguar is almost certainly 
optimised for the nuclear role since both the British and French used the 
aircraft for the nuclear strike role. The French, in particular, widely used 
the single-seat Jaguar-A as a nuclear strike aircraft -2 sqns with a single 
AN 52 on the centreline pylon - while four RAF nuclear strike sqns 
Nos. 14,17,20 & 31 ) used the single seat GR. Mk. l. India's Jaguar 
Internationals are equipped to a much higher standard than Jaguars of either 
Britain or France. 
see Donald & Lake, Encyclopedia of World Military Aircraft: Volume 2, pp. 376- 
379 
69 B. Gunston, The Osprev Encyclopedia of Russian Aircraft: 1875-1995 
London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1995 ), p. 216 
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purchase of ECM equipment from Israel. ' The MiG-23s, however, while having 
considerable electronic warfare equipment, are not up to the same standard as the other 
two aircraft types. 71 
Conclusions - India's nuclear capability & delivery systems 
India has the capability to deploy a very substantial nuclear arsenal in a fairly 
short period of time. At present, delivery systems will consist of manned aircraft - 
especially Jaguars - and Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) like thePrithvi'. 
However, in the next few years, this situation could change quite dramatically. 
As this chapter has shown, India has the technical capacity to manufacture both 
IRBMs & ICBMs. It is possible that the Indian nuclear arsenal would go from 85 fission 
weapons delivered by Jaguars/MiG-27Ms &a few Trithvis'in 1995 to well over two 
hundred fission and enhanced fission warheads (100-150kt) mounted on IRBMs & 
ICBMs, possibly with MIRVs, within the next decade. 
It is not known whether or not India has overtly deployed or will deploy, nuclear 
weapons. This is now a political, and not a technical matter and only time will tell which 
way India decides. The other option is for India to continue with its current policy of 
nuclear ambiguity but with a slight twist - instead of an undeclared, unweaponized 
arsenal - India could move, without anyone noticing to possessing an undeclared, but 
fully weaponized nuclear arsenal. India! s options are wide open. 
71 'India is close to ordering Israeli Radar Jammers', p. 19 in Flight 
International: 10-16 January 1996 
1 Gunston, Encvcloy)edia of Russian Aircraft, p. 215 
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Pakistan's Delivery Systems: Part 1- Missiles 
When dealing with the Pakistani missile program, one is faced with the same 
problems as with the Pakistani nuclear program. There is considerable confusion over 
the state of the indigenous Pakistani program. It remains uncertain if either of the two 
Pakistani missiles, Tlatf- F and 'Hatf-2' have actually entered production. Moreover, 
there has been a recent flurry of rumours concerning the transfer of Chinese M- II 
missiles to Pakistan, and reports that China is helping to construct a missile 
manufacturing plant. Pakistan's space prograrn plays virtually no role in its missile 
program. Unlike India, the Pakistani space program possesses very limited capabilities 
and is incapable of assisting in any meaningful way. Since neither Pakistan nor China 
admits to the presence of M- II missiles - in fact they both strenuously deny it - the 
accuracy of some elements can be called into question. 
The Pakistani missile program first came into prominence in 1989, roughly a 
year after the first launch of the 'Prithvi', when it was announced that Pakistan had flight 
tested two surface-to-surface missiles. On II February 1989, Pakistan claimed that two 
SSMs, one with an 80 km range and the other with a 300 km range, each carrying a 500 
kg payload, had been successfully tested. ' 
There is no evidence that Pakistan continued with as vigorous a testing program 
as the Indians did withPrithvi'. In fact, Leonard Spector has made particular note of this 
point. " The missiles, the'Hatf-1'80km range system, were displayed at the Joint 
72 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 341, note 82 
73 ibid p. 103 
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Services Parade in Islamabad in 1989. ' It is, however, almost inconceivable that the 
system could have been fully operational at this time. These missiles are roughly 
comparable to the ex-Soviet'Scud'and FROG families. While their payload of 500kg 
has been confirmed, no information has been released regarding their accuracy. There 
has also been no mention of what types of warheads have been considered for use. 
Without this information it becomes difficult for any clear assessments to be made 
regarding their military use. 
One thing, however, is abundantly clear, the'Hatf-lappears to have a limited 
capability and with a range of 80 Ian, it has very limited flexibility. The 'Hatf-2' seems to 
have been supplanted by imported Chinese M- II missiles. Indian analysts are uncertain 
whether or not the 'Hatf-2' project continues since there have been no reports of tests or 
deployment for several years. This system, with a range of 300 km and a payload of 
500kg, is claimed to be comparable to the Indian'Prithvi' in size and potential. However, 
without undergoing at least a few more tests, it is highly unlikely that the system is 
anywhere near ready for induction. 
What is more remarkable is that the Chinese M-1 I missile bears a striking 
resemblance in performance to the elusive Tlatf-2'. The reported transfer of these M-1 I 
missiles to Pakistan has dominated the news about Pakistan's missile program. 
Reports of the transfer of Chinese missiles have frequently featured in the Indian 
press and in fragmentary reports from the United States intelligence agencies. It now 
appears clear, however, that some M-1 I missiles have been obtained from China. After 
74 Jane's Defence Weekly: 15 April 1989, p. 635 
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considerable reluctance, the U. S. government now appears willing to admit that about 
30-60 M-1 I missiles as well as 5,000 ring magnets for the Kahuta enrichment plant 
have been delivered to Pakistan. " 
There are also reports that the Chinese are also helping to construct a ballistic 
missile manufacturing plant near Rawalpindi. ' This is clearly aimed at solving one of 
Pakistan's biggest problems - India! s numerical missile superiority. While Pakistan 
possesses a few M- II missiles and may have a number of 'Haft-l'systems, it lacks any 
large scale manufacturing capacity. This is critical since, if the 'Hatf-l' and M-1 I 
systems are to be used with conventional warheads, substantial numbers will be needed. 
Using the Pakistani missiles with nuclear warheads presents a entirely different 
problem. While some reports have indicated that the Chinese nuclear design allegedly 
passed on to Pakistan weighed only 180 kg, 77other, more recent sources suggest that the 
Chinese design was actually from their fourth atmospheric test, which was used to 
provide the warhead of the 'Dong Feng-2A! missile. 7' If this is true, this would have 
weighed over 1000 kg. 'nis is much greater than the payload of any of the systems in 
service with Pakistan. It is probable that Pakistan will be able to eventually minaturize 
the warhead to fit onto their existing missiles. 
The indigenous Pakistani missile program has not made much apparent progress 
for some time and it is uncertain as to whether research still continues. Reports of a 600 
's Indian Express: I February 1997 
7' P. Sawhney, 'Standing Alone', p. 27 
77 Spector Nuclear Ambitions, p. 99 
70 Sawhney 'Standing Alone', p. 27 
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km range missile - the'Hatf-3'- being under development have not been confirmed by 
any reliable n sources. There have also been some sporadic reports of Chinese M-9 
missiles having been delivered. 
The reported characteristics of Pakistan's missiles are as follows: 
Type Range Payload Comments 
Hatf-I 80 km, 500 kg in service 
Hatf-2 300krn 500kg status unknown 
M-1 I 290krn 500kg 30-60 delivered 
Hatf-3 600kim 500kg development 
Source: J. Hackett Ballistic Missile Threat 0 India & Pakistan 
MISS website - www. cdiss. org: 80/column3. htrn 
It is most interesting to note that the range and payload statistics of the M-1 I fall 
just short of those bound by the MTCR ( 300km and 500 kg ). Indian analysts point out 
that the M-1 I's range can be easily be extended by reducing its payload. 7' 
Pakistan! s missile program is neither as extensive nor as sophisticated as India! s. 
With no space program to draw upon, the missile program has had to operate alone. 
With considerable Chinese assistance Pakistan has acquired a number of ballistic 
missiles and manufacturing technology. There remains, however, some doubt as to 
whether Pakistan can manufacture nuclear warheads small enough for its missiles. 
79 Mention should be made of the'Ghauril 1500km range IRBM tested on 
April 1998. Much controversy surrounds this ( including doubts about its 
range and whether it is an IRBM at all ), but one thing is clear, it is 
sometime away from operational status and as such has not been discussed. 
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Mlivery Systems : Part 2- Aircraft 
As in the case of its much larger counterpart, the Indian Air Force, Pakistan's Air 
Force operates a large number of nuclear capable strike aircraft. and, it is even more 
likely that Pakistan's primary nuclear weapons delivery system will be aircraft rather 
than missiles. Pakistan! s aircraft, like India! s are a mix of some extremely sophisticated 
types and a larger number of older types, the cutting edge being composed of American 
supplied F- I 6s. Forty of these extremely potent aircraft have been delivered to Pakistan 
and about thirty-four remain in service. ' There were some problems with spares - due to 
an embargo from the United States, and plans for further acquisitions have had to be 
shelved. 
As impressive as these aircraft are, the Pakistani Air Force faces a major 
dilemma when considering them for the nuclear strike role. The F- I 6A/B is not only 
Pakistan's most potent strike aircraft, but also the PAR only truly effective all-weather 
interceptor. In fact, of the three squadrons currently equipped with the type, all have air 
superiority as their primary role. " This means that the nuclear strike role may have to be 
relegated to some of the older types in the Pakistani Air Force. 
Pakistan operates over 70 Mirage HI and 70 Mirage V aircraft. 112 These have been 
augmented by ex-Spanish aircraft which are to be used for spares. These aircraft are old 
1960s vintage types, but are still viable combat aircraft and may have had their older 
00 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 
1996-1997, p. 166 ( London: Oxford University Press, 1996 ) 
81 Singh, Rikhye, Steinemann, Fiza'Ya, pp. 133-134 The squadrons equipped 
with F-16s are Nos. 9,11 & 14 
82 Donald & Lake, Encyclopedia of World Military Aircraft: Volume 1, 
p. 126 & p. 129 
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avionics upgraded. The Pakistani Air Force is apparently quite satisfied with these 
aircraft and intends to keep them in service for some time. Alternatively, this could 
simply reflect the fact that Pakistan has so far been unable to obtain more advanced 
aircraft in spite of prolonged negotiations for Mirage 2000-5s from France. 
The bulk of Pakistan's tactical attack force is made up of three squadrons of 
Nanchang A-5 attack aircraft. " These fonn the 36 Tactical Attack Wing, and are 
dedicated to the ground support of the Pakistani army. These aircraft could theoretically 
be used for the delivery of nuclear weapons, but they lack any advanced avionics and 
possess only an extremely basic countermeasures suite. They are unlikely to be able to 
penetrate the Indian air defence network and as such cannot be Pakistan's first choice for 
the delivery of nuclear weapons. 
The bulk of the Pakistan Air Force consists of a large number of Chinese F-7s 
and F-6s - clones of the MiG-21 & MiG-19 respectively. " The F-7s are being upgraded 
with a new radar, but these two types possess a very short range and are not equipped 
vvith modem countermeasures. These aircraft are unlikely to be committed to the strike 
role. These aircraft will be fully occupied in the air defence role in any future Indo- 
Pakistan conflict. While a few might be spared for occasional strike missions, the bulk 
of the attack sorties will probably be flown by older aircraft types. Nonetheless, it is 
possible that Pakistan might reserve F-16s for special strike roles and this may include 
nuclear weapons delivery. As such it is necessary to consider the F-16 alongside the 
03 Donald & Lake, Encyclopedia of World Military Aircraft: Volume 
Z, p. 331 
" IISS, Military Balance - 1996-97, p. 166 
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Nanchang A-5 and the Mirage IIJIV family when discussing Pakistani attack 
aircraft. 
The characteristics and inventory of Pakistani attack aircraft may be summarized 
below: 
Aircraft Type Number Payload - Total Combat Radius 
F-16A/B 34 7575 kg 547 kin 
- hi-lo-hi attack 
profile 
- 3000 kg bombs 
Mirage HI/V 140 4000 kg 685 km 
- lo-lo-lo attack 
profile 
- 800 kg bombs + 
3 drop tanks 
Nanchang A-5 60 - approx. 1000 kg 400 krn 
- lo-lo-lo attack 
profile 
- 1000 kg bombs 
Total Number of 250 - approx 
I 
Aircraft 
Source: Compiled from details in D. Donald & J. Lake, Engyclol2edia of World Milita1y 
Aircraft - Volume I&2 
The figures given for the payload of the aircraft include, not only bombs but also 
external fuel tanks as well as self-defence air-to-air missiles. Both the F- I 6s & Mirages 
possess fire-control radars, but these are not optimised for nuclear weapons delivery. 
Conclusions - Pakistan's Nuclear Capability & Delivery Systems 
Pakistan possesses the ability to manufacture atomic weapons and has a working 
design. Pakistan's missile capability is limited, but is growing - with Chinese assistance. 
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Pakistan's Air Force possesses a number of strike aircraft, but will have to divert F- I 6s 
from their primary air defence role or rely on older, but still effective, Mirage III/Vs. As 
Pakistan's missile capability grows, greater emphasis will be placed on ballistic missiles 
as a means of nuclear weapons delivery. 
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The shape of future arsenals & possible command structures 
Having looked at the basic capabilities of both India and Pakistan, what could 
future arsenals look like ? Moreover, are there, and will there be secure command 
structures in place to enable nuclear weapons to be operated with a reasonable degree of 
safety from an accidental launch 
In India there is a great deal of speculation about the structure of an Indian 
arsenal could and should look like. As may be expected there are as many different 
views as there are analysts, but two main schools of thought can be distinguished - the 
maximalist and the minimalist. 
The maximalist school of thought is best represented by Brigadier V. K. Nair 
whose views are outlined in his 1992 book Nuclear Indi . In this book, Brigadier Nair 
outlines a future Indian nuclear arsenal comprising 132 warheads and including 
submarine launched ballistic missiles and land based IRBMs. Some other analysts have 
further argued that India should not stop at IRBMs, but should go further and develop 
an 'all-horizons' deterrent including ICBMs. The minimalist approach is itself divided 
into two main schools of thought. Some advocate a non-weaponized deterrent, believing 
that this is the status quo, while others advocate the overt deployment of a small number 
of warheads and delivery systems which can be easily developed and deployed at a 
relatively low cost. India seems to be moving towards a combination of all these 
schools. 
Brigadier Nair calls for the deployment of 132 warheads - to be used against 17 
targets in Pakistan and 8 targets in China. Ile also allows for a 65% reserve for 
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reliability and a 20% post-war reserve. " His proposed delivery systems include five 
ballistic missile submarines, with sixteen missiles each, and thirty-six land-based 
missiles, both SRBMs and IRBMs. "' It will be noted that he does not propose the 
deployment of ICBMs. This is in contrast to the views of some advocates of the all- 
horizons capability. 
The non-weaponized approach is easily the most popular among academics in 
India and among manyIndia-experts'in the west. This means that India would have all 
the components in place for nuclear weapons, but not actually assemble them and keep 
them away from delivery systems. " This is supposedly different from the status quo 
because it would be overt and verifiable by inspection. The theory is that a certain level 
of deterrence can be reached providing India and Pakistan arrive at some kind of 
understanding with regards to capped but live weapons capabilities. "' The problem here 
is that this is not going to provide much by way of deterrence versus China. 
The second body of opinion in the minimalist school advocates the deployment 
of a small number of warheads and delivery systems. The most articulate advocate of 
this point of view is K. Subrahmanyam, who suggests that a small force of about sixty 
125 kiloton warheads be deployed, split evenly between manned aircraft, IRBMs and 
84 V. K. Nair, Nuclear India (New Delhi: Lancer Publications, 1992), p. 181 
" ibid pp. 170-172 
96 V. Sahni, 'Going Nuclear' pp. 91-92 in D. Cortright & A. Mattoo, India 
and the Bomb: Public ODinion and Nuclear ODtions ( Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1996 ) 
" ibid p. 92 This is the view held by George Perkovich - refered to in 
the introduction - and is an extension of the 'existential deterrence, theory 
proposed by McGeorge Bundy. 
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SRBMs. " These would be earmarked for use solely against cities and soft area targets 
and would be used as a second strike option. 
India is making no overt moves - as yet - to declare itself a nuclear power, and 
there have been no overt moves to marry warheads to delivery systems. At the same 
time, working designs and the production capacity for weapons ranging in yield from 
15-20 kiltons to several hundred kilotons have been established. Moreover, India has 
taken its MM and SRBM capability to the production stage, since'Agni'can be 
deployed without further testing, and has done considerable work on ICBMs to the 
point that an Indian ICBM could be developed and deployed with virtually no warning. 
In addition, India has plutonium stockpiles sufficient for an arsenal of perhaps more 
than two hundred weapons ( if some material from power reactors is used ). This means 
that India can deploy an arsenal in size and yield to those envisaged by Nair and 
Submhmanyam. 
Thus India has a nuclear weapons and delivery capability that permits it to 
develop and deploy, very rapidly, an arsenal comprising 150 warheads of various yields 
Wth delivery being carried out by manned aircraft, 'Prithvi' SRBMs andAgni'IRBMs. 
Moreover, with very little notice, India could move to an'all-horizons'position with the 
development and deployment of a limited number of ICBMs based on its PSLV 
rocket. " Perhaps the most interesting part is that India may be able to develop and 
80 K. Subrahmanyam, 'Nuclear Force Design and Minimum Deterrence Strategy 
for India' in B. Karnad ed. Future ImDerilleds Indian Security in the 1990s 
and Beyond ( New Delhi: Viking, 1994 ), pp. 176-195 
" The only thing missing is the submarine launched ballistic missile 
capability proposed by Brigadier Nair. This, it would appear, is far too 
costly for India and is virtually impossible to conceal. India can hide 
mobile IRBM and ICBMs in forests and in tunnels, but it would be impossible 
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deploy these systems without actually crossing the rubicon and declaring itself a nuclear 
power. 
In stark contrast, there is little clear indication of what Pakistan's nuclear 
ambitions are. Unlike India, there is no wide-ranging debate on how many warheads 
should be deployed, or on how many delivery systems should be procured. Nonetheless, 
some reasonably accurate assessments can be made about what Pakistan's nuclear 
arsenal would consist of in the near future. 
Based on what was discussed in the previous chapters, it is clear Pakistan will, in 
the near future, be able to deploy around 30 basic fission weapons based on its limited 
indigenous production base. While Pakistan may well be able to manufacture a few 
more, estimates on just how many more would be extremely unreliable. ' As far as 
delivery systems are concerned, Pakistan, like India, has nuclear capable strike aircraft 
and some ballistic missile capability. Pakistan may, in the not so distant future, be able 
to deploy nuclear armed SRBMs and perhaps IRBMs- 
One of the key questions relating to the possibility of a nuclear armed India is 
that of how secure and reliable is its nuclear command structure. There is little reliable 
information as to whether or not there is a nuclear command structure at all. However, 
there is a clearly defined military command structure and there is an established civilian 
hierarchy, both of which will serve adequately should a retaliatory strike be needed. 
Under the Indian Constitution, the highest political authority is the Prime 
to conceal the vast bulk of a ballistic missile submarine. 
90 Similarly, how much of the plutonium from India's commercial reactors 
has been diverted for weapons use is a matter for speculation and estimates 
are prone to be unreliable. 
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Minister while the Supreme Commander of the armed forces is the President. " 
Therefore, it would be expected that the National Command Authority ( NCA ) would 
be headed by the Prime Minister with the exisiting Cabinet Committee on Political 
Affairs ( CCPA ) as an aide to the decision making process. ' 
Much will depend on whether India adopts a Launch on Warning or Launch 
Through Attack policy. General Sundadi argues convincingly that India should adopt 
93 the latter since the former is very prone to accidental launches. Having adopted this 
policy, a less complicated and intricate command structure may well prove adequate. 
What is needed is a clear chain of command. General Sundarji believes that the first 
stage would be the establishment of an interim NCA and specifying both the political 
and military chains of command. " This is not particularly difficult for India to do. 
As regards command, control, communications and intelligence ( C31 ), no clear 
picture emerges ofjust how advanced India is in this area. India is, as discussed earlier, 
establishing a secure C31 system for its army under project AREN and the air force and 
navy have similar programmes in place. However, there is no indication of a secure 
command structure being developed for the political authority. 
It has often been argued, by scholars like Neil Joeck, that the Indian military has 
91 Nair, Nuclear India, p. 119 
" loc. cit. 
" Sundarji, Blind Men of Hindoostan, p. 74. It is also important to 
realise that the close proximity of India and Pakistan leads to a very short 
verification time. In addition, the Launch Through Attack policy also ties in 
with India's decision to make both the 'Agnil( if produced ) and 'Prithvil 
systems mobile. 
" ibid pp. 88-89 
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been entirely kept out of nuclear planning. " This is not so. During the Narasimha Rao 
government, a nuclear planning group was constituted that included the Chief of the Air 
Staff. 96 The Air Chief at the time was Air Chief Marshal S. K. Kaul who was also 
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and as the Army and Navy Chiefs rotate 
through the Chainnan's position, they would also be part of the nuclear planning group. 
More evidence of military involvement in nuclear planning comes from the fact that Air 
Headquarters is examining the possibility of a Strategic Air Command to control all 
strategic assets, including long range strike aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles. The 
intention is to bring missiles earmarked for the nuclear strike role under the control of 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee. " This has already been done for the arrny's'Prithvi' 
missiles which are under the control of Army Headquarters. "' 
So where does this leave the reliability of India! s CM structure ? If India adheres 
to solely a second strike policy, in other words a no-first use policy, then the existing 
system, as rudimentary as it is, should prove more or less adequate. The existing 
military chain of command could be relatively easily given the authority to order a 
retaliatory strike and a list of targets could be drawn up at fairly short notice. According 
to Dr. V. Arunachalam, should Delhi be destroyed, a theatre commander would go to a 
safe and follow the instructions given for nuclear retaliation contained therein. " Neil 
95 N. Joeck, 'Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia': Adelphi PaDer 
London: IISS, 1997 ), p. 53 
96 Sawhney, To Test or Not to Test, p. 32 
" loc. cit 
'a Obtained in discussions with Mr. 'C' in April 1998 
99 Joeck, 'Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asial, p. 62 
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Joeck contends that this leads to questions regarding the security of this arrangement 
and the necessity to validate orders in the absence of a national commander. ' 'Such 
concerns would be even more valid if India were to move to a first-strike posture. 
Should India need to rctaliate, however, the theatre commander would have the 
authority to follow the retaliatory orders without question. 
However, if India should consider a first-strike policy, its C31 structure would 
prove to be woefully inadequate. This is also true if India seeks to build a formal 
deterrent against China. There is a much greater chance of an accidental or poorly 
advised launch than in the case of the five declared nuclear powers. Should India move 
towards an arsenal including IRBMs and ICBMs, as advocated by the maximalists, 
there would need to be substantial investments in CM facilties. As of now India does not 
seem to be doing this. Until this happens, any move by India to overtly deploy IRBMs 
or ICBMs would be viewed with great constemation by India! s neighbours as much for 
the physical threat to them as for fears about the inadequacy of the Indian command 
structure. China would be very wary if the current ad hoc system that seems to exist for 
a nuclear strike against Pakistan continues with IRBMs targetted against Beijing. 
There is one thing to consider: India could put in place the necessary C31 
requirements without attracting much attention. It is conceivable that India could have 
already begun work on a thorough nuclear command structure. 
In stark contrast to the chronic shortage of information on India's nuclear 
command structure, some interesting and apparently reliable reports have emerged 
0 loc. cit. 
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regarding the Pakistani nuclear command structure. "is is an interesting reversal from 
the considerable quantity information available on India's nuclear potential and the lack 
of such infonnation regarding Pakistan. 
Pakistan is a state dominated by the army, ( not the armed forces, but the army). 
It is therefore of no real surprise that the most recent and reliable reports give the army 
control of the nuclear program and, presumably, any existing nuclear arsenal. According 
to Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, the nuclear decision-making system is headed by the army 
in consultation with the nuclear bureaucracy and the Corps Commanders Conference. "' 
The President and Prime Minister are very much secondary figures in this structure, 
with the unelected President until recently having a higher status than the Prime 
Minister. " 
As in the case of India, little is known about the status of Pakistan's C31 
facilities. Pakistan has no communications satelites and the overall level of 
communications technology is highly variable. Like India, many Pakistani military 
installations are buried underground, but again there is no sign that a secure 
underground command post for the political establishment exists. 
The dominance of the Pakistani army in the command structure must be a cause 
of some concern. The Pakistani army has traditionally been the most aggressive element 
101 Dr, A. Siddiqa-Aghat'Ad hocracy, decision-making and Pakistan's arms 
production and nuclear projects', Indian Defence Review: July-Sept. 1996, 
pp. 26-27 
112 It is important to explain here that recently, the Nawaz Sharif 
administration has been able to regain control of the Presidency by the 
installation of a pliable figure into that office. Up until the death of 
General Zia-ul-Haq, the office of the Pakistani President and the Army 
Command were identical. 
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in the Pakistani political structure and as a result India views this as extremely 
disturbing. There is a risk that the Pakistani military could initiate a nuclear strike 
without any restraint from the civilian authorities and without the support of the elected 
govemment. 
The same questions that are raised about the reliability of the Indian command 
structure are echoed when looking at the Pakistani command structure. So long as a 
second-strike policy is adhered to, this command structure could function quite 
adequately and without too much of a risk of an accidental launch. However, should 
Pakistan move towards a first-use policy, then the concerns of the Indian government 
will grow. 
One of the major problems facing India and Pakistan is the fact that they are not 
declared nuclear powers. They are therefore very reluctant to develop a command 
structure that could give an indication of a possible nuclear arsenal. This is part of the 
unhealthy air of secrecy over every aspect of the nuclear debate, but is far more serious 
since it detennines the very stability of the nuclear equation in South Asia. 
Since neither side admits to having nuclear weapons or to having a nuclear 
command structure, both countries continue to be highly suspicious of each other and to 
have no proper dialogue regarding the risks of accidental nuclear war. Moreover, the air 
of mistrust that exists ensures that confidence building measures will sound like hollow 
promises to many in both India and Pakistan. This is a major flaw in the arguments of 
those who advocate a continuation of the status quo. 
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Chapter Four: The Nuclear Battlefield - India vs Pflkistan 
India and Pakistan face each other on some of the most varied and inhospitable 
battlefields in the world. Both armies have undergone major modernization and 
reorganization programmes and have sought to bring their military establishments up to 
much higher technological and tactical standards. The Indian and Pakistani armed forces 
are two extremely competent military establishments and should not be underestimated. 
This chapter will exwnine nuclear weapons in the context of their possible use on 
the India-Pakistan battlefield. It outlines the structure and the organizations of the 
principal fighting formations of the Indian and Pakistani armies will be given, including 
a reasonably detailed account of the ongoing modemization/re-structuring programme 
currently being undertaken by the Indian anny. In addition, the standard of NBC 
warfare training will be assessed. This will then be followed by an assessment of the 
various theatres of possible battle and the overall tactics to be adopted by each side in 
order to achieve their desired objectives. The advantages and disadvantages of nuclear 
weapons against available battlefield targets will then be examined. This examination 
vAll also explore the chances of successful nuclear strike against a principal offensive 
fort-nation of either army. Few publications in either India or Pakistan discuss the 
battlefield impact of nuclear weapons. This is not surprising and is in keeping with the 
policy of nuclear ambiguity that currently holds sway over the political and military 
elites of both countries. A discussion of this aspect of the India-Pakistan nuclear 
equation must be carried out as it may determine nuclear strategy against civilian 
targets. 
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The Indian & Pakistani Armies: - Organization & Structure 
Some of the basic formations that exist in both armies are virtually identical in 
India and Pakistan, indeed in most Western influenced armies, and as such some 
generalizations can be made. The basic infantry fighting formation is the battalion. It is 
composed of four rifle companies and headquarters and support companies. Its heaviest 
weapons are generally mortars and machine guns, though some may also have anti-tank 
and surface-to-air missiles. ' In addition to basic infantry battalions, mechanized, 
parachute and commando battalions also exist, each created, trained and equipped for a 
special role. ' 
An average infantry battalion has the following structure: ' 
Battalion HQ 
Support Weapons Infantry Companies *4 
Mortars I 
Machine Guns each with 3 infantry platoons 
SAMs/ ATGMs 
Artillery and armoured formations have battalion equivalents called regiments. 
These are organized in a similar manner - armoured regiments have four tank squadrons 
' IDR Research Team, 'Some thoughts on the Evolution of Infantry 
Organization and Tactics' , Lt. Gen. M. Thomas ed. Indian Defence Review: July 1991, p. 52-53 
2 Maj. Gen. A. Karim ed., The Indian Amed Forces -A Basir Q,, iCjt--, ( New 
Delhi: Lancer Publ., 1995 ), pp. 30-31 
I Loc. cit 
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while artillery regiments have between three and four artillery batteries! All of these 
formations are of similar size, about one thousand men. Battalion sized formations are 
amalgamated with other formations to form brigades. 
In the India-Pakistan context, the most important formation is the brigade. Like 
the battalion, there are armour and artillery equivalents, but all share a basic similarity of 
structure. A brigade consists of three battalions or regiments and is usually provided 
vAth some supporting equipment - artillery and heavy mortars in the case of armour and 
infantry units. Some brigades, however, are designed to operate independehtly and these 
are given more supporting elements, including engineering and signals as well as 
additional artillery. ' 
A typical brigade would have the following structure, whether operating as part 
of a division or indcpendently: 
Brigade HQ 
Support Elements 
Battalion Battalion Battalion I 
III 
Artillery Signals Engineers 
Brigades are usually grouped together, with additional artillery, engineering, 
ibid pp. 36-41 
ibid P. 26 
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signals and other support elements to form a division. India and Pakistan operate two 
basic types of division: infantry and annoured. ' India! s infantry divisions are divided 
into plains and mountains formations which, as their names suggest are trained and 
equipped to fight in different geographic environments. The mountain divisions are 
primarily earmarked for use against China, though they could be converted for use on 
the plains after reequipment. 7 
A typical infantry division comprises three infantry brigades, an artillery brigade 
and an armoured regimene. Support elements include an engineer regiment, a signal 
regiment and an air observation post flight, in addition to medical, transport, supply and 
repair units. ' Mountain divisions lack the armoured regiment and tend to have smaller 
calibre artillery. They also have more engineering and support/logistics elements than 
plains formations. ' 
Division HQ 
Infantry Artillery Armoured Engineer Signal Supply Medical Repair 
Brigade *3 Brigade Regiment Regt. Regt 
6 India attempted to create a mechanized division in the late 1980s. 
However, no effective use could be found for such a formation and it was 
converted into an armoured division. 
A recent development in both armies is the creation of a specialist 
Artillery Division comprising three independent artillery brigades. 
7 Karimf Indian Armed Forces, p. 25 
8 IDR Research Team, I Some thoughts on the Evolution of Infantry 
Organization and Tactics 1, p. 53 
9 Lt. Gen. M. Thomas, 'The RAPID: An appraisal of India's new look 
infantry division for warfare in the plains ',. Indian Defence Review: January 
1989, p. 92 
10 IDR Research Team, 'Some thoughts on Evolution of Infantry 
Organization and Tactics', pp. 53-54 
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Ilis represents the typical organization of a plains infantry fon-nation". 
The largest formation of any army is the corps. This formation, pioneered by 
Napoleon, consists of three divisions and their supporting arms. In the South-Asia 
context, there are two types of corps: Holding Corps and Strike Corps. The fon-ner are 
designed for defensive operations while the latter is the principal offensive formation of 
both annies. 
The Indian Army: Order of Battle 
The Indian army consists of II Corps sized formation with a total of 36 divisions 
and a number of independent brigades. The cutting edge of the Indian army is centred 
around three powerful Strike Corps - each built around one armoured division. The 
other eight Corps are defined as Holding Corps, though they may have significant 
offensive potential. There may be some minor changes to the ORBAT, but no 
significant changes are expected in the foreseeable future. There are some differences 
between the ORBAT outlined below and that listed in many published sources, but this 
ORBAT is more representative of the current Indian army than other sources. The 
Indian Army Order of Battle is outlined below: 12 
11 Karim, Indian Armed Forces, p. 26 
12 ORBAT taken from Asian Age: 12-13 November 1994. This differs 
significantly from the ORBAT given in the IISS Military Balance, but is far 
more accurate. The article was written by Pravin Sawhney. The author 
discussed this ORBAT with both Sawhney and other Indian officers, it was 
generally agreed that the ORBAT listed below was reasonably accurate. 
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5 Regional Commands 
I 
II Corps Headquarters 
3 Strike Corps &8 Holding Corps 
I 
3 armoured divisions 18 41571 
infantry RAPIDS artillery independent indep. parachute 
divisions division armoured infantry brigade 
10 Mountain Divisions brigades brigades 
In addition to these combat formations, the Indian army has four engineer 
bdgades and 14 Army Aviation Corps Helicopter Units. 13 A separate Corps of Air 
Defence Artillery operates six air defence brigades and two surface-to-air missile 
grDUpS. 14 These elements are assigned to formations on a need basis, though, with 
CADA units in particular, many are earmarked for deployment and operations with 
specific formations. 
As mentioned before, the principal offensive formations of the Indian army are 
the, three Strike Corps -I Corps, 2 Corps & 21 Corps. " These are built around a nucleus 
of a single armoured division and two infantry divisions - probably with more 
13 loc. cit. The Army Aviation Corps operates a mix of light utility 
helicopters, some of which are armed with anti-tank missiles. Proposals to 
transfer the IAF helicopter gunship squadrons to the AAC failed to produce 
any result. 
" CADA is responsible for army air defence and has a wide range of 
guns and missiles at their disposal. CADA is in the process of a massive re- 
equipment and modernization programme which will dramatically enhance its 
capability. This will have a major impact on the ability of enemy aircraft 
to damage key army formations and will be dealt with in more detail later in 
this chapter. 
" 21 Corps is built around 33 Armoured Division. This was formerly 33 
Mechanized Division, but the Indian army failed to find a use for such a 
formation and as such decided to convert it into a full-fledged armoured 
division. 
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mechanized brigades than basic infantry formations. The typical Strike Corps has the 












division division *2 brigade" brigade brigade 
The Holding Corps are not as well supplied with support; from either CADA or 
the engineers as the Strike Corps, and do not possess annoured fonnations Iýrger than 
brigades and the armoured regiments attached to the infantry regiments. These 
formations have significant offensive capability, but are largely designed to operate in a 
defensive role. 
The Indian anny possesses a fairly varied arsenal of reasonably advanced 
weapons. Each combat arm - armour, artillery and infantry is in the process of a massive 
modernization program which was slowed in the early 1990s thanks to budgetary 
constraints. However, the program has resumed and has started to show some results, 
many of which will have a significant impact on the ability of the army to operate in a 
hostile nuclear environment. The pace, if monitored on a year by year basis, may seem 
slow, but in reality the Indian army is working to a well conceived plan. 
16 Asian Age: 12-13 November 1994 
17 This is in addition to the organic artillery support of the armoured 
and infantry divisions 
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Indian Anny: Status of Combat ATms: 
Armour: 
Indian armour is divided into three basic formations - the division, the 
independent brigade and the armoured regiment of the infantry division. These are 
equipped with three basic types of tanks - the T-72M I, modified T-55s and Vijayantas. 
The Indian army intends to have 65 regiments of armour by the year 2000, each 
with between 55 and 72 tanks. " The T-72M I is now the principal combat tank of the 
army and has replaced the Vijayanta in local production. The new Arjun Main Battle 
Tank is entering service at an extremely slow rate. As of now, 62 regiments exist, with a 
total of over 3,500 tanks: " 
35 regiments T-72MI - over 1900 in service 
13 regiments T-55 - over 700 in service - 200 in store 
14 regiments Vijayanta - over 1000 in service - 1000 in store 
The current Indian fleet of T-72M Is are in the process of a major upgrade 
program which has focussed on the provision of thermal sights, additional armour, 
better ammunition and better fire Protection. " The older tanks have already undergone 
'a P. Sawhney, 'Indian Battletanks: How far will they go V, The Asian 
Age: 11 August 1994, p. 13 
This regiment combat unit is called a 'brick. Much commotion resulted when T- 
72 units were formed with a brick of 45 tanks - with 10 more in reserve - 
compared to the 72 tanks in a Vijayanta brick. 
19 These figures differ significantly from those in the IISS Military 
Balance but are more accurate and are based on discussions with Mr. 'C' in 
April/May 1996 
20 Govt. of India, Ministry of Defence Annual Reporte 1995-1996, p. 56 
These upgrades would solve many, if not all, of the weaknesses of the basic 
T-72 that were so glaring during the 1991 war against Iraq. 
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minor upgrades - night-fighting in both T-55s & Vijayantas and replacement of the 
original I 00mm. guns on the T-55 with 105mm guns. Some of the Vijayantas have been 
given additional applique armour. 21 
Artillery: 
India! s Regiment of Artillery has recently undergone a reorganization programme 
which has resulted in the field branch of artillery being separated from the Corps of Air 
Defence Artillery and the Army Aviation Corps. It now possesses close to 200 
regiments with approximately 4000 pieces of artillery of various types? 2 
The vast bulk of India's artillery is towed - rather surprising considering the 
increased mechanization of the Indian army. The 130mm Catapult and 105mm Abbot 
self-propelled guns are now being phased out of active service due to age and 
mechanical problems? ' The massive competition for 155mm SP guns has been given a 
lower priority and consideration has been given to obtaining several regiments of 
152mm SP guns of Russian origin. ' 
The Artillery Plan 2000 seems to give much priority to the acquisition of large 
21 loc. cit. The number of upgrade programs is taking money needed for 
the induction of the Arjun battle tank 
See also: IDR Research Team, 'Armour Update', Indian Defence Review: January 
1990, pp. 176-178 
22 P. Sawhney, 'India's Artillery is a force in its own right', Jane's 
Defence Weekly: 9 October 1996, p. 35 
23 ibid pp. 35-36 
24 P. Sawhney, 'US for Technology, Russia for Spares', The Asian Age: 26 
January 1995, p. 13 
There have been persistent rumours that 120 2S5 152mm guns will be 'gifted' 
by Russia while negotiations for more advanced 2S19s are in progress. 
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numbers of SP artillery. 2' As it would be difficult, if not impossible, for towed artillery 
to operate effectively in a nuclear environment, one wonders if this says anything about 
lndia! s attitude towards battlefield nuclear warfare. To further complicate the issue, a 
former Chief of Army Staff has written that the nuclear battlefield places less emphasis 
on artillery support while the Regiment of Artillery sometimes voices the opposite! " 
According to informed sources, the new Indian military doctrine emphasises 
attrition warfare over the previous manoeuvre policy. This means that the artillery, 
which used to be a combat support arm, is now classed as a combat arm with priorities 
27 
shifting between direct support and counter-bombardment. The new army tactical 
doctrine will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, however, the basic thrust has 
moved from deep thrusts with mechanized forces to maximum attrition of enemy forces, 
limited manoeuvre and attacks on strategic and operational targets. " Artillery, 
therefore, has a central role to play in any attrition based doctrine. 
The real modernization of Indian artillery is in the development of Surveillance 
and Target Acquisition (SATA) batteries. These are being supplied with indigenously 
manufactured battlefield surveillance radar as well as artillery locating radars? ' This 
2' The emphasis is on the acquisition of more 130mm M-46 field guns and 
the conversion of several 105mm regiments to 130mm while others are slated 
for conversion to 155mm - rebarrelled 130mms. The Prithvi SSM comes under the 
regiment of artillery and is described in another chapter. The artillery is 
also inducting a potent new multiple rocket launcher - the Pinaka. 
26 K. V. Krishna Rao, Prepare or Perish ( New Delhi: Lancer International, 
1991 ), p. 404 
27 Sawhney, 'India's Artillery is a force in its own right', p. 35 
20 Loc. cit. 
29 Ministry of Defence, Growth and Achievements of DRDO in last 10 
years, p. 26 The 'Rajendral radar used by the Akash SAM can be used in the 
artillery locating role. The Stentor Battlefield Surveillance Radar is 
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dramatically enhances the effectiveness of Indian artillery. A number of Israeli made 
Remote Piloted Vehicles are being obtained for the targeting of the Prithvi SSM. " 
The changes being made in Indian artillery give some indication of Indian anny 
tactical thinking. They also give some clues about India! s new military doctrine. The 
problem is that to the outside observer, there seem to be many contradictions in what 
has been publicly been revealed about this military doctrine, especially regarding the 
artillery. 
Infantry: 
The Indian infantry has, since the 1980s, felt itself a neglected service. The major 
re-equipment programs that affected the armoured regiments and, to a lesser extent the 
artillery, did not come to the infantry. This is not to say that the Indian infantry has 
remained unchanged, as it is in fact constantly changing. The infantry's anti-tank, night 
fighting and target acquisition capabilities have been substantially enhanced, and some 
expansion of mechanized infantry units was undertaken. 
By far the most significant development as far as India's infantry is concerned has 
been the creation of the RAPID - Reorganized Army Plains Infantry Division. This is a 
uniquely Indian creation and is specifically designed for the South Asian battlefield. The 
manufactured under license while a number of American made AN/TPQ-37 radars 
may have been ordered. 
30 The Israeli RPVs have already been purchased. Indian designed RPVs 
are now entering production to supplement and then supplant the Israeli 
models. See: Indian Express: January 6 1997 
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basic RAPID has one mechanized infantry and two standard infantry brigades: ` 
Div HQ 
Army Aviation Sqn 
Air Force Mi-25/-35 attack helo. detachment 
Additional Anti-Tank Company -9 launchers 
II 
Inf Mech Brigade 
Brigades x2 
2x T-72 regt 
I mech inf 
Battalion 
IIIII 
Recce & Artillery Engineers Signals Services 
Support Brigade 
battalion I 
4x Tube Arty Regt 
Ix Rocket Arty Regt 
Ix Air Defence Battery 
There are currently four RAPIDS in the Indian army, these being attached to the 
Holding Corps in Punjab and Rajasthan. " The RAPID provides these essentially 
defensive formations with an extremely flexible unit that dramatically enhances their 
ability to withstand offensive operations by Pakistani armour. Moreover, the RAPID 
possesses sufficient arTnoured/mechanized infantry assets to conduct reasonably 
significant offensive operations . 
3' The RAPID is also easily adaptable to NBC warfare. 
The advent of the RAPID was accompanied by a dramatic upgrade of Indian 
army C31 assets and communications. Under plan AREN - Army Radio Engineering 
Network -a secure, real-time network was established, significantly enhancing the 
31 Thomas, 'The RAPID: An appraisal of India's new-look infantry 
division for warfare in the plains', p. 93 
32 ibid p. 101 
33 ibid pp. 93-101 This article provides a detailed, yet concise account 
of how the RAPIDS are likely to be used in both offensive and defensive 
operations. 
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army's ability to conduct and manage major offensive and defensive operations. ' 
Moreover, because it is EMP ( electromagnetic pulse ) shielded, this network provides 
the Indian army, for the first time in its history, with a reliable C31 system that could 
continue functioning in a nuclear environment. This is extremely significant and could 
be an indication of an emerging Indian battlefield nuclear doctrine. 
Indian officers view the infantry as being particularly significant for wars of the 
future and substantial investments are finally being made in terms of equipment 
upgrades and enhanced training. The Indian Army has made the acquisition of better 
anti-tank and personal weapons, communications gear and night-fighting capabilities 
for its infantry a top priority. " 
These will satisfy most, if not all, of the foreseeable infantry modernization 
targets for the next decade. ' Indian officers have also stressed the need for infantry to 
be prepared for NBC warfare and have made this something of a priority. 37 Items such 
as body armour and improved web gear are finally being issued to infantry units. 
In order to cope with massed Pakistani annour, the old 106mm recoilless guns 
issued to infantry anti-tank units are being upgraded as well as supplemented with new 
3' K. Bajpai, P. Chari, P. Cheema, S. Cohen, S. Ganguly, Brasstacks and 
Bevond,, ( Delhi: Manohar, 1995 ), p. 29 
35 P. Sawhney, 'India pushes Self-Reliance Plans', International Defence 
Review: November 1996, p. 6 
3's Brigadier O. Kaushik, 'Infantry in the battlefield of AD 20001, Indian 
Defence Review: July 1989, pp. 31-32 
37 ibid p. 32 See also Ministry of Defence Report 1995-1996, p. 14 
I. 
147 
anti-tank missiles. "' In addition, night vision equipment - of the imaging intensifying as 
well as thermal imaging types - are now being more widely issued to infantry units. " 
These items, while relatively minor in themselves, dramatically enhance the fighting 
potential of the infantry. 
One of the more interesting aspects of India! s infantry modernization is the lower 
importance of increasing mechanization. Mechanized infantry units, mounted in BMP- 
2 infantry combat vehicles are critical components of the Strike Corps and the RAPIDS, 
however, they have not made their way into the rest of the army in any major way. It is 
possible that the Indian army may consider the reorganization of some more infantry 
divisions into RAPIDS, budgetary allocations pennitting. 'o 
Indian infantry formations have undergone some substantial changes in the last 
few years. For the first time, however, the infantry has been given priority over the other 
arms in the acquisition of new equipment. This means that the Indian infantry of the 
next decade will be better organized, and trained and equipped for any possible 
scenario. 
Air Defence: 
India's Corps of Air Defence Artillery - CADA - is one of the newest fonnations 
30 P. Sawhney, 'India pushes Self-Reliance plans', p. 6 The Milan and 
Konkurs ATGMs are manufactured in India and are now standard issue to 
infantry battalions. The 106mm guns are retained for use against secondary 
targets. 
39 The ATGM launchers are fitted with thermal sights while all infantry 
weapons are fitted with image intensifying sights. These systems are locally 
made by Bharat Electronics Limited. 
40 Interview with General Shankar Roy Choudary in Frontline: March 8 
1996, pp. 9-10 The General did not specifically state this but gave the 
impression that some more infantry formations might be reorganized 
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in the Indian army. The Indian army possesses one of the largest array of medium and 
short-range air defence systems of any army in Asia. Moreover, CADA is set for a major 
expansion and reorganization programme which will significantly enhance its lethality. 
At present, CADA has, as its pride of place, two huge missile groups equipped 
with SA-6 surface-to-air missiles. " These are assigned to the Strike Corps and represent 
a powerful deterrent to any attack aircraft. In addition, there are 30 regiments with 
Bofors LA0170 towed anti-aircraft guns, four with ZSU-23/4 self-propelled AA guns 
and a number with towed ZU-23 guns. These are complemented by a number of mobile 
point-defence missile regiments with SA-8b and SA-13 missile units. " 
As part of its modernization programme, CADA's equipment is set for a dramatic 
upgrade. The Strike Corps may well be provided with a new air defence brigade group - 
comprising S-300 PMU-1 (SA-10), OSA-AKM (SA-8b) and ZSU-23/4 or Tanguska 
regiments. " India! s indigenous SAMs - the Akash & Trishul - are to be deployed as 
replacements for the SA-6 and SA-8 respectively and will enter service in the next two 
years. Man-portable SAMs - namely the SA-16 - are used to cover'blind-areas' for 
CADA units as well as being on issue to infantry battalions. 
Not only will these systems be highly effective against aircraft, but the S-300s 
and Akash units would provide a very significant defence against ballistic missiles. This 
" R. Rikhye, The War that Never Was, ( New Delhi: Chanakya 1988 ), p. 61 
'2 ibid pp. 60-61 Man-Portable SAMs - SA-7/-16 etc. are issued to 
provide close protection to SAM groups and enough SA-16s are available to 
equip every infantry battalion. 
43 Obtained from press reports circulating in January 1997. Some of the 
equipment is already in place. The Tanguska is a mobile SP air defence system 
with both missiles and guns. The S-300 PMU-1 deal is under negotiation. 
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would mean that any aircraft or missile attempting to deliver a nuclear, or any other, 
warhead onto an Indian military target will have to contend with an extremely 
sophisticated air defence screen. 
This screen would be most dense at corps and division level and would still have 
a significant impact at brigade level. The only easy targets for Pakistani aircraft or 
missiles would be Indian infantry battalions which would only have a few SA-16 man- 
portable SAMs for air defence. Therefore, the question any Pakistani planner would 
have to ask is whether the benefits of attacking a major Indian combat formation with 
nuclear weapons are worth the risk -a risk which is getting higher and higher. 
The Pakistani A=s Order of Battle 
The Pakistani army is organized into nine Corps and Force Command Northern 
Area. These contain 22 divisions, 15 independent brigades (6 armoured and 9 infantry), 
9 Corps artillery brigades, 7 engineering brigades and 15 army aviation squadrons - 
including two of attack helicopters. ' In addition, the Pakistani army has 8 air defence 
brigades. It must be pointed out however, that Pakistani brigades and divisions are 
somewhat smaller than their Indian counterparts. Again, this order of battle differs to a 
certain extent from that normally quoted. The order of battle is as follows: ` 
" Asian Age: 12-13 November 1994 After this article was written, a 
third armoured division was raised. 
" 10C. Cit 
150 
9 Corps HQ + Force Command Northern Area 
3 19 69987 is 
armoured infantry arind. inf arty. air defence engineer aviation 
divisions divisions brigs. brigs brigs brigades brigades sqns. 
Pakistan's two principal fighting formations are Army Reserve North (ARN) and 
Army Reserve South (ARS). These are an approximate equivalent to the Indian Strike 
Corps in terms of size and composition. These have, as in the case of their Indian 
counterparts, a nucleus of a single annoured division and up to two infantry divisions 
with numerous brigades: ' 
ARMS 
I armoured. I infantry 1-2 inf div 3 combat brigades engineer aviation 
division division (core) (additional) ( inf, armd, air defence) brigx2 sqn 
Annour. 
As in the case of the Indian army, the Pakistani army possesses three armoured 
division and a number of armoured brigades. These operate almost 2,500 Main Battle 
Tanks of a bewildering variety and from various generations. '" The most recent 
46 loc. cit. This article has the most accurate order of battle for both 
the Indian and Pakistani armies. 
47 IISS, The Military Balance, 1996-1997, ( London: Oxford University 
Press, 1996 ) p. 165 
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acquisitions are 320 T-80 UD MBTs from the Ukraine! ' This deal has been mired in 
controversy because of Russia! s refusal to supply spares, including gun barrels, and 
doubts over Ukraine's ability to provide spares and support. " 
The T-80UD is a major improvement over the existing Pakistani tank fleet. The 
most modem units, until the affival of the T-80UDs, were license made Chinese T-85 II 
tanks. An indigenous MBT - the Al-Khalid - has failed to materialise. ' The rest of the 
fleet consists of over a thousand T-69/-59 tanks of Chinese origin, which have been 
upgraded with 105mm guns. " The rest of the ffeet is a mixture of 1950s & 1960s 
vintage M-47/48AS tanks. These, while serviceable, are not really a match for even 
older Indian armour. " The Pakistani tank fleet lacks modem fire control equipment and 
advanced night-fighting capabilities. It can be expected that Pakistan will attempt to 
rectify this in the near future. 
Artillery: 
As in the case of its Indian counterpart, Pakistan's Regiment of Artillery has 
undergone a tremendous re-organization and modernization programme. While 
substantial quantities of new equipment have been inducted, large numbers of 
"' 'Ukraine is firm on T-80UD sale' in Jane's Defence Weekly: 2 April 
1997, p. 13 
loc. cit. 
50 Jane's Defence 197, p. 36 
51 These tanks are based on the Soviet T-55. Unlike their Indian 
counterparts, the Pakistani tanks have not been subjected to a major 
modernization of fire control systems and night-vision equipment. 
5' The entire Pakistani tank fleet, with the possible exception of the 
T-SOUDs is extremely vulnerable to Indian anti-tanks weapons - even older 
types. The M-47/-48A5s fared badly against Indian Centurions in the 1965 
1971 wars and the Chinese T-59 fleet is not particularly advanced. 
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completely obsolete artillery pieces - long since relegated to reserve/storage status in the 
Indian army - remain in service. 
Pakistan created the subcontinenVs first artillery division using a core component 
of two artillery brigades and an air defence unit. " While Pakistan has far fewer artillery 
tubes than the massive Indian artillery park, it is interesting to note that it was 
responsible for this major organizational innovation. ' 
The most noteworthy feature of Pakistan's artillery is the number of 155 and 
203mm self-propelled guns. ' This gives Pakistani armour an integral artillery capability 
that is currently lacking in Indian annoured, units. Moreover, these guns are more easily 
opemted in an NBC enviromnent than towed guns. 
Pakistan's artillery also comprises an assortment of older pieces, including some 
Second World War vintage 25 pounders. As in the case of the Indian artillery, 
considerable progress has been made in the introduction of fire control computers and 
other surveillance and target acquisition equipment. This, of course, dramatically 
enhances the efficacy of artillery - no matter how old the guns are. 
Infantry: 
Thcrc is not much differcricc bctwccn Pakistani and Indian army infantry 
fonnations. Pakistan has not developed an organization equivalent to the Indian 
53 Maj. S. Bhaduri, 'Weapons Overview: The Artillery Division', Indian 
Defence Review: Jan 1992, p. 114 
54 IISS, Military Balance: 1996-97, p. 165. Pakistan's artillery also 
inducted a limited number of artillery locating radars - or so Indian sources 
claim ( IISS sources do not list these radars ). Pakistan has fewer than 
2,000 artillery pieces in total. 
55 IISS, Military Balance* 1996-97 Over 200 M-109 & M-110 SP artillery 
pieces are in service. 
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RAPIDS and has not attempted the massive modernization programme - in terms of 
modem night vision, target finding and anti-tank weaponry - that the Indian army has 
recently undertaken. 
The only really noteworthy aspect of the Pakistani infantry is the fact that it was 
the first to introduce mechanized units to the subcontinent. These mechanized infantry 
units are provided with over eight hundred M-1 13 armoured personnel carriers. " While 
not as capable as India! s BUIP-2 units, these older APCs provide Pakistan's infantry with 
a reasonable degree of battlefield mobility. However, as far as NBC warfare is 
concerned, these older APCs offer somewhat less protection than the BMPs. 
Air Defence. 
Unlike the Indian army, Pakistan lacks any medium self-propelled surface-to-air 
missiles and modem self-propelled air-defence guns. Pakistan! s six air defence brigades 
are equipped with a wide variety of shoulder-launched SAMs and thousands of towed 
air defence guns. " These are used with both Western and Chinese fire-control radar. 
It is not known if Pakistan intends to obtain any more advanced radar and target 
acquisition equipment. The Pakistani army air defence units remain constrained in their 
ability to obtain advanced self-propelled air-defence assets since Russia, the principal 
producer of these items, will not sell these items to Pakistan. Strangely enough, Pakistan 
does not seem to be making particularly vigorous efforts to rectify this shortcoming in 
their army air defences. 
56 IISS, Military Balance: 1996-97, p. 165 
" loc. cit. 
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Both the Indian and Pakistani armies are extremely well trained. This is 
especially true up to brigade level. Both armies possess a high degree of tactical skill 
and pride themselves on their ability to perform their assigned tasks. Using a mixture of 
traditional methods and modem techniques and equipment, both annies are extremely 
capable. In the area of NBC warfare, however, a rather confusing picture emerges. Both 
countries frequently made mention of their ability to fight in NBC conditions, but little 
hard information is available on the degree of NBC readiness. 
In the 1980s, the Indian army began some tentative preparations for NBC 
warfare. " In the early part of that decade, a limited quantity of S6 respirators and 
No. I MU NBC suits - both of British origin - was purchased. "' A quantity of NBC 
equipment was imported from the USSR, but proved to be useless in Indian 
environmental conditions. ' Moreover, India! s defence research organization, in 1987, 
produced prototypes of NBC suits, decontamination suits, facelets, overboots and NBC 
tents. " This equipment has entered production and service with the Indian armed 
forces. 6' 
As regards training, from 1987 onwards, the Indian army, through its College of 
59 S. Gupta, 'The New Thrust', India TodaY: November 15 1985, p. 58 
5' A colour photograph of this equipment appeared in The Indian Army 
New Delhi: Lancer, 1990) which was edited by Lt. General Mathew Thomas. 
60 Personal co=unication with Mr. IDI on 28 July 1994 
61 S. P. Baranwal, The Military Yearbook: 1987-1988, ( New Delhi: Guide 
Publications, 1988 ), p. 243 
11 'Five-fold NBC protective system develope for safety of troops' - UNI 
report in the Deccan Herald: October 18 1997 
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Military Engineering, began running familiarization courses in NBC warfare, " while 
scientist conducted courses at brigade level. ' Moreover, a series of studies were 
undertaken to provide for both active and passive defence against nuclear attack for 
army combat formations. " 
As regards equipment; the Indian Ministry of Defence has obviously allocated 
high priority to the indigenous production of NBC gear. ' This has also involved the 
participation of the private sector for the manufacture of both NBC suits and 
respirators. "' In addition, the Indian army has retained its old Second World War 
respirators - these are old, but would still offer significant protection. "' India would not 
find it particularly difficult to produce enough NBC personal gear - respirators and NBC 
suits - for its armed forces in a relatively short period of time - though this equipment 
might be placed in storage. Mention should also be made of the fact that a new 
decontamination vehicle has entered production. "' 
While it is abundantly clear that NBC warfare has been accorded a much higher 
priority in the Indian army, it remains unclear as to the exact status of NBC 
6-' ibid p. 311 
" ibid p. 244 
65 1IDR comment: Internal Affairs', Lt. Gen. M. Thomas ed., Indian 
Defence Review: July 1987, p. 18 
16 Ministry of Defence Annual Report, 1995-1996, p. 14 
67 The company, Modern Apparels, has submitted such suits to the Indian 
Navy's evaluation centre. 
Private sector involvement has made India self-sufficient in respirator 
production - while many of these are not really intended for military use, 
these respirators offer significant NBC protection: communication with 
Dr. 'V: undated letter received on 3 March 1997. 
68 Personal communication with Lt. General IJI dated 18 August 1994 
69 Ministry of Defence Annual ReDorto 1995-1996, p. 56 
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preparedness and training in the Indian army. Attempts to contact senior military 
officers on this subject proved unsuccessful, though some retired officers offered some 
vague information that leads to the conclusion that some training is in progress. 
It has become clear that India! s Army Training Command has conducted detailed 
studies into NBC warfare. ' Indeed, given India! s perception of its nuclear threat, it is 
not surprising that the Indian army schools of instruction and combat include NBC 
scenarios. 71 Moreover, the publisher of the prestigious Indian Defence Review stated 
that the forces earmarked for use against Pakistan are well equipped to deal with NBC 
warfare. 
72 
It would be natural for India! s Strike Corps to be the first to be fully equipped 
and prepared for NBC warfare and there are some indications of this beginning to occur. 
It is highly probable that at least one Corps is fully prepared - trained and equipped for 
NBC warfare. The other formations, would probably receive - or already have access to 
personal NBC gear - but will be allocated a lower priority for receiving decontamination 
and monitoring equipment. It should be pointed out that the RAPIDS require virtually 
no modifications for deployment in an NBC environment. "' 
It can probably be assumed that the state of NBC warfare in Pakistan is in a 
similar state to that of India, except that Pakistan's industry is not yet capable of meeting 
70 The Hindu Weekly - International Edition: 3 December 1994F p, 5 
71 Personal communication with Lt. General 'A' dated 13 December 1994 
72 Personal communications with Captain IBI dated 3 August 1994 and 30 
August 1994 
73 Thomas, I The RAPID: An appraisal of India's new-look infantry 
division for warfare in the plains 1, p. 93 
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all NBC needs and that the country lacks the massive R&D inftastructure of India. 
Indian sources assume that Pakistan has a nucleus of NBC trained personnel - with 
Chinese NBC gear. ' 
One thing is clear, however, both countries have now made NBC warfare 
something of a priority and are making efforts - covertly - to train and equip themselves. 
Nonetheless, there may be a large gap between what the military wants and reality. 
While there is some reference to NBC warfare and the necessity to fight under 
such conditions in both armies, there have never been any major NBC exercises 
conducted by either side. It is therefore not inconceivable that the principal focus of 
NBC training and equipment programs in both countries is more geared towards 
meeting an emergency that might arise after one side uses such weapons. This would 
involve stockpiling equipment and drafting rapid training instructions - aimed at rapidly 
familiarizing troops who have to enter an NBC contaminated area. It does not seem that 
either country intends to develop a tactical nuclear warfare doctrine. 
One of the reasons for the lack of NBC exercises could be the extremely severe 
environmental conditions prevailing on the South Asian battlefield. These conditions 
range from the intense cold of the Siachen glacier to the blistering heat of the Thar 
desert. Under normal peacetime conditions these climates pose great difficulties for 
human endurance, if the troops were clad in full NBC gear and armoured vehicles 
'buttoned-up', there would be more casualties from heat-stroke than from exposure. ' 
74 Lt. Gen. M. Thomas, 'Indo-Pakistan Equation' , Indian Defence Review: 
January 1987, p. 13 
75 It should be noted that the temperature inside a tank can rise to 
over 60 degrees Celcius. 
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MAP # 2: The India- Pakistan Border. 
Ibis map illustrates the Punjab & North/Central Rajasthan Theatres of Operations 
Also, the map shows, in approximate terms, where the international border ends and the 
Line of Control begins. 
Source: Neil Joeck, Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia!: Adell2hi Paj2er 312 
p. 26 (London: IISS 1997 ) 
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This brings us to the other issue that needs to be considered - where on the South 
Asian battlefield could tactical nuclear weapons possibly be used ? The answer to this 
question will determine whether or not there is any battlefield use for nuclear weapons. 
Theatres of Operations: 
Any India-Pakistan conflict will take place in four major theatres, each varying in 
geography and, to a lesser extent climatically. The theatres of operations are-! ' 
1) Along the Line of Control - Northern Kashmir region 
2) Southern Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab sectors 
3) North and Central Rajasthan 
4) South Rajasthan and Gujarat 
When looking at these theatres of operations, it must be borne in mind that the 
Line of Control in the Northern Kashmir region is not an internationally recognized 
border. It should also be noted that Punjab and Kashmir are politically very sensitive 
areas for the political establishments in both countries. It is, therefore, hardly likely that 
any major loss of territory in either of these two areas would be acceptable. 
In the Southern Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab sectors, stretching down into 
North and Central Rajasthan, there are a series of extremely formidable obstacle 
defences, which are called ditch-curn-bunds by the Indians, and canals by the Pakistanis. 
These defences, combined with the existing natural ground features make large-scale 
76 Lt. Gen. M. Thomas, 'An Analysis of the Threat Perception and Strategy 
for India' , Indian Defence Review: January 1990, p. 63 
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mechanized operations virtually impossible. ' These linear defences are extremely 
formidable, since the ditch-cum-bunds are liberally faced with diffused and well 
concealed concrete bunkers which have considerable defensive firepower and are 
difficult to locate, even with thermal imaging. ' This effectively limits operations to 
defensive positions with only local offensive capability. 
The Rajasthan and Gujarat regions present an entirely different scenario. In the 
Northem/Central Rajasthan theatre, considerable scope exists for the large scale use of 
mechanised formations in the desert and semi-desert sectors. It is in these sectors, the 
Ilar desert and the Rann of Kutch, that the major armoured battles of the next India- 
Pakistan war are likely to be fought. " It is, therefore, not surprising that a complete 
Indian Strike Corps is earmarked for use primarily in this area. 
The Thar Desert and Rann of Kutch also present the best possible place for 
tactical nuclear warfare. ' The barren desert areas are ideal in that so-called collateral 
damage could be reduced. Moreover, any meaningful Indian gains in this area, that is 
beyond the major river lines, would threaten the very existence of the Pakistani state, 
thus prompting Pakistan to actively consider using nuclear weapons in the event of a 
major Indian breakthrough. 
On the other hand, since the Indian Strike Corps will be operating in this area, so 
"' 10C. Cit 
78 S. Bhaduri, 'The Artillery Division - Part III , Indian Defence 
Review: April 1992, p. 118 
'19 P. Sengupta, 'Indian Armoured Doctrine and Modernization', Military 
Technology: 511992, p. 30 
go-Thomas, 'An Analysis of the Threat Perception and Strategy for 
India', p. 63 
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will be the bulk of India! s formidable Corps of Air Defence Artillery. This means that 
any Pakistani attack against a major Indian formation would be met with heavy 
resistance from extremely dense and sophisticated CADA assets - not to mention fighter 
squadrons from the Indian Air Force. Therefore, any Pakistani attack stands a good 
chance of being repelled without reaching their assigned target. 
India could also reduce the risk of nuclear retaliation by limiting its advance to 
the major river lines, or to between 60-80 Ian in the North/Central Rajasthan sectors. " 
This would mean that the existence of Pakistan would no longer be threatened while 
India would still occupy chunks of territory. Pakistan would probably be less willing to 
cross the nuclear threshold for such a limited Indian advance. 
It is unlikely that either India or Pakistan would initiate nuclear warfare in either 
the Punjab or Kashmir regions purely for tactical gain. Indeed, for Pakistan the use of 
such weapons in Kashmir would almost certainly alienate the Muslim population of the 
Kashmir Valley. In the case of Punjab, Pakistan's military and political elites are largely 
drawn from that Province and as such it is extremely unlikely that they would take a risk 
as large as this for limited tactical gains. From a purely military standpoint, it should 
also be pointed out that the ditch-cum-bund defences and their network of concrete 
bunkers would probably survive a nuclear attack. " This would tender a nuclear attack in 
this sector virtually useless. 
Therefore, the only area in which nuclear weapons would be tactically useful is 
a' Loc. Cit. 
82 Maj. Gen. S. Singh, 'Nuclear War in South Asia - The Worst Case,, Indian 
Defence Review: January 1987, p. 70 
162 
in Rajasthan and Gujarat - for reasons which have already been given. Yet that land, 
especially in Rajasthan, Thar Desert sector, is of virtually no strategic importance. 
Would any militarily sane nation risk revealing the full extent of its covert nuclear 
program unless its very existence was threatened ? The answer is clearly no. Therefore, 
if India limits its territorial gains in this area, Pakistan would have no reason to resort to 
nuclear weapons. 
There is one wild card in this scenario - the Line of Control. If India were to 
launch a major assault along the LoC - would Pakistan use nuclear weapons ? An 
examination of a possible war scenario will perhaps illustrate Indian planning more 
clearly. 
War-Scenario: 
In 1987, the India army conducted a massive military exercise, 'Brasstacks', 
which outlined what was then a new tactical doctrine. No longer would the Indian anny 
concentrate on operations in Punjab, as it had during the 1965 war, but would deploy 
massively powerful armoured formations in the Rajasthan sector with the aim of 
bisecting Pakistan at its weakest point in the Sindh Province. 
This has been the model most often used and quoted by scholars in the literature 
available on possible war scenarios. " Moreover, it has been further argued that thanks 
to Pakistan! s nuclear capability, an Indian offensive in the Sindh that met with success 
would be answered by a Pakistani nuclear strike. Since the defences in the Punjab are 
strong, it was therefore argued that as India! s military superiority was hardly 
93 An example being A. Tellis Stability in South Asja by the RAND 
corporation. 
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overwhelming, the nuclear factor may be creating an environment where war was almost 
impossible. 
This model is, however, obsolete and far from creating a certain conventional 
stalemate, has simply led to the Indian army re-thinking its tactical doctrine. No longer 
will the Indian army attempt to make major territorial gains, but it will concentrate on 
occupying a small stretch of territory, not enough to threaten Pakistan's existence, but 
enough to force Pakistan to commit its forces where they will be met by superior Indian 
firepower which will then inflict maximum attrition". The reason for this in part lies in 
the risk of nuclear warfare, but the main reason lies in the fact that previous wars in 
1965 and 1971 have shown that major territorial gains are unlikely in a short war. 
If a major Indian offensive occurs, it will occur in Kashmir. Never before has the 
Indian army attempted any offensive in Kashmir, but this time, thanks to the massive 
influx of troops into the State, an Indian offensive along the Line of Control is very 
possible. It could be argued that these troops are primarily for counter-insurgency 
operations. However, this does not explain why the formations coming into Jammu and 
Kashmir are bringing their artillery with them. Any fighting will in Kashmir will centre 
around a clash of infantry and artillery and as such, the induction of substantial artillery 
assets into the region must be seen as significant. 
At the outset one thing must be made clear. Neither India or Pakistan believes 
" Personnalconmunications with Mr. 'Cl and Lt. Gen. 'Al provided this new 
insight 
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that anything would be decided in a war lasting less than four weeks. "' India bases its 
plans on a period of intense fighting lasting six to eight weeks followed by a period of 
major, but less intense fighting lasting up to four more weeks. War Wastage Reserves 
are calculated on this basis and so if a war lasts only two weeks or thereabouts, the most 
that can be hoped for is for heavy attrition of the enemy forces. 
India has therefore moved away from the Brasstacks plan of bisecting Pakistan 
in the Sindh and threatening Islamabad with encirclement to a more modest objective of 
destroying as much of the Pakistani military as possible. Pakistan's nuclear weapons 
provide some deterrence against any Indian move to make deep thrusts into its territory 
and against any possible bisection of Pakistan, they are of no use in a war aimed solely 
at inflicting maximum attrition against Pakistani military fi 
The Indian anny has two Strike Corps, 2 Corps &I Corps, assigned to the 
Rajasthan and Punjab siýctors resppptively. 87 The Strike Corps pre ftscribpol in an earlier 
section, but each is composed of one armoured division and several infantry divisions 
and supporting units. Each will also have an artillery division attached. There is another 
Strike Corps - 21 Corps which is not yet fully operational. 
In the Brasstacks model, these were the two formations Pakistan was most 
concerned about and their continued presence in the Rajasthan and Punjab sectors will 
85 Interview with Mr. ICI in January/ February 1998, interview with Air 
Marshal IEI and with Mr. IF' on 23 March 1998. This is further confirmed in an 
interview with Lt. Gen. M. Thomas that is found in W. P. S. Sidhu, 'Chinks in the 
Armour', p. 129 in India Today: November 15 1991 
e6 P. Sawhney, 'If Pakistan and India go to War', The Asian Age: 12-13 
November 1994, p. 13 
07 P. Sawhney, 'Prithvils Position: India Defends its Missile', 
International Defence Review: July 1997, p. 45 
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ensure that Pakistan cannot consider any major troop redeployments in either sector. 
Under current plans, India intends not to advance more than 60-80krn in the 
North/Central Rajasthan sector and only up to the major river lines in South 
Rajasthan/Gujarat, Pakistan's existence would hardly be threatened. " 
However, it must be remembered that India and Pakistan will be fighting a 
political war as much as a military one and any loss of territory is considered a major 
political embarrassment. This means that Pakistan would invariably have to attempt a 
counterattack against Indian forces occupying any of its territory. Its forces would then 
be drawn into a battle of attrition against Indian forces, a battle that they would lose. If 
the current build up of air defence assets, upgrading of annour and anti-tank munitions 
and the increase in artillery within the India army is seen in light of this post-Brasstacks 
tactical doctrine, it is abundantly clear that India is building up its forces to ward off any 
Pakistani counterattack, inflicting devastating losses on the attackers. 
In the Southern Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab sectors, the huge fixed 
fortifications described previouslyr effectively limit the scope of any Indian operation. 
India is highly unlikely to attempt a major offensive in this sector for two reasons. The 
first is the extent of the fortified defences in this sector, but the second is far more 
significant and goes to the core of Pakistan's vulnerability versus India. 
The real vulnerability of Pakistan lies, not in a lack of 'strategic depth', but in the 
fact that so many of its major population centres and politically and military sensitive 
targets lie very close to the border with India. As was mentioned earlier, this negates the 
08 M. Thomas, 'An Analysis of the Threat Perception and Strategy', p. 63 
166 
tactical use of nuclear weapons in the Punjab sector in particular. However, should India 
threaten Lahore, for example, Pakistan could be compelled to attempt a nuclear strike 
against an Indian civilian target. " As such, it is hardly likely that India would want to 
risk a major advance in Punjab. Aims in this sector would be limited to holding 
Pakistani forces in a defensive deployment pattern while inflicting maximum attrition 
with 2 Corps and 21 Corps. 
Along the Line of Control, however, the situation is very different. One of the 
consequences of the Kashmir insurgency is that India has transferred several divisions to 
the area to reinforce the troops already there and bringing total troop strength in this 
sector to over 250,000. The Indian divisions and brigades also brought their supporting 
artillery with them and this combination - which is far in excess of what is needed for 
defensive operations - enables Indian planners to contemplate a major offensive along 
the Line of Control with every chance of success. 
The importance of the term Line of Control cannot be understated. Pakistan 
clings to the illusion, in official pronouncements at any rate, that its part of Kashmir is 
not really part of Pakistan. As such, it has always refused to recognize the Line of 
Control as the international border with India. This is something that India intends to 
exploit to the fullest. 
Pakistan, on the other hand, appears to work to a different strategy. From the 
time of the 1965 and 1971 wars, up until India! s Brasstacks exercise, emphasis was 
" During the 1965 war, the Indian army was poised to capture Lahore. 
Lahore, the heart of Pakistani Punjab, would be apolitically devastating blow 
to Pakistan. As such Pakistan would probably take all stepd to guard against 
a repeat of the 1965 experience 
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MAP # 3: Kashmir and the Line of Control 
This map shows the Line of Control and the disputed regions of Kashmir. It also shows 
the Siachen Glacier where an undeclared war is currently being waged between India 
and Pakistan. 
Source: Neil Joeck, Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia!: Adelphi Paper 312, 
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placed on the static defence of the Line of Control and the border. ' However, in light of 
India's substantially enhanced offensive capabilities, Pakistan realised that this'stand 
and fight' doctrine would lead to serious Indian penetration of Pakistani territory with 
the Pakistani army being unable to manoeuvre to meet the threat. Counterattacking 
formations would then be destroyed piecemeal. 9' 
Pakistan has therefore adopted a new strategy - the Riposte. This is remarkably 
simple in concept in that Pakistan would accept the loss of territory in Indian 
penetrations, but would conduct a limited advance along narrow fronts with the aim of 
occupying territory near the border to a depth of 40-50lun. ' Pakistan believes that this 
would give it a bargaining chip to be used in the aftermath of a ceasefire brought about 
by international pressure after 3-4 weeks of fighting. 
The Pakistanis, to some extent, still assume that India will attempt deep 
penetrations into the territory. Moreover, it appears that though the Pakistani army is 
well prepared for this new doctrine, there is an inadequate appreciation of the threat 
posed by Indian air power to the attacking formations. Some planning has been based 
on the highly unrealistic assumption of local air superiority and as such these plans may 
go seriously awry. " 
So what will a future India-Pakistan war look like ? There are a number of good 
90B. Cloughley, 'Pakistan strives to match aims and capabilities', 
International Defence Review: March 1995, p. 73 
" ibid, p. 74 
" loc. cit 
" loc. cit. 
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books on the 1965 and 1971 wars and some excellent accounts of the tactical thinking 
behind Exercise Brasstacks are available. 94 These, however, are not of much use at 
present. However, perhaps the best and most realistic war scenario was painted by 
defence journalist Pravin Sawhney in the Asian Age newspaper in November 1994.11 
Holding formations in both India and Pakistan can man their forward defensive 
positions and fortifications in less than 24 hours. However, Corps level reserves with 
large stockpiles of munitions will take between 24 to 72 hours for mobilization after 
being given their orders. In this regard, both annies will be evenly matched in the first 
24 hours since the Pakistani units have to travel a shorter distance to their forward 
16 
positions. 
Pakistan's Army Reserve North is based in the Kharian/Mangla complex and 
would need to travel only 200krn to its forward concentration areas or even their 
assembly areas where regrouping before an offensive is done. ' This could be done at 
extremely short notice and is consistent with Pakistan's pre-conceived offensive plans as 
outlined in the Riposte doctrine. Army Reserve South, which is based in the Multan area 
can also be available for operations in a similar time. 
While many of India's formations may take up to 72 hours to be fully deployed, 
" Some examples being Major General Harbaksh Singh, War DesDatches 
(New Delhi: Lancer 1991) and Major K. C. Praval The Indian Army after 
Tndevendence (New Delhi: Lancer 1993) 
95 This account in Asian Age: 12-13 November 1994, remains the only 
post-Brasstacks work to explore the new tactical doctrine governing Indian 
Amy operations against Pakistan. 
96 Some Indian formations will be drawn from Central and Eastern India 
and they will take some time to arrive. 
" Sawhney, 'If Pakistan and India go to War', Asian Age: 12-13 November 
1994, p. 13 
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two out of India! s three Strike Corps, I Corps &2 Corps, are so positioned as to match 
the mobilization timings of Army Reserve South. As of now, it is not known if the third 
Strike Corps, 21 Corps, will be available at such short notice. " 
India could, in theory, disrupt the early deployment of Army Reserve North if 
the Indian Army's Northern Command denies deployment space with the pre-emptive 
mobilization and deployment of Northern Command's theatre reserves. In 1994, 
Sawhney was unconvinced that this was possible owing to the employment of so many 
units of the Indian army on internal security duties in Jammu & Kashmir. " However, 
since 1994, the number of paramilitary units in Jammu & Kashmir has grown and the 
Indian army has deployed almost thirty thousand men from its Rashtriya Rifles 
battalions. "0 These would take at least some pressure off the regular army in counter- 
insurgency operations. Moreover, the number of regular army troops in the state seems 
to have grown. "' These could provide the Indian anny with sufficient troops in theatre 
to deny Pakistan's Army Reserve North deployment space, thus neutralizing any 
advantage Pakistan had in this regard. 
The problem with assessing whether or not Indian troop strength is adequate to 
90 Inteviews with Mr. 'C'in January-March 1996 
" loc. cit 
" India's paramilitary forces are reasonably well trained and fairly 
well equipped. The three main paramilitary units operating in Jammu and 
Kashmir - the Central Reserve Police Force, the Border Security Force and the 
Assam Rifles - possess almost the full range of infantry weapons. The Border 
Security Force also has several artillery units, while the Rashtriya Rifles 
battalions are almost clones of their regular army counterparts. 
101 It is not known exactly how many regular troops India has deployed 
in Jammu and Kashmir. However, a figure of 250-300,000 is feasible. Most of 
these are not assigned to counter-insurgency roles and are an indication of 
possible Indian offensive plans in the Kashmir theatre. 
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the task of neutralizing Army Reserve North's dep'loyment is that the internal security 
situation in Jammu and Kashmir is very variable. " It is possible that the paramilitary 
forces and the Rashtriya Rifles will free a large number of troops for conventional 
operations. Moreover, it is possible that up to three divisions, with over forty thousand 
men, could be moved ftom, the China border without seriously degrading India! s 
defences against a Chinese assault. These troops are held by Central and Eastern 
commands, and have actually been earmarked for out of theatre operations. "' 
In the case of Army Reserve South, the Indian Airforce has the potential to 
cause havoc with their deployment by beginning an intensive interdiction campaign in 
the Gujrat (Punjab)-Sialkot-Gujranwala area. "' However, this would make India the 
aggressor in any conflict. Sawhney argues that this would make the Indian government 
reluctant to permit this, however, that is not at all certain. ' Ile Indian government may 
well engineer incidents to give an excuse, however flimsy, for the Indian Air Force to 
begin such an interdiction campaign. 
In order to further reduce the risk of a Pakistani nuclear strike, it is possible that 
India, through the United Nations, might make certain pledges to Pakistan. These might 
include a pledge not to deliberately attack a civilian target, to refrain from attacking 
civilian nuclear installations and a promise not to initiate the use of weapons of mass 
102 The situation in Kashmir is something of an enigma. On one hand, the 
Indian government is claiming an improvement in the overall internal security 
situation while on the other analysts like Mr. 'C' feel that the situation is 
still grave 
103 Sawhney, 'If Pakistan and India go to War', p. 13 
I" 10C. Cit 
"' 10C. Cit 
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destruction unless attacked with such weapons. India could also make it clear that it 
would abide by these terms only if Pakistan agrees to do the same. Should Pakistan not 
agree, India would probably assume that a nuclear strike would be forthcoming. '06 
Let us for the moment assume that India does not deny Army Reserve North 
deployment space and that the Indian government does not sanction the launching of 
preemptive air strikes. Both India and Pakistan will have a relative parity in manpower 
and combat formations at the start of any conflict. India will be able to bring up some 
very large combat formations from central and eastern India, but Pakistan would be 
almost fully committed. A force of three infantry divisions plus some independent 
brigades under II& 12 Corps would be transferable from the Peshawar and Quetta 
areas respectively, but with very little artillery and armour. " Moreover, if there is any 
serious escalation of fighting in Afghanistan, Pakistan may be less willing to denude its 
Afghan border of all regular army formations. "' 
The Indian objectives in the Northern sector, in Jammu & Kashmir, are 
somewhat unclear. The Indian Defence Review Research Team argued that the capture 
of Skardu to cut off the main glacier zone in Baltistan would be a major objective. " 
Moreover, a strong offensive aimed at capturing Muzzafarabad from the North and the 
'06 There is no real evidence to suggest that India might make such a 
pledge. However, it is certainly very feasible that India would do something 
like this if only in an attempt to limit Pakistan's options. 
, 0, loc. cit. 
100 If the Pakistani backed Taliban forces suffer any serious reverses 
in the Kabul area, the moving of Pakistani forces to the Indian border is 
even less likely. 
109 IDR Research Team, 'Operational Scenario Alpha', Indian Defence 
Review: July 1992, p. 22 
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South of the Jhelum, and the neutralization of the Haji Pir (Bedori ) Bulge would have 
to be undertaken. "O The Indian army would also attempt to capture the Mirpur-Mangla 
Complex with the view of presenting a clear and present threat to the Pakistani national 
capital region. "' Finally, to cope with the threat posed by Army Reserve North, Indian 
formations would make a penetration into the Sialkot sector with the sole aim of 
bottling up and denying deployment space to the Pakistani formations, thus ensuring its 
eventual destruction. 
The scenario described above leads to the question as to whether Pakistan would 
launch a nuclear strike in response to the threat posed to its national capital. The Indian 
Defence Review Research Team does not answer this question in any way. Pravin 
Sawhney describes a far more detailed scenario which, while essentially similar in 
concept, seems to differ in some major details. 
Sawhney, in his scenario, argues that the Indian army would have a choice - 
attacking into either Ladakh-Baltistan or into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir ( POK ) and 
that the anny would prefer an ingress into the latter along the Line of Control! 12He also 
argues that the main thrust would be in the Jammu division between Poonch and 
Chammb with a secondary thrust into the Tithwal-Keran sectors. ' 13 
Northern Command might also suggest that a limited offensive be conducted to 
110 loc. cit 
111 loc. cit. It is easy to forget that Islamabad and Pakistan's Army 
Headquarters at Rawalpindi are extremely close to the Line of Control. 
112 Sawhney, 'If Pakistan and India go to War', p. 13 POK is known as 
Azad Kashmir to the Pakistanis. In this thesis the Indian designation- POK- 
will be used. 
11, loc. cit. 
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the west of Zojila in the Dras-Kargi I sectors. ' " The aim here would be to cut off the 
lines of communications of the Pakistani brigade based near the Shingo and Indus 
Rivers. These operations will call for troops specially trained and equipped for 
operations in mountainous and hilly terrain and to this end, the three divisions 
previously eannarked for use against China would be invaluable. Moreover, select 
formations from these forces already send divisional reconnaissance groups into 
Kashmir for terrain familiarization. "' 
That these divisional reconnaissance groups have been conducting terrain 
familiarization for quite some time gives rise to the idea that India has been planning for 
a major offensive in the Jammu & Kashmir sector for a long time. 
Pravin Sawhney assumes that the attack in Kashmir would be launched first with 
two mountain divisions concentrated to begin operations in the directions of Jhanghar- 
Mirpur and Nowshera-13himber with the ability to switch between the two. "" A third 
division would be allocated to the Mendhar-Kotli-Mirpur axis in two columns. Pakistan 
would probably understand that some move was afoot at this stage to the sector 
dcfcndcd by 19 Infantry Division. The Pakistanis would thcn movc the 7&9 infantry 
divisions based at Peshawar to assist in their defence! 17 However, it is not certain that 
these two divisions would be available entirely since the Afghan border is volatile at the 




ibid P. 18 
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Nonetheless, assuming these formations begin an eastward movement, Pakistan's 
Army Reserve South would start mobilizing at Multan. At this stage, India! s three Strike 
Corps would begin a forward movement. The plan as envisaged by Indian planners is 
for I Corps to face Army Reserve North and 2& 21 Corps to face Army Reserve South. 
The offensive would begin in the Ladakh sector with two brigades attacking 
from Kargil along with two brigades from the Northern Kashmir holding division 
tasked with straightening the Line of Control in the Tithwal-Bugina bulge sector. "s The 
three mountain divisions mentioned earlier would then commence their offensive which 
would probably face extremely stiff resistance from the Pakistani infantry divisions 
facing them. Compared to the dashing manoeuvre warfare employed during the 
Brasstacks exercise, the current Indian army high command is fully convinced that their 
present offensive plans would be more akin to the'meat-grinding! assaults of the Second 
World War 
As Pakistan's strategic depth was eroded around Islamabad and with its Army 
HQ at Rawalpindi fixed on the worsening situation at Mirpur, Army Reserve North 
would be committed to action. ARN would attempt an offensive aimed at the Jammu- 
Pathankot corridor while crossing the river Ravi aimed at threatening Gurdaspur- 
Pathankot. " 
These operations would be met by India! s I Corps which would engage Army 
Reserve North in a savage battle of attrition, forcing Pakistan to move 9 division to the 
"" loc. cit. 
I" loc. cit. 
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Mirpur sector, where the Indian offensive continues, while 7 division moved, along with 
30 Corps, to reinforce Army Reserve North. In the meantime, the Indian and Pakistani 
air forces would engage in their own battle of attrition, with the former waging a heavy 
counter-air offensive whilst engaging in a massive offensive-air-support operation for 
the Indian army. 
With the Indian offensive overcoming its opponents in the Kashmir region and 
Army Reserve North, and its reinforcements, engaged with India! s I Corps in a battle of 
attrition, Pakistan's army high command would prefer that Anny Reserve South be kept 
out of action as long as possible. However, since the whole object of the Indian plan is 
to inflict heavy attrition on Pakistan's armed forces, it would be essential for Army 
Reserve South to be neutralized. 
Sawhney believes that India would use its Desert Corps (12 Corps) to draw ARS 
into action. "0 12 Corps would launch a limited offensive aimed south of Rahimyar 
Khan to which Army Reserve South would respond with a thrust to its north. The Indian 
Holding Corps, with their RAPIDS, would probably find themselves under heavy 
pressure from the powerful ARS. At this stage, with ARS fully committed, India would 
spring its trap with 2& 21 Corps, along with massive air support, launching out 
together along a very narrow front aimed at punching through 31 Corps and falling on 
the soft under-belly of Army Reserve South which would then be destroyed in detail. 
In this scenario, the fighting which has lasted between two and four weeks, has 
left Pakistan's armed forces severely depleted, if not almost destroyed. Army Reserve 
"' loc. cit 
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South has been destroyed along with the Pakistani formations in the Rajasthan/Gujarat 
sector. Indian forces have made gains along the Line of Control, severely eroding 
Pakistan's strategic depth in the region of Islamabad and Army Reserve North and its 
reinforcing formations have been mauled by I Corps, Indian Holding Corps and the 
Indian Air Force. 
What is significant is that Pakistan would not have suffered any major territorial 
losses. No Indian offensive actually seized much land and in no case was the existence 
of Pakistan actually threatened. While nuclear threats and counter-threats might be 
traded, Pakistan would probably not feel quite so compelled to go nuclear as it would if 
its very survival was at stake. 
India! s gamble is that with such a mauling of its military capability and since 
Pakistan has neither the money or the resources to re-build such a large and powerful 
military machine again, Pakistan might be far more amenable to a permanent settlement 
of the Kashmir dispute and other outstanding matters. Since India would hold a major 
advantage in that Pakistan could no longer rival India militarily, such a settlement would 
probably go in India! s favour. At least that is the Indian plan. Whether or not any 
permanent settlement over Kashmir can be achieved after such a war remains a matter 
for spcculation. 
The most important point to note in this scenario is that in no case would India 
be seeking to grap large areas of Pakistani territory. Pakistan's existence will not be 
endangered so would Pakistan risk using nuclear weapons on the battlefield ? Having 
said this, it should further be pointed out that there is a lot of room for misinterpretation 
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in this scenario. For example, will Pakistan be able to distinguish between a limited 
Indian advance and a full scale invasion ? At what stage would Pakistan consider its 
existence to be threatened 
After discussions with a number of retired Indian officers - specifically about this 
question of misinterpretation - the only answers that could be provided revolved around 
the fact that a limited Indian penetration would be along a broad front and have limited 
depth while a full invasion would have areas of narrow but deep penetrations into 
Pakistani territory. 121 The officers believed that Pakistan would have no difficulty in 
differentiating between the two and as such the question of misinterpretation did not 
anse. 
The Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons: - Advantages & DisadvanLaggL 
Having looked at the areas in which nuclear weapons might be applied, it is now 
appropriate to examine the 'pros' and 'cons' of using nuclear weapons on the South 
Asian battlefield. The first question that has to be answered is how nuclear weapons can 
be used tactically ? 
Unlike the American and Russian - and possibly the Chinese - armed forces, the 
Indian and Pakistani military establishments are unlikely to have access to weapons in 
the very low yield - 0.1 -4 kiloton - range. "' Therefore, the nuclear weapons most I ikely 
to be used on the South Asian battlefield might range between 5 and 20 kilotons. 123 
121 Interviews with Mr. 'Cl & Lt. Gen. IGI on 25 March 1998 
122 These weapons, while technically feasible, are difficult to assemble 
without doing at least one test. Enhanced radiaton weapons are also possible, 
but again would need to be tested. 
123 S. Singh, 'Nuclear War in South Asia - The Worst Case Scenario', p. 65 
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These weapons are fairly large - by Western battlefield standards - and it is extremely 
difficult to differentiate between 'tactical' and 'strategic' nuclear weapons in the India- 
Pakistan context. 
124 
For defending forces, either Indian or Pakistani, nuclear weapons might be used 
to block attacking units crossing obstacles - e. g. rivers. "' To this end, the defending 
forces would adopt a mobile defence posture, which would present a difficult target for 
a retaliatory nuclear strike. The nuclear weapons would be used as the attacking force 
concentrates to overcome a defensive position or obstacle. "' This would require a 
degree of advanced warning to the defending units and this might be detected. 
As far as offensive operations are concerned, these would necessarily be planned 
around the use of nuclear weapons. The attacking forces would remain dispersed and 
only concentrate rapidly to attack. "' The objective of this is to present as few 
worthwhile nuclear targets as possible. In addition, the attacker would aim to destroy the 
enemy's nuclear capability and, perhaps more importantly, the controlling Headquarters. 
In order to perform these tasks, in both defence and offence, the armies must 
possess mobile reserves and strike formations with a preponderance of armour and 
mechanized infantry and possess excellent intelligence. "" In this regard, both the Indian 
224 K. V. Krishna Rao, Prepare or Perish, p. 404 
125 LOC. Cit 
126 Loc. cit. 
127 Loc. cit. General K. V. Krishna Rao gives one of the clearest and most 
concise accounts of how nuclear weapons might be used in both offensive and 
defensive operations. 
K. Sundarji, Blind Men of Hindoostan, p. 91 
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and Pakistani armies have such forces in sizeable numbers, the Indian Strike Corps and 
RAPIDS and Pakistan's Army Reserve North and South. This mechanization was 
carried out as part of the evolving conventional military doctrine, but, as can be seen, 
also prepares both annies for the use of battlefield nuclear weapons in South Asia. 
However, there are a number of very serious constraints that mitigate against the 
battlefield use of South Asia. The first, and perhaps the most important, of these is the 
stigma attached to being only the second country in the world to use nuclear weapons. 
CertainlY India, for example, would be very much restrained from using nuclear 
weapons in the initial stages of any attack on Pakistan. "' Similarly, Pakistan would be 
very wary of using nuclear weapons for tactical gain. Both sides would only use nuclear 
weapons in the event of their very existence being threatened, not just to gain a 
battlefield advantage. 
In addition to this, there are limitations to the success of a nuclear strike on an 
enemy position. A Pakistani attack on an Indian Strike Corps, as mentioned earlier, 
would be met by intense anti-aircraft fire - in addition to Indian fighters. This does not 
apply, at least not to the same extent to an Indian attack on a major Pakistani formation, 
owing to the limited variety of air defence weapons available to the Pakistani army. "O 
An attack on a well dispersed, mechanized combat force would not be 
129 Col. T. N. Dupuy, Future Wars ( New York: Warner Books, 1992 
P. 79 
130 The risk to Pakistani aircraft and missiles should not be 
underestimated. Moreover, imagine the embarassment the successful 
interception of an aircraft carrying a nuclear warhead would cause. The 
gamble would have failed and India would have an excuse to retaliate with 
nuclear weapons. 
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catastrophic. "' Armoured vehicles in both armies are designed to operate in NBC 
conditions and furthermore, unless the unit is almost at the centre of the blast ('Ground 
Zero') it is highly possible that the MBTs and APCs would provide significant 
protection from the blast and radiation effects. 132 This means that the principal offensive 
formations of both annies would be rather less vulnerable targets than would be ideal. 
The holding formations - heavily dug in and in well-constructed concrete 
bunkers and behind the ditch-cum-bund and canal defences - would be more vulnerable. 
However, even these, with the protection afforded by the fixed defences might not 
suffer as much as hoped as these defences would probably survive a nuclear strike. "' 
The most vulnerable units would be ]one battalions or brigades in isolated areas. "' 
There is also a major problem of providing intelligence to friendly forces in the 
area of a nuclear blast. It is unlikely that either army would want to have sizeable 
numbers of friendly forces caught either at the centre or in the vicinity of a nuclear 
strike. In order to prevent this, instructions for dispersal, issuing of protective 
equipment and constructing shelters would have to be given. There may also have to be 
large scale issues of NBC protective gear and decontamination and monitoring 
equipment. Moreover, medical units would also have to be alerted to the possibilty of 
the use of nuclear weapons so as to cater for battlefield casualties. 
"' Sudarji, Blind Men of Hindoostan, p. 137 
132 Lt. Gen. E. A. Vas, 'India's Nuclear Options in the 1990's and its 
Effect on India's Armed Forces', p. 21 in Indian Defence Review: January 1986 
133 S. Singh, 'Nuclear War in South Asia The Worst Case Scenario', p. 70 
Troops in concrete bunkers - with thick walls have a good defence against 
both blast and radiation effects of a nuclear strike. 
134 Sundarji, Blind Men of Hindoostan, pp. 36-41 
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These preparations would probably be noticed by the enemy, thus eliminating the 
essential element of surprise. "' In addition, given the fact that only the Southern 
Rajasthan/Gujarat sectors are really suitable for tactical nuclear warfare, the disastrous 
effects of using NBC gear on combat efficiency would have to be taken into account. 116 
Perhaps the ultimate deterrent to the tactical use of nuclear weapons is the threat 
of massive retaliation. "' In the absence of a clear nuclear doctime, neither side is fully 
aware of where the nuclear threshold lies. "' Would either India or Pakistan risk a 
concentrated nuclear attack on each other's cities in retaliation for a nuclear strike on a 
battlefield target ? "' This is hardly likely, however, in the absence of clearly stated 
policies and nuclear doctrines, such a miscalculation cannot be ruled out. " Ultimately 
tactical nuclear restraint revolves around the vulnerability of South Asian population 
centres - civilians will pay the price for any nuclear miscalculation on the battlefield. 
135 It is possible that these preparations will not be noticed and the 
attack would achieve the desired surprise. However, is either country 
prepared to take the risk if it does not achieve the desired results ? 
136 K. Sundarji, 'Chemical Warfare & South Asia' in The Hindu: February 
21 1997 
137 It must be remembered that a 20 kiloton blast - not a particularly 
large weapon - on a city -even a Western city - would have catastrophic 
consequences. It should also be stressed that India, in particular has access 
to weapons that have yields in excess of 150 kilotons - possibly more. 
13' This lack of clarity indicates that deterrence, as understood in the 
West, may not exist in South Asia 
139 Pakistan is particularly vulnerable owing to the proximity of its 
cities to the battle area 
"0 Sundarji, Blind Men of Hindoostan, pp. 131-140 
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Chgj? ter Five: Nuclear Attacks on Civilian TaMets: - South Asian Annageddon 
The most horrifying aspect of nuclear warfare is the prospect of civilian targets 
being bombarded with nuclear or thermonuclear weapons. This is also the ultimate 
guarantor of deterrence as neither side would want to lose large numbers of its civilian 
population and its industrial base to nuclear attack. 
The effects of nuclear strikes against countervalue targets in South Asia have to 
be assessed differently to the effects in the event of a nuclear war between the Soviet 
Union and NATO at the height of the Cold War. First of all, as discussed in an earlier 
chapter, the weapons available to South Asian countries are of a smaller yield compared 
to the megaton monstrosities possessed by the big five nuclear powers! Pakistan in 
particular has access to weapons limited to the 15-50 kiloton range. India has the 
capacity to manufacture both thermonuclear and boosted-fission weapons, but these 
seem to be earmarked more for use in the event of hostilities with China. 
While the weapons are smaller, the conditions existing in South Asian 
metropoles ensure that any nuclear attack will cause devastating casualties. The cities 
are crowded, buildings are of poor materials and fire-fighting facilities are inadequate 
even in peacetime. Moreover, medical facilities for treating cases of radiation bums etc. 
arc limited - especially in the case of Pakistan. 
In this discussion of attacking civilian targets, an analysis of the effects of 
nuclear strikes will be explored, as will an overview of the likely targets. Any nuclear 
attack on a civilian target depends on the ability of the attacking force to penetrate the 
' See Chapter Two pp. 65-70 &pp. 85-87 
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defences and the effects of the attack depend on the efficacy of the civil defence 
organization. These will be also discussed in some detail. One final point must be made 
on the ability of Indian and Pakistani forces to attack civilian targets. India's delivery 
systems, manned aircraft and missiles, are capable of hitting any target in Pakistan. 
Pakistan's systems are not yet able to reciprocate as they can only cover a limited area. 
Before analyzing the impact of nuclear weapons on South Asian urban centres, a 
few assumptions have been made regarding the size and composition of the nuclear 
forces ranged against civilian targets. As discussed in earlier chapters, Pakistan is 
unlikely to possess more than 30 20-kiloton atomic weapons at present. In India! s case, a 
minimum of 85 such weapons is a reasonable estimate. Any boosted-fission or 
experimental thermonuclear weapons in India! s possession are assumed to be earmarked 
for possible use against China. 
These assumptions have very serious implications for speculating oncity- 
busting' strategies adopted by both countries. With the limited number of weapons 
available, Pakistan would have to carefully choose its targets in order to achieve 
maximum effect. It cannot afford to waste effort on small military targets or on civilian 
targets of little political significance. In addition, with so few weapons available, 
Pakistan would have to carefully weigh the penetration prospects of their delivery 
systems. This would ensure that Pakistan would choose to attack targets as close as 
possible to its air bases and this would preclude attacks on the majority of India! s major 
industrial targets and on the bulk of its military defence installations. Even Pakistan's 
ballistic missiles cannot as yet cover much of India. 
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India, on the other hand, does not face these problems. Because of Pakistatfs 
limited geographical depth, all Pakistani targets lie within range of'Prithvi'SSMs and 
Indian MiG-27s and Jaguars. Moreover, Pakistan is even more vulnerable than India 
since most of its ma or cities lie very close to the Indian border. i 
Once the nuclear weapons reach their targets, however, the effects in both 
countries would be catastrophic. Even operating under the limitations given above, a 
nuclear exchange in South Asia would easily result in over a million civilian deaths. The 
urban centres of South Asia are amongst the most crowded in the world and their large 
slum areas would become death traps as the blast effects of even 20 kiloton weapons 
would wreak havoc. 
Attacking Strategic/Civilian TaMtta 
The first question that must be asked is what are the likely targets in South Asia. 
The second issue is whether strategic counterforce targets be differentiated from 
civilian countervalue targets in either India or Pakistan. The second of these is easiest to 
answer, since no strategic target in South Asia is truly isolated from a major urban 
centre. For example, Mumbai houses BARC and India! s Western Fleeý and of course, a 
huge civil population. Similarly, any attack on India! s Western Army Command 
Headquarters at Chandimandir will have devastating consequences for the neighbouring 
city of Chandigarh. 
The first question is rather more difficult since the ranges of many delivery 
systems are heavily dependent on a number of external factors, such as carrying external 
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fuel tanks and the actual weight of the nuclear weapon carried. I lowever, for the 
purposes of this chapter the following assumptions are made: ' 
For Pakistan: - 30 * 20 kT weapons 
- 40* F-16 fighter-bombers - range of 547km with 3000kg payload 
- 140* Mirage IHN - 685km. with 800kg payload +3 drop tanks 
- 50* M-1 I missiles - payload of 500kg & 300krn range. 
For India: - 85-100* 20kT weapons 
-I 10 * Jaguars - 852km range with 4500kg payload 
- 200* MiG-27 - 5401an with 2000kg payload + external fuel 
- 70* MiG-23 - 400krn with external fuel 
- 75* Prithvi SSM - payload of 500-1000kg & range of 150-350km 
These are the forces likely to be available to either country in the event of war. 
However, it does not mean that all these forces will be earmarked for a nuclear strike . 
These figures lead to some rather interesting points. Firstly, New Delhi falls just 
short of the range of the M-1 I while Mumbai falls just short of the realistic range of the 
F-16s. This adds a new dimension to the nuclear vulnerability debate as otherwise 
extremely capable scholars like S. Rashid Naim who have always given much higher 
ranges for Pakistatfs strike aircraft. ' 
What this also means is that most of India's nuclear reactors and nuclear 
facilities, especially the Indira Gandhi Atomic Research Centre in South India and 
BARC near Mumbai, are just out of the reach of Pakistani delivery systems. Mumbai is 
'See VXNair, Nuclear Indi (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1992 ), p. 50 and earlier chapter on 
Indian & Pakistani delivery systems - missiles & manned aircraft. Range/Payloads are, of course, dependent on 
external fuel 
' S. Rashid Naim, Asia! s Day After Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan 7 in S. P. Cohen ed., JhC 
Securily of South Asia: American and Asian PersRectives ( Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987 
p. 258-259. The assumptions here are based on the maximum range of these aircraft flying a hi-hi-hi attack profile 
and external fuel, Ths is not practical in reality as this dramatically increases the vulnerability of the aircraft. 
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over 800krn from the nearest Pakistani airbase while Madras is over 2200km and the 
installations in central India are between 800-1000krn away. " Again, it must be stressed 
that while the range of the Pakistani aircraft can be increased by adding external fuel 
and by altering the attack profile to a high altitude ingress and egress to and from the 
target. This would have the effect of massively reducing the aircrafVs maneuverability 
and increasing its radar cross section, if external fuel is used, and enhancing the 
aircraMs vulnerability to air defences if a high altitude attack profile is adopted. 
India does not face these problems against Pakistan, thanks to Pakistan's very 
narrow geography. Indian Jaguars can reach almost the whole of Pakistan, while the 
large MiG-27 fleet can hit all of Pakistan's major cities, owing to their extremely close 
proximity to the Indian border. The key to any successful strike by either country are the 
opposing defences. 
Air Defe ces: 
Any nuclear strategy based around attacking civilian targets, either in a first 
strike or in retaliation, has to have a reasonably good chance of reaching their targets 
safely. To this end it is imperative to examine the air defenses protecting key strategic 
military and civilian targets in the Indian subcontinent. 
Both India and Pakistan have advanced air defense ground environment systems. 
These link a large number of air defense radars of varying origins into an effective air 
defense network. This network coordinates the responses of powerful fighter-interceptor 
" J. Singli, Tbe Wars that Never Were, India Toda)r February 28 1994, p. 64 
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units and, in the case of India, a large number of surface-to-air missile squadrons. 
India and Pakistan face very different problems regarding air defense. India has 
the enormous problem of contending with its vast land area while Pakistan has to deal 
with its lack of depth. Both nations face financial constraints, although this has not 
prevented them from acquiring sophisticated air defence equipment. In addition, both 
India and Pakistan have to contend with the increasing sophistication of the attacking 
force available to both sides. 
In recent times, India has embarked on a two-fold approach. Its nuclear strike 
forces have been dramatically upgraded with the'Prithvi'missile and upgrades to the 
Jaguar and MiG-27 fleets. In addition, Indian air defences are being expanded and re- 
equipped with weapons and sensors that would render an attack by either Pakistani 
missiles or aircraft an extremely risky proposition. Pakistan, on the other hand, has been 
unable to procure modem surface-to-air missiles in any meaningful numbers and lacks 
an effective defence against either 'Prithvi' or, to a certain extent, Indian aircraft. This is 
a remarkable fact given the size of the potential Indian nuclear strike force. 
Strategic Air Defences in India 
India, with its vast airspace, maintains an advanced Air Defence Ground 
Environment System. This system, along with the civilian Air Traffic Control, is 
responsible for the detection, identification and, if necessary, the interception of aircraft 
in Indian airspace. The Air Defence network is also in the process of being upgraded to 
cater for ballistic missile threats. 
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Before examining the system in detail, a quick overview is in order. India! s air 
defence network is essentially divided into two parts - the Air Defence Ground 
Environment System and the Base Air Defence Zones. These two components are 
closely linked and share infonnation relating to air defence tasks. 
The Air Defence Ground Environment System consists of an array of radars 
along the Western and Northern Borders as well as a network of mobile systems in the 
North East and South of the country. The ADGES network is responsible for overall 
airspace management and detection of intruders. The ADGES also controls and 
coordinates the air defences for large area targets. The Base Air Defence Zones, as the 
name implies, are tasked with the defence of high value targets - air bases, nuclear 
installations and key military installations. The BADZ is a scaled down ADGES 
network, limited to an arc of I OOkm. The BADZ is a far more concentrated air defence 
environment than the ADGES and provides the only gap-free air defence cover in most 
sectors. 
In addition to these networks, India is now establishing an anti-tactical ballistic 
missile screen - with new radars and weapons. It is not clear whether this will be 
incorporated into the BADZs or whether it will comprise a separate network. This 
ATBM screen is slowly taking shape and news of its structure is still awaited. 
Indian Air Defences: Sensor Network 
The Indian Air Defence Ground Environment System employs a three tier 
detection network. While this system is currently in the process of a major 
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modernization program, the basic structure of the ADGES network will remain 
unchanged. The first layer, rather surprisingly, consists of Mobile Observation Posts. 
These remain among the most reliable of the early-waming mechanisms available to the 
Indian Air Force. ' The MON consists of two-man teams equipped with a HFNHF 
radio set and field glasses. ' The personnel in the MOP are very well versed in the visual 
identification of aircraft as well as their general direction of flight. ' 
The MOPs are scattered along the borders at random intervals, ranging between 
25 and 45 kilometres. ' The MON give the first warning of airborne intrusion, the 
general direction of the attack and, more often than not, the number of aircraft and their 
type. 9 The MON are assisted in this task by personnel from the Indian police forces 
and Railway Protection Force who are given some training in aircmft identification. 10 
These agencies report via a communications system based on both HF/VHF radio sets 
as well as telephone lines. A more advanced communications system based on fibre 
optic cables and satellite communications is also available to assist the MOPs in 
reporting to the radar picket line. " 
The radar picket line, which lies about 150km behind the MOPs, consists of a 
S. P. Baranwal, Military Yearbook 1990-1991 p. 246 
J. Baranwal, SIvs Military Yearbook 1992-1993 p. 748 
'ibidp. SS 13 
'ibidp. 749 
10C. Cit 
1* G. KTanharn & M. Agrnon, The Indian Air Forcee Trends & Prosnects ( Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), 
pp. 4748 
" S. Basu, Made Eyes in the Desere in the Hindu Weekly Edition: 26 August 1995, p. 16 
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number of radar clusters. These comprise three radar stations separated at a distance of 
the sum of their radii. " The equipment issued to these clusters generally comprises one 
I icense-made Soviet ST-68/U and two P- 18/49 radars. These are then flanked by two P- 
12/45 radars. " The ST-681U acts as the Control and Reporting Centre ( CRC ). 
This may have changed somewhat as the ST-68U, which was plagued with some 
nagging development problems has largely replaced older Soviet-made equipment. 14 
Moreover, India has been license producing the French designed TRS-2215D 3-D 
surveillance radar for a number of years and has derived an indigenously built radar - 
PSM Mk. 2 from it. These have probably supplanted most of the older Soviet-bloc 
equipment. " It should be pointed out, that these radars are all long-range surveillance 
types with ranges in excess of 300km and good performance against targets flying at all 
altitudes - even those employing electronic countermeasures (ECM) and anti-radiation 
missiles. " These radar pickets are responsible for giving accurate information on the 
intruding force to the Air Defence Control Centres ( ADCC ) located behind the radar 
picket line. The picket line and the ADCC are separated by a first layer of air defence 
weapons which are the first to engage the intruders. " 
12 J. Baranwal, SP's Mlitary Yearbook 1992-1993 p. SS 13 
" loc. cit 
14 ibid pp. 751-752 
" B. Blake, Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systemsj 995-1996 (Surrey. Jane's Info. Group, 
1995), p. 17 
16 For a more detailed discussion, see Jane's Radar & E. W. Systems as well as the Indian Air Force 
section of SP's Military Yearbook 1992-1993 pp. 738-758 
" Baranwal, Srs Mflitary Yearbook 1992-1993 p. 749 
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ADCCs also keep in touch with the Base Air Defence Zone ( BADZ ) control 
centres. The BADZ is a scaled down version of the ADGES configuration and is geared 
towards the defence of key air bases and other high value targets. The BADZ is limited 
to an arc of I OOkm, compared to the hundreds of kilometres in the case of the ADGES 
system. 
Like the ADGES, the BADZ consists of three layers. The first of which are the 
mobile observation posts, followed by a mixed layer of weapons and their associated 
radars along with a picket line of low-level radars. These are in turn supported by anti- 
aircraft artillery batteries. nis network is controlled by a ST-68U radar. "' The BADZ 
provides comprehensive and gap-free coverage over its assigned area of responsibility. 
Some observers have likened the BADZ set-up to the defence pattern of a carrier battle 
group. Any aircraft attacking a vital military target, therefore, not only has to get past 
the ADGES, but also the far more formidable BADZ. This has serious implications for 
the attacking force. 
India's air defences currently rely on a mix of MiG-21/-23/-29 and Mirage 2000 
interceptors and thirty-eight squadrons of surface-to-air missiles. The SAM units 
comprise 30 squadrons of SA-3b Pechoras and 8 squadrons of SA-8b OSA-AKM 
systems and are deployed to protect key air bases as well as some major 
military/industrial centres. " Though the SAMs are old, they have been updated 
periodically and, when operating as part of the BADZ, are deployed in such a manner as 
" 10C. Cit. 
" World Air Power Joumal - Volume 12: SoHna 1993 p. 146 
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to minimize their shortcomings. It should be pointed out, however, that this system is 
geared up to the defence of point targets and not for overall area defence. It also lacks a 
viable capability against ballistic missiles. With this in mind, the Indian Air Force has 
begun a massive modernization of its strategic air defences. 
The first signs that India was modernizing its air defences came when a massive 
order was placed for Sukhoi SU-30 combat aircraft. These aircraft, the first batch of 
which has now been delivered, are primarily long range interceptors, capable of 
intercepting targets at ranges exceeding 1201an. 20 When this is added to the fact that 
India's ongoing MiG-21 bis upgrade program is primarily aimed at enhancing the 
aircraft's air defence capabilities and that AEW aircraft are about to be deployed, it can 
be seen that India! s fighter defences are about to be drainatically enhanced. 
Further to these developments, news began leaking out about the deployment 
from 1998 onwards of an Anti-tactical Ballistic Missile screen. " This system is to 
comprise the Russian S-300V ATBM (SA- 12) and fndia! s ownAkash'missile which 
has a considerable ATBM capability. In March 1997, the Indian press confirmed these 
reports, stating that one S-300V squadron was being purchased, with morc to be built 
under license. ' These would provide a comprehensive defence against ballistic missiles 
as well as manned aircraft coming in from either Pakistan or China. These ATBMs may 
not be able to intercept all incoming missiles but they would provide an additional layer 
"Me Hindu - 12 June 1997, p. I 
" 'Coping with Sky Spies' in the Hindustan Times - IS January 1997 
' Deccan Herald - March 27 1997 On 23 March 1998, the author held discussions with retired Air 
Marshal Vwho confinned existence of the ATBM plan. Ile refused to be drawn into divulging its current status. 
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of defence. 
As can be seen, these systems will provide India with an extremely potent 
defence against both Pakistani and Chinese ballistic missiles and manned aircraft 
carrying nuclear weapons. In the case of Pakistan, the problem is further compounded 
by the fact that any aircraft attempting to avoid these defences by going over the 
Arabian Sea, will be detected and engaged by the fighters and SAMs of India's powerful 
Western Fleet. In fact, if they attempt a low-level penetration run against BARC or 
Mumbai, which would be a risky venture without external fuel, they would come within 
range of India! s coastal patrol forces which are equipped with 40mm anti-aircraft guns 
and man-portable SAMs. Would Pakistan risk their aircraft against targets deep in India 
when the probability of intercept increases the further away from Pakistan the target 
lies 
Therefore, India's strategic air defences severely restrict the number and types of 
targcts that would bc potcntially vulncrablc to Pakistani attack. Morcovcr, whcn India's 
air defence modernization is complete, and the Indian government seems to be 
committed to this, the prospect of any Pakistani aircraft getting through is remote. 
Ballistic missiles may have a better chance of succeeding, even with an Indian ATBM 
screen, but their ranges arc severely limited. The old adage of nuclear deterrence -one 
will always get through'- is being challenged by massively enhanced Indian defences. 
This could, in theory at any rate, seriously upset the Pakistani nuclear deterrence 
strategy. 
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Strategic Air Defences in Pakistan 
Pakistan's Air Defence Command was formed in 1975 - over a decade before 
India's. It is based at Chaklala air force base near Rawalpindi and exercises control, 
surveillance and coordination over all Pakistani airspace. " The ADC HQ is based in 
bunkers 5 to 10 metres below ground and has four rows of consoles with 20-25 men 
operating them. All units - aircraft, airbases and AAA units - are represented on screens. 
In fact, the ADC HQ set-up is regarded as being one of the most modem in existence. 
Subordinate to the ADC HQ are four Sector Operations Centres, which in turn 
control seven Control & Reporting Centres (CRCs). The four sector headquarters are 
located at Quetta, Sargodha, Karachi and Peshawar. ' As in the case of India, Pakistan 
has a comprehensive radar network which can also accept data from the civilian air 
traffic control radar. The radar network was established from 1976 onwards as part of 
Project Crystal which aimed to give Pakistan a modem air defence network. Pakistan 
operates a bewildering variety of radars from varying sources. The most modem units 
are six TPS-43G 3-D long range radars. These are supplemented by some older 
American, Chinese and British long range radars. 25 
As regards low-level radars, in 1979-80, as the first stage of Project Crystal, 
Pakistan purchased 45 mobile pulse doppler radars from Siemens of Germany. These 
systems are of the MPDR 45/E type and are controlled by 6 CRCs. 1' These are 
23 Rikye, Singh & Steinernann, Fiza'ya: The Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force p. 95 
24 I. OC. Cit 
ibid p. 96 
10C. Cit 
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extremely capable radars and significantly enhance Pakistan's ability to detect low-level 
Indian intruders. However, since most of Pakistan's major targets are located so close to 
the Indian border, there is very little time available for the defenders to react. This 
problem will remain with Pakistan for the foreseeable future. 
Despite this investment in radars, one major gap remains - along the Indian 
border from Sialkot to Suleimanke where major targets are located. " Pakistan had 
hoped to bridge this gap, and solve a few other low level detection problems with the 
purchase of E-2C Hawkeye AEW aircraft, but this order failed to materialize and 
Pakistan is unlikely to get an AEW aircraft in the near future. 
Pakistan's air defences are centred around three squadrons of F- I 6A/B aircraft, 
backed up by large numbers of Chinese F-7s and French Mirage IlVVs. These aircraft, 
while reasonably effective, are handicapped by a lack of long range air-to-air missiles 
and, in the case of the F-7, Mirage fleets, the lack of truly modem radars. Pakistan had 
hoped to obtain up to 40 Mirage 2000-5 aircraft from France, but the deal has not yet 
materialized, and may have been cancelled outright. Pakistan has now started an update 
program for its Mirage and F-7 interceptors with the hope of making them more viable 
in the all-weather intercept role. These will provide Pakistan's air defence assets with a 
major leap in overall capability and would pose some problems for an Indian attacking 
force. At the very least, India would have to provide a heavy escort to its strike aircraft. 
Pakistan's SAM defences are also peculiarly thin - comprising only 6-8 
squadrons of Crotale mobile SAMS and I squadron of HQ-2Js ( Chinese versions of the 
" ibid p. 97 
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SA-2 ). " These are backed up by a very large number of flak regiments (up to 43) 
operated by the air force and the regular army as well as AAA units held by reserve 
formations. These regiments largely operate Chinese made anti-aircraft guns of calibres 
ranging from 12.7mm to 37mm. While these provide some defence against aircraft, they 
are of no use against missiles. What is even more surprising is the lack of Pakistani 
investment in SAMs. It is possible that this is because of the relatively high running 
costs of SAM units and the desire to obtain as many manned aircraft as possible. This, 
of course, has the result that Pakistan has no defence of any kind against Indian ballistic 
missiles. 
Compared to India! s array of SAMs and fighters, Pakistan's air defences, while 
well coordinated, are not very sophisticated. Pakistan is further handicapped by the fact 
that it cannot yet develop or deploy any defence against ballistic missiles. Neither 
Russia nor the United States will sell ATBMs to Pakistan and China has only a few 
batteries of SA- I Os. As the Indian Air Forces obtains more and better ECM, the ability 
of Pakistan's air defences to stop a determined Indian air assault for more than a few 
days must be questionable at best. If ballistic missiles are brought into the equation, 
Pakistan's position is even worse. What is even more alarming from the Pakistani point 
of view is that any Indian nuclear strike would probably be prcceeded by a massive 
effort aimed at destroying the Pakistani air defence network? " As India! s conventional 
air doctrine involves heavy effort against Pakistan's air force, after a few days, the 
" ibid p. 100 
' Interview with Air Marshal'E'on 23 March 1998. Ile indicated that'surges'of sorties would be made 
with the sole objective of rendering the Pakistani air defence grid inoperative. 
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Pakistani air defence network could lose much of its cohesion. 30 
Implications of Air Defences on Nuclear Strike Pattems 
In view of the details of the air defences provided above, what conclusions can 
be drawn about the nuclear strike options available to India and Pakistan ? 
The first thing has to be that the 'sneak attack' scenario of one or two Pakistani 
F-16s penetrating Indian air defences and bombing New Delhi, while favoured by 
Indian journalists and alarmist analysts, is complete nonsense. " Any nuclear strike by 
manned aircraft would have to be quite large - perhaps 20+ aircraft. The bombers would 
have to be protected by escort fighters and electronic countermeasures support aircraft. 
Given that Pakistan has only 40 F- I 6s and that these aircraft form the core of 
Pakistani air defences, it is highly unlikely that more than a few of them would be 
spared for each strike. The rest of the aircraft would comprise Mirages and, possibly 
Chinese made F-7s & A-5s. Moreover, the minute the Indian air defences detect a 
formation of Pakistani aircraft heading for a major city, they may well view this as a 
nuclear strike. 
India! s manned aircraft face a similar problem. Although there are more of them, 
and Pakistan's air defences are not particularly dense, Pakistani interceptors operating 
under the excellent direction of the Air Defence Command, may well be able to swamp 
-' Air Marshal Vindicated a period of 10-14 days before the Pakistani grid became completely defunct 
" The Indian popular press from 1987 has been fidl of such scenarios. In recent years, however, the press 
now substitutes Pakistani missiles for the F- 16 as the prime delivery system 
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a small Indian raid by sheer weight of numbers. So any Indian nuclear strike would 
also have to include 20+ aircraft per strike. In addition, it is possible for India to mount 
very heavy air defence suppression raids, this would warn Pakistan of a possible nuclear 
strike. 
The only truly effective delivery systems available to either side are their ballistic 
missiles. While India is developing an ATBM screen, this will not guarantee the 
interception of all ballistic missiles. Pakistan, on the other hand, has no defences against 
India! s ballistic missiles. This means, however, that targets only within a 300k: m radius 
can be realistically attacked. Anything beyond that is very risky for the strike aircraft 
involved. 
32 In certain cases it may be possible for Pakistan to put up two or three interceptors for every Indian 
raider. However, these encounters would be rare. 
200 
The Effects of Nuclear Strikes in South Asia 
It is an established fact that a nuclear attack on any South Asian city would bring 
death and destruction on an unprecedented level. But how bad is the damage likely to 
be ? What about civil defence measures ? And, what targets are most likely to be 
attacked ? There is a complicated mathematical formula for working out the blast effects 
of various nuclear explosions. " However, the most important outcome is the 
realization that the effective blast radius is quite enormous - the radius of the 2 psi ring 
being between 1.25-2 miles and the area destroyed ranging from 4.9-12.5 miles. ' 
To get a better understanding of the casualties produced by the blast effects, the 
United States Office of Technology Assessment calculated that the winds associated 
with as little as 2-3 psi could blow people out of windows. " The OTA also suggested 
that it could be assumed that anyone within the Spsi ring would be killed. " Scholar 
S. Rahid Nairn goes further, stating that it is possible to assume that all the people 
between the Spsi ring and the 2.2psi ring would be injured. " These figures are largely 
extrapolated from the actual effects of the atomic weapons used at Hiroshima and 
33 K. Sundaýi, Blind Men of Hindoost pp. 222-230 This provides a very simple and extremely clear 
analysis of the mathematics involved in the calculations. It is vastly more understandable than the work done by 
S. Rashid Nairn inAsia! s Day Aftee pp. 253-255 
' S. Glasstone & P. J. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weap"n (Washington D. C.: Department of Defense 
& Department of Energy, 1977 ), p. 544 and on the ! Nuclear Bomb Effects Computee. A discussion on the varying 
psi effects is also giverL 
35 Office of Technology Assessment The Effects of Nuclear War ( Montclair, N. J. : Allanheld, Osmun & 
Co., 1980 ), pp. 18-19 Hereafter, this report will be reffered to as OTA - this is the abbreviation used by both 
S. Rashid Nairn & General SundaajL 
" ibid p. 19 
" S. Rashid Naim, Aadhi Rat Ke Baad (After Ndnigbt)'in S. P. Cohen ed. Nuclear Proliferation in South 
Asia- The Prosl2ects for Amis Contro (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991 ), pp. 28-29 
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Nagasaki. Moreover, while these figures are mere estimates, they provide a horrifying 
glimpse at what could happen. 
The assumptions in the OTA report are summarized by General Sundarj i: 38 
1) A typical residence will collapse with an overpressure of 5 psi 
2) Over 12 psi - 98% dead &2% injured 
3) 5-12 psi - 50% dead, 40% injured & 10% safe 
4) 2-5psi - 5% dead, 45% injured & 50% safe 
5) 1-2 psi- 25% injured & 75% safe 
Using a further series of mathematical formulae, we can get an estimate of both the 
killed and injured. " For this purpose, General Sundarji used a population density of 
15,000 people per sq. km for both India and Pakistan, while S. Rashid Naim has uses a 
variety of sources. 'O Both give a terrifying glimpse into potential armageddon. 
While S. Rashid Naim, gives a comprehensive list of targets, populations and 
casualties, some of his targets are unrealistic as they are either out of the range of 
Pakistani delivery systems or close enough to the Pakistani border to inflict considerable 
fallout damage. "' General Sundarji, however, has provided a much more realistic 
scenario - using Sundarji's targets and S. Rashid Naim's analysis a very interesting 
picture emerges. 
Sundarji assumes an attack on Delhi with 4x 20kT atomic weapons - low air 
bursts delivered by aircraft; an attack on Mumbai with 2x 20kT weapons - low air bursts 
delivered by surface ship launched missiles ( not as yet a Pakistani option ) and three 
" General KSundaiji, Blind Men of ffindoostan p. 224 
39 ibid pp. 228-230 
ibid p. 230 and S. Rashid Naim, Asia! s Day Aftee, pp. 271-272 
10C. Cit. 
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tactical targets attacked with Ix 20kT each (these were not used in the casualty analysis 
and were assumed to have suffered relatively modest casualties). " Sundarji's assumption 
is that a nuclear attack on a mechanised infantry or armoured fonnation would not be 
catastrophic. 
In retaliation, Sundarji assumed that India had 20x 20kT weapons earmarked for 
use against Pakistan - after leaving aside a reserve for use against China. India retaliated 
by attacking Islamabad-Rawalpindi with 5x 20kT atomic low air bursts and Lahore with 
3x 20kT low air bursts. " It should be stated at the outset that Islamabad and Rawalpindi 
are very close geographically and Lahore is the heart of the Muslim Punjabis that 
dominate Pakistan's political and military establishments. S. Rahid Naim does not give 
separate figures for Islamabad, so the population he gives for Rawalpindi was used 
instead. His figures are only for a single 20kT weapon hitting each target, so some 
modifications are needed, highly inaccurate in this example, but still a better estimate 
for casualties. 
The estimated casualties, using first S. Rashid Naim's estimates and then General 
Sundadi's are approximately as follows: 
`2 Sundauji, Blind Men of Hindoostan p. 136 
' ibid p. 13 9 
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India: 
Tamet Population Deaths Injuries 
Mumbai 11,914,900 136,900 x2 224,600 x2 
Dclhi 9,118,600 40,700 x4 66,900 A 
Source: S. Rashid Naim, Asia! s Day After' p. 272 Figures here are for a single 20kT 
strike. Multiplying by the number of weapons used gives an inaccurate, but somewhat 
better idea of the casualties. 
Pakistan: 













Source: S. Rashid Naim, 'Asia! s Day Aftee p. 27 1. Again multiplying the figures by the 
number of weapons used provides a more appropriate, but very inaccurate estimate. 
General Sundarji arrives at rather different figures - he does not give a city 
breakdown, but rather summarizes the casualties as follows. " 
Killed Wounded Total 
India 1,025,800 2,078,700 3,104,500 
Pakistan 1,360,940 2,760,000 4,120,940 
Sundarji goes even further, stating that if India had used all 20 weapons earmarked for 
use against Pakistan in its retaliatory strike, Pakistan would have suffered over three 
million dead and close to seven million injured. " 
Of these figures, Sundarji's produce the higher estimate of casualties ( and 
44 10C. Cit 
, 10C. Cit. 
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probably the more accurate ). In addition, his estimate of six Pakistani weapons actually 
reaching and striking their targets is perhaps a fair assessment of the number of 
weapons that might actually penetrate Indian defences today. Whether they will be able 
to survive once India! s air defence modernization is complete is open to question. 
It will be noticed that both Sundadi and Rashid Naim. have assumed a case where 
no civil defence measures of any kind were taken to provide even a veneer of protection 
to the civil population. It is well known that in both India and Pakistan fire-fighting and 
medical services are very limited indeed and this has led to the assumption that neither 
country has either plans nor any structure to cope with any nuclear catastrophe. In the 
case of India, at any rate, this may not be entirely accurate. 
If there is any warning prior to war -a few days or a week - India has the ability 
to field a potentially huge civil defence force operating to a plan -a fairly old and 
unpractised plan - of some kind. It is extremely important that the civil defence structure 
be examined in some detail. Too many analysts overlook the Indian civil defence 
structure completely. However, as will be shown, the sheer number of personnel 
available with even a modicum of civil defence training has the potential to make some 
difference 
Civil Defence in India: 
On 19 June 1997, a very strange meeting took place. The eleventh Conference of 
Directors of Civil Defence and Home Guards took place over two days; the first such 
meeting in eight years. Of the 32 items under discussion, the threat of NBC weapons 
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was placed first on the agenda. ' This indicates, at the very least a revival of this issue 
within the Civil Defence Structure. Up until the mid-1980s all civil defence measures 
remained primarily concerned with conventional attacks and the civil defence volunteers 
were trained to cope with air raids. However, in 1985, the set-up was altered and a new 
category of towns - Category I (A) - was created. These towns were those considered to 
be most at risk from nuclear threats. 
Ilere is a major factor that will affect the efficacy of the Indian civil defence 
structure - warning time. There is a huge difference between an attack in the middle of a 
war and a surprise attack. In the former case, a major mobilization of all assets would 
have already been completed and some basic civil defence measures, such as limited 
evacuation and shelter construction, undertaken. In the latter case an even more chaotic 
situation would occur. It is extremely difficult to assess the capability of the Indian civil 
defence structure in the event of the nuclear attack, however, the sheer number of 
personnel available makes the discussion of the issue essential. 
As part of the post- 1962 massive rethinking and reorganization of India! s 
national security policy, the British civil defence expert, General Irwin, was invited to 
draft the blueprint of a national civil defence plan and to give practical advice on how to 
meet both conventional and unconventional attacks. " Two manuals were compiled and 
circulated to all state governments for the preparation of comprehensive civil defence 
plans in selected high priority towns which were categorized on the basis of their 
46 AL Talwar, 'States asked to give thought to nuclear threaf, Wian Express: June 28 1997 
"' R-Prasad, India! s Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age ( Bareilly: Prakash Book Depoý 1988 ), pp. 63-64 
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importance. 
The Defence of India Act 1962 gave the State and Union Territory governments 
with all the powers necessary for the implementation of the measures outlined in 
General Irwin's manuals. These two manuals - 'The Master Plan for Civil Defence in 
India'and 'General Principles of Civil Defence'- form the structural basis for India! s 
Civil Defence Organization to the present day. " 
As regards the implementation of these plans, it was officially stated in the 
Indian Parliament in 1963, that while certain recommendations were implemented 
immediately, other measures regarding civil defence were to be kept on paper, to be 
implemented when needed. To this end, a comprehensive plan of operation was drawn 
up and directives issued to the State and Union Territory governments to make their 
own civil defence plans and to keep them, even ifjust on paper, in a state of readiness 
for their successful implementation in an emcrgenCy. 49 
In 1995, the Indian Civil Defence Organization had a sanctioned strength of 
676,000 volunteers in addition to a small ( strength unknown ) nucleus of professional 
staff which is to be augmented in an emergency. 10 However, only 376,000 have actually 
been raised and of these, only 330,000 are fully trained. " The civil defence staff and 
"' ibid p. 64 
' Loc. cit Also, 27 March 1998 interview with Major General Ir - former Director General of Civil 
Defence. The author was informed that the plans seek to make optimum use of existing assets, including drawing 
safety and protective equipment as well as personnel from the civil chemical industries as needed. 
'0 Government of India, India 1995 -A Reference Annual. (New Deh: Ministry of Infomation & 
Broadcasting, 1996 ), p. 685 
5' Loc. cit Ile fact that the Indian Government publishes these three figures and is fairly honest about the 
numerical strength of the Civil Defence Organization may be an indication that the Government is fully aware of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the existing structure and is working to remedy thern, but is not having much 
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volunteers are a distinct and separately organized group from the other Indian 
emergency services - i. e. fire departments and paramedics. 
At present civil defence units are raised and stationed in categorized civil 
defence towns. These towns are graded on both their vulnerability and on their strategic 
importance -a practice dating back to the Second World War. At present, there are I 10 
categorized towns spread over 24 states and union territories. " This means that civil 
defence personnel and expenditure are concentrated in the areas where they are needed 
most. This is particularly important since the regular civil defence forces receive only 
Rs. 65 million from the central government. 53 The Central Government handles all 
matters regarding equipment and communications. All the central government ministries 
have civil defence cells which would be activated in wartime. ' 
In addition to these volunteers, the Indian Civil Defence Organization relies 
heavily on the Home Guards and the National Cadet Corps. These two organizations are 
funded and, in the case of the NCC, trained separately from the civil defence volunteers. 
The Home Guards have a sanctioned strength of 573,793 and has a current 
raised strength of 418,493. " Unlike the Civil Defence Organization, the Home Guards 
are spread across the country and extend into the rural as well as the urban areas. The 
Home Guards were created as an auxiliary to India's vast police and paramilitary forces 
sucess. 
52 Government of India, India 1995 -A Reference Annut p. 685 
Loc. cit 
R. Datta, Civil Defence - Problems & Proslýects ( New Delhi: Shegal Publishers, 1991 ), p. 13 
Goverment of India, India 1995 &. 685 
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and have an important role in the maintenance of law and order as well as internal 
security. " in peacetime, the Home Guards assist communities in emergencies as 
epidemics, fires and floods, while their role in wartime extends to civil defence work as 
well as assisting the army in maintaining rear area security. 57 
The Home Guards have a budget of Rs. 280 million which is considerably higher 
than the Civil Defence Organization budget. " The organization, since it is more 
geographically widespread, provides a veneer of civil defence cover to rural areas as 
well as reinforcing the civil defence units in the 110 categorized civil defence towns. 
Their training prepares them for rescue and fire-fighting work. In fact, the Home 
Guards, along with personnel from the police and paramilitary forces are expected to 
provide the trained personnel needed for the enlarged rescue and f ire-f ighting services 
needed by civil defence units. The National Cadet Corps are another important source of 
manpower for civil defence. 
Since the 1980s, 32 NCC officers and cadets are trained as civil defence 
instructors at the National Civil Defence College each year. " The National Cadet Corps 
Act of 1948 states that NCC cadets have no military service liability. ' This means that 
they cannot be deployed on duties where they have to be armed unless special 
m Loc. cit 
LtGen. M. L. Clibber, Paramilitary Forces - UST PARer 4 
( New Delhi: United Services Institution, 1979 ), p. 10 
Government of India, India 1995 p. 685 
Govenunent of India, Ministry of Defence Annual Reg? grt 1995-1996 p. 88 
S. P. Baranwal, Nlilitarv Yearbook 1974 ( New Deffii: Guide Publications, 1974 ), p. 223 
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legislation is passed. This, however, does not exempt them from civil defence work. 
On 9th. September 1965 - during the 1965 India-Pakistan war - the Indian 
Central Govemment drew up a list of duties which were to be performed by NCC 
personnel over the age of 17. " These included passive air defence - rescue operations, 
first aid and casualty evacuation as well as the operation of evacuation camps. " The 
NCC cadets are also given training in fire-fighting and some instruction in specialized 
rescue operations. With even the limited training imparted to the cadets, the NCC forms 
a very useful reinforcement for the Civil Defence Organization. This is even more 
obvious when it is realised. that the NCC has 420,000 cadets in its Senior Division, 
which is made up of university students over the age of IT" The central and state 
govermnents contribute to the expenditure on the NCC in the ratio of 2: L' 
In addition to these organizations, the Indian government controls the Central 
Industrial Security Force and the Crisis Management Group of the Atomic Energy 
Regulatory Board. These two organizations, while not specifically created for the task of 
civil defence, could provide vital equipment, training and skilled personnel when 
operating in an environment of either radioactive or chemical contamination. 
As regards funding, the Indian central government maintains a sizeable calamity 
relief fund for use in the case of a natural disaster. This would provide a valuable source 
of reconstruction funds for post-war recovery. In fact it can be said that the published 
61 LOC. Cit 
61 Loc. cit 
' J. Baranwal, The Military Yearbook 1992-1993, ( New DOW: Guide Publications, 1993 ), p-801 
"J. Baranwal, 71be Military Yearbook 1993-1994 (New Deffii: Guide Publications, 1994), p. 366 
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expenditure on civil defence - Rs. 65 million - represents a relatively small fraction of 
the expenditure on a disaster relief/civil defence infrastructure. While little evidence of 
civil defence activities can be seen in peacetime, the extensive pool of manpower, 
combined with plans and an organizational set up, gives India to field a civil defence 
organization in wartime that is far better organized, larger and more capable than would 
first be apparent from the rather pathetic peacetime infrastructure. 
A reliable and flexible early warning network based on both telephone lines and 
on radio and wireless has been established in categorized civil defence towns. " Most 
states have communications networks for use in the event of a natural disaster - cyclones 
and floods in particular. The Indian Department of Telecommunications would be 
responsible for most emergency broadcasts. Agencies like All India Radio will play an 
essential role in any civil defence situation in the Indian context. 
As far as the individual states are concerned, there is a nucleus of civil defence 
instructors and experts under the control of the state police and fire services. These have 
in the past been used for rescue operations beyond the ability of the regular emergency 
servipes. "' They are apparently well trained and reasonably well equipped - including 
157 
protective masks and clothing for chemical attacks/disasters. It is not clear, however, 
as to how many personnel are available for immediate use nor are any clear details 
available about their organization - it is unlikely to be above company/battalion strength. 
" Govt. of India, India 1995 p. 685 
" Me Asian Age -5 July 1995, p. 5A team of civil defence experts from Rajasthan were involved in a 
rescue operation to free some villagers trapped in a well after being overpowered by poison gas. 
67 LDC. Cit. 
211 
The regular fire-fighting services, though poorly funded, are generally quite capable and 
have reasonably modem equipment - at least in the major cities. 
As far as air-mid shelters are concerned, the Indian Civil Defence Act of 1968, 
makes provision for any Indian police officer or civil defence official to order the 
construction of an air mid shelter wherever and whenever necessary. " The Crisis 
Management Group of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board constructed a number of 
shelters for use in the event of a nuclear accident, designed to be blast and fallout 
proofed. " All military installations have underground command centres and major fuel 
and ammunition stores at airbases are buried deep underground. " The Indian civil 
defence plans place great emphasis on the construction of emergency air raid shelters. 
Particular emphasis is given to trench shelters - both covered and uncovered. While 
these would provide very little protection against blast effects, the trench shelter offers 
very considerable protection against the effects of nuclear fallout and radiation. 
All states have evacuation plans of some kind and some have become quite 
adept at emergency evacuation of even extremely remote areas. The government of the 
impoverished state of Andhra Pradesh, for example, was able to evacuate over 260,000 
people over the course of a few days in November 1996. " This was done to avoid a 
sudden cyclone - much more could be expected to be done with adequate warning and 
from urban centres well served with road and rail links- like the various state capitals, 
Civil DefienceAct 1968 - Section 18 
South - June 1989 p. 15 
Maj. S. Bhaduri, Veapons Overviev/ in Indian Defence Review: July 1991, p. 168 
G. Radhakrishna, 'Once is not enougW in Sunday - 15-21 Dec. 1996, p. 29 
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though the huge populations of the major cities would present a daunting task. 
As regards equipment, the Public Works Departments possess almost all 
equipment necessary for rescue work. The fire departments are usually equipped to a 
reasonable standard - including aluminized fabric garments and breathing apparatus, 
which protect against NBC agents to a considerable extent. ' The auxiliary fire fighting, 
rescue and emergency units would be provided with protective gear as and if required. 
Paper plans to cope with emergencies abound in India - though they are not 
publicized. However, the moves by the Indian government to create a comprehensive 
disaster management plan must be viewed positively, even if much of the infrastructure 
is not in place. This policy, drawn up in consultation with the state governments as well 
as central ministries and institutions, lays out a comprehensive set of guidelines for 
dealing with natural calamities, civil strife as well as chemical and nuclear disasters. " 
A crisis management plan has already been implemented for dealing with 
chemical emergencies at the central, state and district levels. ' Guidelines have already 
been sent to the states and the central government is providing assistance for the 
development of the required infrastructure. " While this may seem to be of little 
relevance, the coordination of skilled personnel now being trained and equipped under 
this scheme would be invaluable in the event of a chemical attack - as would the 
protective equipment needed. 
' Personal communication widi Dr. T- dated 29 January 1995 
"Centre drafts disaster management policyin MeAsian Age - December 29 1994 
Govt. of India, India 1995 p. 186 
Loc. cit 
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Of even greater importance are the emergency plans of the Crisis Management 
Group of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. In addition to the provision of shelters 
mentioned earlier, the CMG has organized a central stockpile of protective clothing and 
monitoring equipment which could be airlifted to the scene of an emergency. ' The 
CMG has also trained medical and relief workers in the areas around nuclear power 
plants on how to deal with a nuclear disaster. n 
The Category I (A) civil defence towns, of which there are now 13, have civil 
defence plans to cope with the threat of an accident from nuclear power plants. The 
plans concentrated on minimizing the effect of nuclear fall-out through affordable 
methods. The Home Ministry also believed these plans to have some capability to deal 
with a nuclear attack . 
78 These plans, however, need updating and it appears that while 
contingency plans exist, no truly comprehensive policy exists to cope with a nuclear 
attack. This may be changing, at recently held conference, the Civil Defence 
Directorate urged all states to work out plans to cope with nuclear attacks. In fact, the 
conference seemed to suggest that the whole civil defence set-up be reconfigured to 
cope with NBC attack. How far these plans have progressed is unknown, but it is clear 
that plans and a nucleus of trained personnel exists. 
What is striking about the Indian civil defence plans is their reliance on the 
Home Guards, police and NCC to provide manpower for the emergency units. The 
' South - June 1989, p. 15 
77 1=. Cit 
' A. Talwar, 'States asked to give thought to nuclear threaf 
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problems with this scheme are twofold: how well trained are these units and how fast 
can they be mobilized ? 
Elements of the National Cadet Corps do receive training in civil defence - 
instructors at the National Civil Defence College and others at annual training camps. " 
The NCC has, during the 1965 and 1971 wars, been used for civil defence duties. In 
197 1, over 100,000 cadets volunteered for civil defence duties. " The performance of the 
NCC units in both wars was considered reasonably good and they earned considerable 
praise. " It is not known how well they would perform, but their previous performance 
gives cause for some optimism. With regard to the Home Guard units, they have, even 
in peacetime, been used to augment both the police and regular fire brigades. Their 
performance in any future war would depend on how much time was available for 
refresher training in new civil defence techniques. Not much time may be available - at 
least a week would be needed. 
The mobilization of the manpower for civil defence tasks could well be a very 
time consuming task. Home Guards are raised in their specific towns and are therefore 
available at relatively short notice. However, it is not clear whether their equipment 
would be available as easily, nor is it clear that this equipment would be in a good state 
of repair. Nonetheless, at least some equipment - especially the fire-f ighting and rescue 
apparatus - is kept to a very high standard as it is often needed by the regular fire- 
" S. C. Maikap, Cadet Coll2s in Indi (Calcutta: DarbariUdjog, 1979), p. 117 
ibid pp. 163-165 
"' Brig. M. M. Sharma, The National Cadet Corgs of Indi (New Delhi: Vision, 1980), pp. 161-163 
215 
fighting services and the public works departments. The NCC units are based at 
colleges and universities and as such may be easily mobilized. Additional manpower is 
available from the State Armed Police Battalions, which are usually available at short 
notice and have a fair amount of expertise in rescue work during natural disasters. 
Perhaps the biggest hurdle faced by the Indian Civil Defence Organization is 
public apathy in peacetime. It is extremely difficult to motivate people and governments 
to allocate either time or money for civil defence tasks. This is why there is a shortfall of 
300,000 personnel in the strength of civil defence volunteers. " Indian state government, 
while receiving adequate funding from the central government, tend to cut back on the 
state's contribution to civil defence units. In the case of the corrupt and impoverished 
state of Bihar a state of utter chaos exists in the state civil defence department. 13 
In peacetime, the police officers assigned to civil defence departments are usually 
officers who are anti-corruption or who have the courage to stand up to illegal orders. " 
These officers, while reasonably competent, feel frustrated as they are considered to be 
out of favour with the police high command. In some states, however, these police 
officers are also in command of the regular fire-fighting units. Here, as in the case of 
civil defence, inadequate funds are provided, though, with help from Japan and from the 
Government Insurance Corporation of India, additional funds for the modernization and 
expansion of state fire services have been recently been forthcoming. " 
Prasad, India! s 00 Defence in the Nuclear As! p. 64 
Me Statesman Weekly Edidon - October 23 1993 
Datta, Civil Defence - Problems & Prosnec p. 44 
Govt of India, India 1995 p. 687 See also S? s Military Yearbook 1992-93. p. 809 
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Public apathy is far more difficult to overcome. As soon as an air-mid 
materializes, there is a clamour for civil defence measures, yet, the public have not taken 
and do not take civil defence seriously, until war breaks out. " It is virtually impossible 
for the police officers, Home Guards and fire service personnel to encourage the 
population to take civil defence more seriously in peacetime - it is almost impossible to 
get Indian civilians to take peacetime fire prevention regulations seriously. 
The other problems faced by civil emergency units in India are extremely serious. 
There is a lack of coordination among various agencies and many lack adequate 
preparation for their assigned tasks. " In addition there is a lack of centralised 
ambulance, accident and trauma services. " These make relief operations in peacetime 
extremely difficult, but India copes cffectivcly with several natural calamities each year. 
The civil defence plans provide for rectifying many of these weaknesses in times of war 
by mobilizing auxiliary units, but it remains to be seen if this will work effectively. 
Nuclear war is a very different proposition to either a natural disaster or conventional air 
raids. 
It will be noticed that this discussion has exclusively focussed on the Indian civil 
defence structure. A few- and it must be stressed a very few- good books are available 
on India! s civil defence establishment. " However, these are not available for Pakistan. 
" P. V. R-Rao, Defence Without Dri (Bombay: Popular PrakashaN 1970), pp. 282-286 
" K. M. Mathur, Management of IntemW Security. ( New DeH: Oyan Publ., 1995 ), pp. 166-167 
" ibid p. 169 
" The best being Dr. R-Prasad India! s Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age v6ch has been used extensively 
in this chapter. 
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Pakistan faces identical problems to India but with the additional problem of the very 
limited land area available for evacuation and on the smaller number of trained 
personnel available for civil defence tasks. In addition, medical facilities in smaller 
Pakistani cities are substantially inferior to those in some of the less important Indian 
cities so the loss of hospitals and medical personnel will be more acutely felt. 
Nonetheless, no matter how quickly either country can prepare their civil defence 
units, it is unlikely that the enormous casualties involved in a nuclear attack will be 
avoided completely, even with large scale evacuations. The sad truth is that no civil 
defence plan can adequately protect a city from a nuclear strike and the millions of 
casualties predicted by both Sundarji and Rashid Naim will probably occur. The 
casualties would only be the start of the post-attack problems. Depending upon the size 
of weapons used and whether air or ground bursts are used, there could be colossal 
environmental consequences and severe economic repercussions. 
The only consolation for India is that the bulk of the vital war industries - and 
most of the civilian industries - lie far away from the most likely targets of a Pakistani 
nuclear strike. This is not the case in Pakistan where the lack of geographical depth 
prevents the dispersal of key industrial sites. This truth of geography also leads to 
another fact - India has the potential to recover more successfully and more completely 
from a nuclear strike than Pakistan. As of now the Pakistani High Command has to face 
an unpleasant truth - India would be severely battered by a nuclear strike but Pakistan 
will be almost completely obliterated. 
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The Uneasy Stalemate - What is preventing War ? 
As the Kashmir dispute spirals downwards, there seem to be no signs of India 
and Pakistan being able to resolve the dispute amicably. Several attempts at talks 
regarding the issue have been checkmated because of each side's unwillingness to move 
from their long established positions. At the same time, neither side seems to be moving 
towards an offensive posture and war seems does not seem to be an immediate 
possibility. There is a continuing modernization and a small expansion of conventional 
armed forces, but no move to war. So what is keeping this uneasy peace ? Is it the fear 
of nuclear weapons or is it something else 
Is Nuclear Deterrence Preventing War ? 
in an earlier chapter it was pointed out that Indian military strategy in the mid- 
1980s revolved around major mechanized formations being able to bisect Pakistan, 
capturing as much territory as possible and forcing Pakistan to captitulate. The nuclear 
factor changed all this quite dramatically. 
India has to believe that Pakistan can, and will, use nuclear weapons to prevent 
its disintegration. This, it can be argued is what is responsible for India not taking 
military action even as Pakistani support for Kashmiri separatist groups increases and as 
the violence in Kashmir continues unabated. India, it can be argued, fears that if it 
defeats the Pakistani armed forces and is poised to capture substantial chunks of 
Pakistani territory, Pakistan %ill go nuclear. This argument can be extended to speculate 
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that it is this tentative nuclear deterrence is responsible for the current lack of full-scale 
war. 
This may not be entirely correct. As shown previously, India has altered its 
strategy. No longer does it envisage a war aimed at territorial gain but a much more 
limited campaign aimed solely at inflicting maximum attrition on the Pakistani military. 
These objectives were the basis for the war scenario outlined in a previous chapter. It 
was shown that Indian forces would limit their advance in the Punjab, Gujarat and 
Rajasthan sectors while concentrating troops in an offensive along the Line of Control. 
Both countries are fully aware of the scale of the destruction that would result - 
should the nuclear threshold be crossed and as such neither country is keen to unleash 
armageddon upon the subcontinent. It has been shown that nuclear weapons have very 
limited tactical utility in the India-Pakistan context and that the sprawling urban centres 
of India and Pakistan present prime targets for nuclear strikes. Neither side can take the 
risk that a limited use of nuclear weapons to halt an enemy advance would not be 
answered with an unlimited strike on civilian targets. As such, it is extremely unlikely 
that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons unless its very existence was threatened. 
The introduction of nuclear weapons into the South Asian military equation has 
had the effect of limiting the scope of conventional war. However, is nuclear deterrence 
responsible for the state of 'no-war' currently in place ? 
It has been shown that current Indian military plans will significantly reduce the 
risk of Pakistani first-use of nuclear weapons, yet war does not seem likely, and this is 
in spite of what may be considered to be a'prox_V war being waged by Pakistan against 
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India. Neither side is keen to initiate conventional military action against the other, 
despite provovation. One reason for this lies in a delibcrate political decision taken by 
India - partly inspired by the nuclear factor, another is the basic parity that exists at the 
operational level between India and Pakistan. 
The Deterrence of Operational Parijy: 
India does hold numerically superior and more sophisticated forces than Pakistan 
and is blessed with a reasonably advanced defence industrial base. However, in a short 
war lasting two to four weeks, it would be extremely difficult for India to bring the full 
weight of its forces to bear. While most of the Indian air force could rapidly be 
transfered to the Pakistan border, the Indian army would be very reluctant to withdraw 
anything more than a few divisions from the Chinese frontier. At the operational level, 
both sides are matched in a war of limited duration. 
The operational level of war is at the level of an Army Regional command. This 
is where strategic aims are translated into a workable plan for war-f ighting within a 
particular theatre and military assets are provided commensurate vith these plans. The 
operational level is where tactical battles in a particular area are given a coherent design 
and are tackled as part of a wider strategic objective. "' 
Operational parity takes several things into account. The numbers of troops and 
" The author is extremely gratefid to Mr. 'C' for clarifying this issue in a series of discussions in March 
1996. This holds true for the Indian Army. Pakistans General headquarters performs the dual task of strategic 
planning and operational directive control. 
Until the early 1990s, the Operational level in the Indian arrny was pegged at Corps level which is the 
minimum level at which joint service operations are undertaken. 
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the quantity of equipment are only part of this calculation. Training, doctrine and the all 
important issue of surprise are all critical factors in determining the parity at the 
operational level ip the India-Pakistan context. To understand the concept of the 
deterrence of operational parity, it is useful to examine the factors listed above, starting 
with the all important issue of surprise. 
As stated before, both India and Pakistan would find it politically unacceptable to 
lose any major territory in either Punjab or Jammu and Kashmir. To this end, vast 
Holding Corps are deployed in a purely defensive role. "' This is combined with a 
network of extremely formidable defensive fortifications in Punjab and southern 
Jammu and Kashmir that would slow any advance until at least threatre and possibly 
even Army reserves can be brought into the field. " For at least the first forty-eight 
hours an offensive would be delayed by the troops manning the linear defences. This is 
ample time for reinforcement. These linear defences remove the factor of surprise from 
the equation. Surprise would be difficult, if not impossible to achieve and, in the 
unlikely event that it was achieved, the linear defences virtually negate any advantage 
that might possibly be accrued. 
With regards to training and doctrine, both sides seem to be more or less evenly 
matched. Both armed forces have configured their doctrines to take into their respective 
limitations of time, space and finance. Moreover, as far as training is concerned, despite 
" For a more complete discussion on the roles, functions and theatres of war, please examine chapter four 
in which this is detailed. 
" The author was informed by Mr. 'C'that the defensive fortifications have been extended into 
North/Central Rajasthan 
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the fact that division and corps level exercises are relatively rare in the case of the Indian 
army, the standard of training of the personnel is high on both sides. " Similarly, the two 
air forces possess a correspondingly high standard of training. " 
This brings us to the issue of numerical strength of manpower and equipment. 
Here again the two sides are pretty evenly matched. India does have more troops and 
more ( and in some cases, better) equipment, but this is not overwhelming by any 
means. As discussed earlier, the strengths of artillery and armour in the two armies do 
not give a major advantage to either side. Moreover, since Pakistan raised its third 
armoured division, the two sides now have parity in terms of massed armoured 
formations. ' India may have an edge in numbers of tanks and in armoured regiments, 
but not in dedicated armoured divisions. 
Pakistan's desire to maintain a certain numerical equality between itselfand India 
can be extended to cover the issue of ballistic missiles. India! s acquisition of the'Prithvi' 
was matched by Pakistan's purchase of M-1 1/Hafl-2s. In addition, India! s indigenous 
production base for Trithvi'was matched by a technology transfer to Pakistan from 
China of the M-1 I missile. " 
" The Indian army is in two minds about the utility of big exercises. Some believe they are absolutely 
essential, others believe that these exercises simply highlight coordination problems and have little military utility. 
Tlis was highlighted in Bajpai, Chari, Cheema, Cohen & Ganguly, Brasstacks and Bevon p. 24 A much more 
detailed account was found in II)R Research Team, Tbe Big Exercise Syndromein Lt. Gen. M. Tliomas ed. Indian 
Defence ReWew. June 1990, pp. 146-156 
" Both air forces base their training on NATO standards. The Indian press was fidl of rumours of severe 
restrictions in flying hours in the IAF. However, a 23 March 1998 personnal interview with retired Air Marshal 11' 
revealed that the IAF has had no major problems in flying 15-20 hours per month which is the NATO standard. 
' India at one stage massed three armoured divisions against PakistaWs two. 
" See Chapter Three - section on Pakistaifs missiles. It is not clear if the factory has actually started 
producing nýssiles or not. However, given Pakistan's bugetary constraints, it is hardly likely that large scale 
production will occur. 
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The one area where Pakistan may be in danger of losing its operational parity is 
in the case of air power. Pakistan's air force, though much smaller than its Indian 
counterpart, has sought to build up sufficient forces to deny India clear air superiority 
and to mount sustained strike operations against Indian ground formations. However, 
since the embargo of F- I 6s to the Pakistani air force, and its subsequent failure to find a 
replacement, there is a distinct possibility of India achieving a convincing qualitative as 
well as a quantitative superiority over its Pakistani counterpart. ' This may well give 
India a means of breaking the current stalemate in terms of operational parity in the 
future. 93 
At present, this situation of operational parity between conventional military 
forces favours Pakistan. As long as Pakistan believes that it has achieved this 
operational parity, then it will continue to support subversive activity in Indian Kashmir. 
India, therefore will seek to break this impasse by modernizing its own forces and 
reorienting its operational doctrines. Conversely, Pakistan will make all efforts to ensure 
that this operational parity continues. The net result is that there is no war. 
Nuclear weapons play a marginal role in this state of no war and no peace. The 
efrect that the introduction of nuclear weapons has had is that the Indian army has had 
to reorient its battle plans and to limit its advances in Punjab and Sindh. In other words, 
nuclear weapons have served to limit the scope of an India-Pakistan war, but saying that 
' The Indian Air Force has now fannulated its first air power doctrine. For a discussion of this refer to 
P. SawhneY, India! s first Air Power Doctrine takes shape, Internadonal Defence ReWew. June 1997, pp. 33-3 8 
Aso from personnal discussions between the author and Mr. 'C' in May-June 1997. 
" Whether this happens depends of course on if current modernization plans continue and on Pakistan's 
inability to match India in terms of aircraft quality in the future. 
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they are responsible for preventing war from taking place may be an exaggeration . 
Perhaps the real deterrent to war, as has been argued above, lies in the current 
operational parity in conventional forces. Should this operational parity be upset, then 
the chances of war will increase. This is not to say that war will be inevitable or 
immediate, but should operational parity be upset in the future, then war may seem to be 
a more attractive option to the side with the advantage. It is with this in mind that 
conventional as well as non-conventional arms acquisitions in South Asia must be 
examined since war is being prevented by a tenuous balance of power between India 
and Pakistan. 
225 
Chapter Siv The Political Implications of a Nuclear South Asen 
The technical constraints to a nuclear armed India and Pakistan have largely been 
overcome. However, should India and/or Pakistan overtly deploy nuclear weapons, the 
implications for the relationship of these two countries with the international 
community will permanently be altered. There are very strong domestic pressures in 
both countries arguing in favour of overt nuclearization and, as will be shown later, 
these pressures cannot be ignored. Moreover, there is an alternative argument that seems 
to point to overt nuclearization by both India and Pakistan would lead to a stable 
deterrent system being established. 
The United States is an important player in the region. Both India and Pakistan 
depend on trade with the United States and both would suffer enormously in the event 
of American sanctions. By virtue of its large economy and trade with India and 
Pakistan, and with its global clout, the Americans are potentially very influential. 
However, the United States has limits to its influence. It has lost a considerable degree 
of its credibility in South Asia and its rhetoric and mandatory sanctions may be counter- 
productive. ' 
Neither India nor Pakistan can test a nuclear weapon without invoking the wrath 
of the United States. According to United States law, under the Glenn Arnmendment of 
1994, should any country outside the five declared nuclear powers test a nuclear 
weapon, sanctions would be imposed and World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
1 See Chapter 1 pp. 41-45 
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loans vetoed. ' This would be economically and politically disastrous for Pakistan and 
would be almost as bad for India. While either country would readily defy the United 
States should they be overtly physically threatened with nuclear weapons or if their 
strategic threat assessments were to undergo a major change, neither would want to risk 
sanctions simply for local political prestige without extreme provocation. 
Should either India or Pakistan overtly declare their nuclear weapons status, the 
entire effort against the proliferation of nuclear weapons will suffer a heavy blow. So 
long as neither country states that it actually has nuclear weapons, the international 
system can delude itself into thinking that the non-proliferation campaign in South Asia 
has credibility. However, neither country needs to test a nuclear weapon in order to field 
a fully operational and viable nuclear arsenal. ' This is significant since sanctions would 
not be automatically triggered should either country simply declare itself to be a nuclear 
power - no matter how much that upsets the Americans. 
Moreover, while the current position non-declaration of nuclear weapons 
possession may be pleasing for the United States and its allies, allowing them to 
strongly advocate nuclear non-proliferation, it does little for stability in South Asia. 
Since neither country admits to having nuclear weapons, they cannot sit down and open 
a constructive dialogue to avoid a potential nuclear conflict. Any discussions between 
the two South Asian rivals that are now held are held behind the facade of non- 
' The Economist: February 7th-13th 1998, p. 82 The Ammendment also 
demands that the United States cut-off all non-humanitarian aid to countries 
testing nuclear weapons and to sever military ties. 
' This was discussed in some detail in the chapters dealing with Indian 
Pakistani nuclear capabilities and delivery systems. 
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possession of nuclear weapons and therefore cannot be entirely sincere or honesO There 
is a lack of transparency regarding nuclear issues that does nothing to build confidence 
between the India and Pakistan. 
What about domestic politics ? How popular is the nuclear option among the 
public in India and Pakistan ? Unlike in the West where there is a growing sentiment 
against nuclear weapons, the consensus in both India and Pakistan is decidedly in favour 
of retaining the capability to produce nuclear weapons, if not so heavily in favour of 
outright deployment. In what was a landmark study of public opinion, the Marketing 
and Research Group Pvt. Ltd. of New Delhi was commissioned to survey the opinions 
of the educated elites found in major Indian cities. 
The results of this survey, which was conducted between late September and 
early November 1994, were published in February 1995, and showed that fifly-seven 
percent of all respondents were in favour of the current policy of neither confirming nor 
denying a de facto nuclear capability while thirty-three percent were in favour of an 
open declaration of nuclear weapons status. A mere eight percent were in favour of 
renouncing nuclear weapons. This means that a staggering ninety percent of 
respondents were against India renouncing the nuclear option. ' If this survey is accurate 
- and there is no reason to suggest otherwise as yet - then the 'pro-bomb' lobby in India 
has a good deal of support. 
4 In light of this inability to be honest with each other, it is not 
altogether surprising that Confidence Building Measures in South Asia have 
failed more often than not. 
' D. Cortright & A. Mattoo, 'Indian Public opinion and Nuclear Weapons 
Policy', Cortright & Mattoo, India and the Bomb, p. 11 
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In December 1995, another survey, by the same company was carried out, this 
time on a cross section of the socio-economic groups found in urban India. An 
impressive sixty-two percent were in favour of conducting a nuclear test and of those, 
fifty-four percent were in favour of an Indian bomb test, even if the United States and 
Japan imposed sanctions. ' 
Politically, therefore, it is virtually impossible for an Indian political party to 
renounce nuclear weapons, and this leads to the remarkable consensus on the need for a 
strong nuclear weapons capability amongst India! s many political parties. " Moreover, in 
the December 1995 survey, forty-three percent of all respondents said that they would 
be more inclined to support a political party that would ensure that India had nuclear 
weapons. " 
Therefore, it is quite clear that the Indian public believes firmly in the need for a 
nuclear weapons capability and is against any renunciation of this option. Should India 
conduct a nuclear test and sanctions are imposed, India will be severely affected but, 
there may be a "lingness on the part of the Indian public to tough it out. ' There is no 
similar survey in Pakistan, however, it is very reasonable to assume that there is 
6 India Today: Dec. 11 1995, pp. 48-49 It will be noted at around this 
time that a report in the United States claimed that India was preparing to 
conduct a nuclear test. 
' There is a similar consensus on India's not signing the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty. 
' ibid p. 49 
9 It should be pointed out that the Indian economy is not really driven 
by foreign trade. Sanctions would have an impact, but the economy would not 
collapse and would gradually recover. Also, a latent distrust of foreign 
powers in India and sanctions could rally public political support for any 
government that conducted a test. 
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considerable similarity in views between the Indian and Pakistani publics on the nuclear 
issue. 
What these surveys indicate is that there is really no major domestic constraint 
on the deployment on nuclear weapons. However, as mentioned earlier, there will be 
significant fallout on the relationship India and Pakistan have with each other and with 
other countries. In the event of a nuclear of a nuclear test by either country, sanctions 
from the United States, and probably Japan, would follow. However, this would not 
necessarily be the case in the event of nuclear weapons declaration. 
One author has argued that any such declaration by India would lead to 
embargoes of military hardware from Russia, Britain and France - three of India! s key 
weapons suppliers. " This is certainly a possibility, but in the case of Russia, it is less 
than a certainty. Russia needs India as a customer for anns, since India is the only 
country in the world to actually win a conventional. war using Russian equipment. The 
sheer monetary value of India! s arms imports from Russia make a total embargo less 
certain. France, following its relatively independent foreign policy, may not impose an 
embargo, but can India's decision makers afford to take the risk 
In Pakistan's case, it is almost certain that China would continue to supply arms 
to Pakistan, even if the rest of the world does not. In this sense, Pakistan may be better 
placed than India. On the other hand, Pakistan's domestic arms industry is far less 
developed than India! s and in the event that China does impose an embargo, Pakistan's 
military credibility may well cease to exist. 
10 V. Sahni, 'Going Nuclear', Cortright & Mattoo ed. India and the 
Bomb, p. 100 
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. 
Furthermore, an overtly nuclear South Asia may well start another series of 
nuclear arms races. Japan may be unwilling to accept a lower military status to India and 
may initiate a nuclear weapons program of its own. This would in turn create problems 
in South East Asia, owing to a long-standing distrust of Japanese militarism, with 
possibly Indonesia and perhaps other countries initiating weapons programs. II There 
could even be repercussions in the Middle East as Arab states and Iran initiate and 
accelerate their own nuclear weapons programs. In other words, there could well be a 
massive increase in the numbers of states seeking nuclear weapons and this would 
sound the death-knell of Western non-proliferation efforts. 
On the other hand, a nuclear South Asia may have no effect whatsoever on 
neighbouring countries. Any detailed analysis of a possible nuclear weapons declaration 
by India and Pakistan would come to the conclusion that any such declaration is merely 
a confirmation of long standing suspicions. Is there really any difference between two 
un-declared nuclear powers and two declared nuclear powers ? If there is a difference, it 
is in the fact that declared nuclear powers can at least become part of the international 
dialogue on nuclear weapons. At present, since neither country admits to having nuclear 
weapons, they are not part of this dialogue. They are 'spoken to rather than spoken with. 
This only serves to increase domestic resentment while doing absolutely nothing to 
prevent them from developing nuclear weapons. 
11 No country has actually said what it would do in the event of an 
openly nuclear South Asia. Moreover, it is not at all clear as to what the 
reaction would be from non-American Western allies in the event of either 
India or Pakistan conducting nuclear tests. Some may impose sanctions, others 
might not. 
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As regards sanctions, while domestic legislation in the United States virtually 
demands sanctions in the event of a nuclear test by either India or Pakistan, there is no 
international treaty demanding the imposition of economic sanctions. While countries 
like Japan and the United Kingdom may be tempted to follow the American lead, other 
countries would in all probability not react in a similar manner. And, in the event of a 
simple declaration of nuclear power status, it is not altogether certain that even 
sanctions from the United States would be incurred. 
There is no international law, even in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that demands 
the imposition of economic sanctions, or even an embargo on sales of conventional 
arms to a state that declares itself a nuclear power outside of the currently recognized 
five nuclear states. There would certainly be an embargo on the sale of certain high- 
technology items, but since both India and Pakistan are already restricted in what they 
can obtain in terms of nuclear technology and items related to ballistic missile 
development, this would not have too much of an impact. " 
Unilateral sanctions on the part of the United States against India or Pakistan 
would only serve to heighten domestic mistrust of the motives of the United States and 
could actually strengthen support for the nuclear program. Since few countries are likely 
to support the United States - so long as neither country actually conducts a nuclear test 
- the United States could find itself isolated internationally and, perhaps far more 
importantly, lose whatever influence it has in the region. 
12 India has faced sanctions on its nuclear program since its 1974 test. 
This led to the Canadian government's withdrawal from the construction of the 
two atomic power stations in Rajasthan. 
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The role of the United States is the subject of considerable discussion in South 
Asia and in the United States as has been discussed earlier. Any administration runs the 
rislc of being perceived as partisan by either India or Pakistan and both countries are 
extremely suspicious of American motives in the region. The United States apparently 
played a major role in diffusing the crises of 1987 and 1990. These have been described 
in more detail in the first chapter, however, in both cases, the United States was not 
really seen as an unbiased observer. Reports of American offers to warn Pakistan of any 
Indian moves did nothing to improve India! s confidence in the United States. Should the 
United States react with sanctions or excessive diplomatic pressurq to India declaring 
itself a nuclear power, any residual goodwill in India will immediately evaporate. " 
Pakistan also has no reason to have much faith in the United States since 1990 
when all economic and military aid to Pakistan was suspended. "' Pakistan has not 
forgiven the Americans for this. Conversely, the moves by the Clinton Administration to 
relax the arms embargo on Pakistan have been viewed as American support for 
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and a direct threat by some groups in India. The 
United States seems to be in an unenviable position where it can neither please India nor 
Pakistan at the same time. 
13 In the pro-bomb lobby of India there is considerable resentment over 
what is seen as American hypocrisy in its dealings with China as compared to 
India. They particularly resent America's apparently fawning respect for 
China's nuclear weapons while seeking to deny India the same right to nuclear 
weapons. A former Indian Foreign Secretary, A. P. Venkateswaran, asked 'Why is 
China's Power - its huge army and intercontinental ballistic missiles - 
considered absolutely acceptable while India's is not V- cited in 
R. H. Munro, 'Superpower Rising' Time international: April 3 1989, p. 18 
14 The suspension of United States aid to Pakistan was done under the 
Pressler Ammendment. In the early years of the Clinton Administration, some 
of the provisions of the Pressler Ammendment were relaxed. This was done 
under the Brownback Ammendment of 1995 - see World Air Power Journal: Volume 
27- Winter 1996, p. 12 for details. 
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There has been much speculation and debate on the issue of India-Pakistan 
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). As of now, there are strictly limited CBMs in 
operation and these, while not completely ineffective, are far from adequate. 
Over many years, India and Pakistan have agreed not to attack each others' 
nuclear installations and not to produce or deploy chemical weapons. " These were 
sensible measures since attacks on nuclear installations would be environmentally 
catastrophic and chemical weapons have never been considered viable weapons by the 
anned forces of either country. 
In the military sphere, CBMs have been much more limited. Both sides have 
agreed to give advanced notification of military exercises and a'hot-lind has been 
established between the opposing Directors General of Military Operations. " These 
have been aimed at reducing the possibility of a misunderstanding along the lines of 
'Brasstacks' in 1986-87. However, these remained unused when India and Pakistan 
became involved in a massive artillery duel along the Line of Control in Kashmir in 
1997.17 
An agreement also exists to prevent airspace violations. Again, this is not 
particularly effective since Indian MiG-25 reconnaissance aircraft have often violated 
Pakistani airspace unchallenged, while a Pakistani Remotely Piloted Vehicle was 
15 Chari, Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff, pp. 157-158 
" 10C. Cit 
" The 1997 shelling in Kashmir was exceptionally intense and involved 
the exchange of thousands of round of artillery shells and mortar bombs. The 
author was informed by Mr. 'CI that the 'hot-line' remained inactive in 
September 1997. 
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intercepted by Indian aircraft and damaged over Gujarat. " 
One Indian scholar, P. R. Chari, has proposed that these CBMs be extended to 
include 'hot-lines' between the air-forces and navies and an extension of the agreement 
not to attack each other's nuclear sites to include identified population and high value 
economic targets. " These are interesting proposals, but since the entire concept of 
nuclear deterrence relies on being able to threaten population centres, it is unlikely that 
Pakistan, in particular, will agree to any such demand. Moreover, given the fact that the 
'hot-line' has not proved to be particularly effective at times of real crisis, namely last 
year's duel along the Line of Control, any more 'hot-I ines' may be seen as purely 
symbolic and having no real value. 
Chad further proposes that the agreement giving notification of military 
exercises could be broadened to provide information on the deployment of certain 
'offensive' weapon systems within specified border zones. " This is currently not 
plausible since giving information on key systems such as combat aircraft, tanks and 
surface-to-surface missiles would render these systems vulnerable to a pre-emptive 
strike. Moreover, the fact that so many high value civilian and military targets in both 
India and Pakistan lie so close to the border ensures that no ma or military withdrawal j 
from these areas can be contemplated! ' 
"' Interviews with Air Marshal 'E'r Mr. 'F' and Group Captain 'KI on 23 
March 1998 
29 Chari, Indg-Egk NucleaL Standoff, p. 158 
"' 1QC. Cit 
21 To put it more bluntly, there is no way Pakistan is going to leave 
Lahore defenceless and India is not going to leave Amritsar without adequate 
troops. 
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This ties in with Chari's final proposal which involves extending theopen-skies' 
policy to permit aerial reconnaissance of specified border areas. ' Neither side is 
confident enough of the other's intentions to give such access. " Perhaps CBMs are 
needed to facilitate these CBMs ? Unfortunately, however, these ideas are at present 
unworkable and are likely to be unworkable for some time to come. 
A critical factor in the India-Pakistan conftontation is the nuclear dimension. 
Under the existing system, the two sides cannot be honest with each other about even 
possessing nuclear weapons, much less building confidence. There is deception at the 
very heart of the military structures of both countries and unless they are permitted to be 
fully honest with each other regarding nuclear intentions, without fear of sanctions and 
condemnation fi7om Washington, then all CBMs will ultimately be futile. 
One issue that has not been dealt with adequately is the possibility of India and 
Pakistan exporting nuclear weapons technology for financial gain. Both countries are in 
need of hard currency and there are many states - in the Middle East in particular - that 
would be only too happy to purchase nuclear weapons technology from South Asia. The 
prospect of a cash-strapped India or Pakistan hawking nuclear weapons technology to 
states such as Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya is frightening. 24 
So far, a mix of political restraint on the part of India and Pakistan, combined 
22 Chari, Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff, p. 158 
23 At present, any aircraft that violates certain border areas is 
treated as hostile. Both India and Pakistan maintain interceptors on 'cockpit 
alert' to deal with such intruders 
2' This horrifying possibility was described in a Federation of American 
Scientist website report dealing with Indian nuclear weapons potential. 
See http: //www. fas. org/spp/starwars/advocate/ifpa/report696_ch4_ind. htm 
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with some subtle pressure from the United States has kept the spectre of proliferation 
from South Asia at bay. However, wi-11 this continue ? Should sanctions be imposed on 
either state, then the temptation to earn desperately needed hard currency by selling 
nuclear weapons technology might prove to be irresistible. It is therefore imperative that 
both countries be brought into the international discussions on the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. The fact that both countries have proved cooperative with 
respect to the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons gives some cause for 
optimism. However, the sooner both India and Pakistan are made partners in the 
international campaign against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the 
better - even if it means recognizing these two states as nuclear powers. 
Any discussion of the political implications of either India or Pakistan declaring 
itself a nuclear power is as yet somewhat speculative. While there have been a few 
statements from Washington regarding sanctions in the event of a nuclear test, there has 
been remarkably little reaction from the rest of the international community. As such, it 
is rather difficult to clearly assess exactly what their reaction would be. However, as has 
been pointed out in Chapter Two, both India and Pakistan have moved so far along the 
path to nuclear weaponization that the day of an overt declaration of nuclear capability 
may be in the not too distant future. 
Aa number of things are clear. There is considerable domestic support for 
nuclear weapons in both India and Pakistan. In the case of India, a sizeable percentage 
of the population also supports nuclear testing even in the event of economic sanctions 
from the United States. The United States is not trusted by either India or Pakistan and 
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as such has to tread carefully when dealing with these two countries in order to prevent 
a total loss of influence in South Asia. Finally, the cuffent Confidence Building 
Measures are almost a complete farce. Without being honest about the critical nuclear 
issue, how can either country trust the other enough to have faith in the CBMs ? 
Ultimately, the world, and the United States in particular, will have to contend 
with a nuclear India and a nuclear Pakistan. It is then going to be up to the governments 
of India and Pakistan to initiate steps to discuss the nuclear issue honestly with each 
other and to gradually build confidence between the two countries. Unfortunately, the 
past record of confidence building measures between the two countries does not give 
much cause for optimism. 
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Conclusion 
South Asia remains plagued by the seemingly incessant hostilities between India 
and Pakistan. Almost everything else, including human and political development is 
held hostage to this hostility. Military expenditure in Pakistan consumes a massive share 
of the country's budget while India spends considerably more on defence than it does on 
primary health-care and education. The increasing proxy war between India and 
Pakistan continues to take a heavy toll of civilian lives while serving to exacerbate the 
already appalling state of affairs between the two rivals. 
Into this already somewhat explosive mixture must be added the nuclear factor. 
As has been shown in the preceeding chapters, India and Pakistan have advanced a long 
way down the path of nuclear weaponization. Both nations see nuclear weapons as 
being necessary for their very existence. Indeed, chapter one argued that, in a strange 
way, nuclear weapons are linked to internal security. 
India and Pakistan have a significant nuclear weapons capability. ' Both have 
extremely advanced nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and both maintain 
large air forces with sizeable numbers of nuclear capable strike aircraft. ' India, in 
particular, has an advanced space program which could provide the basis for more 
advanced ballistic missiles in the near future. Both countries have already deployed 
short-range ballistic missiles, though it is uncertain whether these have been equipped 
with nuclear warheads or not. Nonetheless, the extent of the existing missile and nuclear 
'This is discussed in detail in Chapter Two 
' See Chapter Three 
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weapons projects means that India and Pakistan may be more accurately derined as de 
facto nuclear weapons states rather than as 'threshold' nuclear weapons states. 
However, as far as command and control goes, many questions remain 
unanswered. These include questions regarding the security and redundancy of these 
command and control facilities. Questions also exist regarding the amount of political 
control exerted by the civilian authority in Pakistan. As South Asia rapidly progresses 
down the path towards overt nuclearization, it is of paramount importance for regional, 
as well as international stability, for these command and control features to be 
strengthened. The thick veil of secrecy surrounding the nuclear programs in India and 
Pakistan means that accurate information regarding command and control structures is 
difficult to obtain. For any degree of nuclear stability to exist in South Asia there need 
clearer signals from the Indian and Pakistani governments regarding their command 
structures. Unless this step is taken, it is impossible for either country to make a proper 
assessment of where the nuclear threshold lies. The United States and the former Soviet 
Union put in place extremely advanced command structures with many layers of 
redundancy. While South Asia may not need to replicate American and Soviet command 
structures, something better than the existing, somewhat ad hoc, systems needx to be 
developed. It must also be remembered that unlike the United States and the former 
Soviet Union, India and Pakistan share a common border and routinely exchange 
artillery fire. With this in mind, the need for a stable and secure command and control 
structure becomes even more apparent. 
This thesis has also shown that nuclear weapons have very little use against 
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military targets in the South Asian context.. The armed forces of India and Pakistan are 
slowly preparing for nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, but neither side seems to 
be moving towards a nuclear war-fighting doctrine. The battlefields of the India- 
Pakistan conflict do not lend themselves to the tactical use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear 
weapons would have very little effect against the massive network of linear defences 
that stretch from Southern Jammu & Kashmir down to North/Central Rajasthan, and in 
South Rajasthan and Gujarat where nuclear weapons could conceivably be used, the 
mechanized formations of the strike corps on both sides may not be rendered combat 
ineffective by a nuclear strike. Moreover, given that there is such ambiguity of targeting 
and escalation in South Asia, it is distinctly possible that a nuclear strike on an 
armoured formation would be answered with a massive strike on civilian targets. 
The vulnerability of South Asian cities to a nuclear strike has also been examined 
in chapter five, and it can be safely concluded that despite the presence of substantial air 
defences and limited civil defence networks, the destruction that a nuclear strike would 
wreak on an Indian or Pakistani city would be absolutelY catastrophic. It is this fear of 
massive retaliation that serves both to limit war in South Asia on one hand, while 
rendering nuclear weapons tactically unusable on the other. 
Are nuclear weapons keeping the peace in South Asia ? This thesis argues that 
this may not entirely be the case. India has altered its military tactics and has limited its 
objectives in any war that may emergeý Nuclear weapons serve to limit war, but do not 
-' See Chapter Four pp. 174-178 
" Refer to Chapter Five pp. 215-216 
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necessarily keep the peace. It has been argued that the real reason for the uneasy peace 
that has been kept in South Asia for the past twenty-f ive years is in the basic operational 
parity that exists between India and Pakistan in conventional forces and ballistic 
missiles. With comparable standards of training and equipment, the Indian and Pakistani 
arinics have maintained this operational parity for some time. 
While India strives to break this operational parity, Pakistan strives to preserve it. 
This extends to the creation of a third Pakistani Armoured Division to match India! s 
three Armoured Divisions. Perhaps far more ominously, in the area of ballistic missiles, 
Pakistan has managed to reduce India! s advantage in production capacity and technology 
by not only importing missiles, but by also purchasing a factory to produce such systems 
from China. It is this uneasy military balance that has kept the peace in South Asia. 
Nuclear weapons play an extremely important role in limiting war, but play a much 
more peripheral role in preventing war from occurring in the first place. ' 
The political implications of nuclear weapons in South Asia are somewhat 
uncertain. As discussed in chapter six of this thesis that India and Pakistan would be 
unlikely to test nuclear weapons for fear of sanctions. However, as discussed in chapter 
six, there is a widespread consensus in favour of keeping the nuclear weapons option 
'open'and a fair minority support overt nuclearization. Moreover, if poll data from India 
is to be believed, a substantial number of people support nuclearization even if sanctions 
are enforced on India. Sanctions may hurt the Indian economy badly, but the Indian 
economy will survive. The effects of sanctions on the Pakistani economy vill 
' Chapter Five pp. 216-220 
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undoubtedly be far more severe, but, as in the case of India, there is widespread 
consensus on the retention of the nuclear weapons option. 
Will India and Pakistan go to war ? There have been some very close calls in the 
recent past - the Brasstacks' crisis of 1987 and, allegedly, the crisis of 1990. In both 
cases a combination of pressure from the United States and the underlying operational 
parity existing between India and Pakistan forced both sides to back down. If the crisis 
of 1990 is any indication of things to come, then the existence of a Pakistani nuclear 
deterrent - which was revealed in 1987 - proved to be no deterrent to the possibility of 
war. War was averted by outside pressure and by operational parity. 
Should the operational parity existing between these two antagonists break 
down, war becomes a distinct possibility. This operational parity is maintained by 
conventional arms and as such, renewed attention has to be given to the burgeoning 
conventional arms build-up that is taking place. To date, budgetary constraints have, to 
some extent, affected expansion programs. However, the India economy in particular, 
even if sanctions are imposed, may be in a position to support at least some of the armed 
forces modernization programs. In Pakistan's case, every effort will be made, even if the 
economy slides further into recession, to maintain the operational parity. " 
This thesis has argued that the attempts at Confidence Building Measures 
(CBMs) between India and Pakistan have been fundamentally flawed because of the 
ambiguity and dishonesty surrounding the nuclear issue. Neither side has any faith in 
the promises of the other and, combined with the underlying dishonesty over the true 
'Refer to Chapter Five pp. 216-220. These are the pages quoted in footnotes 4&5 in this chapter. 
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state of nuclear and missile programs, there is very little scope for effective confidence 
building measures. It was also mentioned that thehot-lines'that exist between the 
Indian and Pakistani military leadership were not even used when a series of intense 
artillery duels took place along the Line of Control. 
The Kashmir issue, which is central to the India-Pakistan conflict is far from any 
kind of resolution. India will not yield an inch of Kashmir and Pakistan will not halt its 
claims on Indian Kashmir, nor will it cease its support for the ongoing insurgency. India 
and Pakistan do not seem to have any room to compromise on this issue. The violence 
will continue, and both India and Pakistan will continue their antagonistic relationship 
in an unhealthy atmosphere of mutual suspicion. 
It is this environment of distrust and suspicion that envelopes South Asia and is 
responsible for making this area so prone to conflict. Unless India and Pakistan can be 
persuaded to take steps to build mutual confidence and to reduce tension along the 
international borders and the Line of Control, South Asia will continue to be haunted by 
the spectre of nuclear Armageddon! 
Into this heated environment, India! s relationship with its massive neighbour, 
China, must be considered. India regards China with a great deal of suspicion, while for 
the most part, China has continued to an-n Pakistan while ignoring the border dispute 
that exists between India and China. 8 These two massive countries have yet to take 
7A more detailed analysis of the scale of the destruction that rrýght be wrought by nuclear attacks on 
civilian targets is found in Chapter Five pp. 196-200 
' China's involvement in Pakistan's missile program was discussed in Chapter Three pp. 113-115, while 
China! s involvement in Pakistan's nuclear program was dealt with in Chapter Two p. 76 & p. 79. 
For a discussion of the unresolved Sino-Indian border dispute, see R. G. C. Thomas 'South Asian Security in the 
1990s! ( London: USS, 1993 ) pp. 12-14 
244 
serious steps to resolve any of their outstanding differences. 
In the introduction of this thesis, the debate currently taking place in the West 
regarding th future of nuclear weapons was briefly discussed. In the South Asian 
context, the debate on nuclear weapons is hampered by the fact that nobody is sure 
exactly what the status-quo actually is. During the decades of the Cold War, both NATO 
and the former Warsaw Pact evolved a complex and intricate nuclear strategy based on 
their perceptions of the intent of rival forces and on each others' strengths and 
weaknesses. In South Asia, much of the debate is as yet more basic and is largely 
confined to the question as to whether nuclear weapons should be developed and 
deployed or not. 
India and Pakistan illustrate the limited influence of the five recognized nuclear 
powers to promote non-proliferation. As laid out in the introduction, Michael Quinlan's 
rationale for the continued retention of nuclear weapons by Western states, while at the 
same time limiting proliferation to others, sounds ! hypocritical'. " India, as discussed in 
chapter one, has been a long-standing advocate for a nuclear weapons-free world. 
However, no substantive moves have been undertaken by the established nuclear states 
to disarm. John Baylis pointed out that even the arms reduction treaties that have been 
signed between the United States and Russia would keep the nuclear framework of the 
Cold War essentially intact. " This, to continue Michael MccGwire's arguement as laid 
out in the introduction, gives little incentive for either India or Pakistan to renounce 
'See NtQuinlanThe Future of Nuclear Weapons', IntenzationalAffairs: July 1993, pp. 485496 
10 J. Bayhs, 'rbe Future of Nuclear Weapons, Intemational Relations: August 1997, pp. 1- 14 
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nuclear weapons. " 
In the introduction, Shekar Gupta! s Adelphi Paper was cited for its discussion of 
the shift in Indian foreign policy from one based on ideals to one increasingly based on 
pragmatism. " Nowhere is this clearer than in the nuclear and missile fields. As has been 
shown in this thesis, India and Pakistan have continued to develop and refine their 
nuclear weapons capability and their ballistic missile potential inspite of efforts from the 
United States to persuade the two rivals to desist from such moves. 
As of April 1998, neither India nor Pakistan has made any overt moves towards 
nuclear weapons deployment. However, this does not mean that India and Pakistan have 
not deployed nuclear weapons - it just means that we don't know about it. Both 
countries surround their nuclear programs in secrecy and accurate information, even on 
conventional military forces, is very difficult to obtain. With these limitations, it is 
probable that the world will know the true status of nuclear weapons programs only in 
two possible circumstances: either India or Pakistan announces that it is a nuclear 
weapons state, or, if either country begins nuclear testing. 
Some analysts, George Perkovich among them, have argued that a state of non- 
weaponized orexistential' deterrence exists between India and Pakistan. " The problem 
with this concept is that it assumes that neither India nor Pakistan has weaponized. In 
chapter two of this thesis it can be seen that, given the vast nuclear capabilities 
11 NiMccGvvire Is there a fidure for nuclear weapons', IntemadonalAffairs: April 1994, pp. 211-228 
12 S. C 
JUpta, India Redefines its Role'Adelphi PMer 293 ( London: IISS, 1994 
" G. Perkovich, A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia!, Foreign Policy: Summer 1993, pp. 85-104 
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developed by both states and their seemingly implacable steps towards weaponization, 
that this assumption is dangerous. 
From the evidence that has been presented in this thesis, the emergence of India 
and Pakistan as nuclear weapons states seems inevitable. With the rise to power in India 
of the decidedly pro-nuclear Bharatiya Janata Party, India! s emergence may be close. 
The BJP has made no secret of its nuclear plans, and while it will have to contend with 
an extremely hostile international reaction, internal party and domestic compulsions 
may well decide the issue. Moreover, India! s security concerns have not diminished - 
neither have Pakistan's - as such the emergence of an overtly nuclear South Asia may 
nearer than expected. 
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Epilggug 
In May 1998, just as this thesis was being printed, the nuclear landscape of South 
Asia changed forever. On May 11 1998, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee of India 
announced to a stunned world that India had conducted three underground nuclear 
tests, which were followed by two more on May 13 1998. The Western world responded 
with a series of sanctions and a number of extremely harsh messages while 
simultaneously trying to persuade Pakistan not to follow India! s lead with a numbcr of 
incentives. ' 
The incentives did not work. Two weeks after the Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan 
followed suit with six nuclear tests of its own. The Prime Minister of Pakistan blamed 
India for his need to test while chastising the West for not being harsh enough with 
India. The nuclear arms programs of South Asia were now out in the open. 
This epilogue was written to examine the nuclear tests and their implications for 
the conclusions made in this thesis. It has been only a few months since the tests and the 
full impact of the tests in terms of the India-Pakistan conflict is as yet unclear. The 
nuclear plans of both countries continue to be shrouded in secrecy and the sizes of the 
nuclear arsenals planned are still classified. However, it is vital that the tests be 
examined as they provide some vindication for the assessments of the status of the 
Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs made in this thesis. 
In terms of the India-Pakistan confrontation, this epilogue will argue that the 
'The United States offered to lift its military embargo on Pakistan and deliver 28 F-16 fighters while 
considering the transfer of other high-technology military items. Japan and Canada offered increased foreign aid in 
exchange for Pakistani restraint See Z. Hussain & P- Chengappa, Mang for Bang!, India Today. June 8 1998, pp. 12- 
14 
248 
essential conclusions will remain unaffected. However, this is not the case in the India- 
China confrontation where the tests have a profound impact. 
'ne Tests: What Wes of designs were tested 
Pokhmn-2: 
On May 11 1998, India announced that it had tested a fission device, a low-yield 
device and thermonuclear device. Two days later, these tests were followed by two more 
sub-kiloton tests. 
Known as 'Operation Shakti-98, the five tests had a recorded seismic magnitude 
of 5.0+1- 0.4 on the Richter scale. ' By May 14, Indian seismologists at the Bhabha 
Atomic Research Centre (BARC) stated that an analysis of the data received at the 
Gauribidnaur Seismic Affay indicated that the yield of the May 11 1998 blasts was 
around 55 kilotons. 3 They also indicated that the seismic waveform was very complex 
because the explosions were carried out simultaneously. 
The first group of tests - Shakti Lll & HI - consisted of a two stage thennonuclear 
device with a yield of 4345 kilotons (kt), a lightweight fission device with a yield of 
12-15kt and a low-yield subkiloton device of 0.2 kt. These were placed in two shafts, 
one kilometre apart, and simultaneously detonated from a control located 3.5km awayý 
Shakti IV &V had yields of 0.5 and 0.3 kilotons and were conducted to provide 
2 India goes nermonuclear' -http: # www-fas-org - p. 2 This site provides the finest analysis of the Indian 
nuclear tests available. It is detailed, easy to understand and systematic. 
JOC. Cit 
" loc cit. 
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additional data for improved computer simulation of designs. ' 
Almost immediately a somewhat unseemly row erupted between Indian scientists 
and certain American seismologists regarding the yields of the devices. Preliminary 
estimates put the combined yields at anywhere between 10 and 25 kilotons and some 
questioned whether India had actually tested a thennonuclear device based on these 
yield estimates. 6 This row continues with an American scientist - Dr. Terry Wallace - 
giving a yield of 10-15 kt and practically accusing the Indians scientists of lying. " 
According to David Albright, a scientist at the Institute of Science and 
International Security in Washington D. C, the lower estimates were largely due to the 
fact that a few Western scientists were of the view that India's first atomic test in 1974 
fuyJed and produced a yield of only 2kt. ' However, P. K lyengar, fonner chairman of 
India! s Atomic Energy Commission, has stated that the yield was between 8-1 Okt based 
on radiochernical analysis of samples of bomb debris taken from the shaft-9 
Soon after Wallace's article, three Indian scientists writing in Current Science, 
gave a detailed account of why Wallace was wrong. These scientist pointed out that 
there was a very large variation in the estimates of the body-wave magnitude made by 
I loc cit 
' ibid p. 3 
7 Wallace's report was discussed in the LA Times: 16 September 1998. An interesting point was made at 
the end of the article where an American nuclear weapons scientist indicated that even 15 kilotons could have 
been a thermonuclear device and said that the seismologists had an inadequate knowledge of nuclear weapons 
desigrL 
' The reports about the 1974 test having a yield of only two kilotons surfaced in an article back in 1981 in 
the Sunday Observer 30 August 1981 by Y. Aggarwal. While a few Western experts may cite this, there appears to 
be a consensus that the 1974 test had a yield of 8- 1 2kt. 
' D. Albright, The Shots heardround the world, Me Bulletin ofdw Atomic Scientists: July/August 1998 
This article was found on the bufletin website http: //www. bullefinofatornicscientists. com 
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different seismic stations. The variations at stations at similar distances from the 
explosion site varied by a staggering factor of 30 - or three times as much as expected. " 
The scientists pointed out that seismic stations located to the east and west of Pokhran 
recorded lower magnitudes than those located to the north and south of Pokhran. Since 
two large explosions - the thermonuclear device and the fission device - were detonatcd 
in separate shafts one kilometre apart in an east-west direction, delays between the two 
signals could result in seismic stations recording lower strengths than the actual 
values. " 
The article went on to say that seismic stations to the north and south of Pokhran 
would have the least time delay and so would record the highest signal strength, while 
those to the east and west would have the maximum delay. Averaging out all seismic 
stations would therefore lower the value. Moreover, the true body-wave magnitude 
would have to be obtained by superposing the signals from the two powerful 
explosions. 
12 
The scientists, Dr. S. K. Sikka, Dr. FaIguni Roy and Dr. G. K. Nair of the BARC 
High Pressure Physics Division, believed that a true estimate of the body-wave 
magnitude could only be obtained by taking the data from seismic stations to the north 
and south of Pokhran. The data from 10 to the north and two to the south indicated a 
body wave magnitude of 5.36. If the reading of one station was excluded because the 
"' 13ARC scientists defend estimates of n-tests' Me Hindu: September 19 1998 
This article received little notice in the West and was remarkably poorly covered in India. 
" 10C. Cit 
" loc. cit 
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signal to noise ratio was too low, the average value rose to 5.39 which tallied with 
BARCs own measurements at Gauribidanaur. This data was in agreement with the yield 
claims made by Indian weapons scientists. " 
To complicate matters fiinher, Dr. Roger Clark, a seismologist at Lccds 
University, stated that after data from 12 seismic stations was taken into account, the 
yield estimate was close to 60kt. " The US Geological survey indicated that the body- 
wave magnitude was 5.2 which suggested a yield of 30-60 kilotons. " 
Of geat concern was the fact that the May 13 explosions were undetected. This 
has led to scientists like Wallace alleging that these tests never took place. However, 
Clark points out that if the Indians tested in a sand dune, as claimed by 
Dr. Chidambaram, or if the devices were exploded in a large cavity, then the tests could 
have been completely concealed. The other possibility was that the tests were 
hydronuclear or sub-critical tests as was claimed by Dr. Raja Ramanna. 16 
There was another major controversy over India's nuclear tests. There was 
considerable doubt that India had detonated a thermonuclear device. Once the yield 
estimates were more or less verified, doubts focussed on the fact the device seemed to 
have a low yield. The yield of 43 kilotons was said by some to be too small for a 
" 10C. Cit 
"' D. MacKenzie, Making Waves' in New Scientist 13 June 1998 
" S. v= Moyland & R-Clark, 'Me Paper Trair in ne Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists: July/August 1998 
One of the most puzzling aspects of this whole saga is that Wallace agrees with the body-wave magnitude of 5.2, 
but sticks to his assessment of 15 kilotons. In other words, a body-wave magnitude of 5.2 could mean a yield of 
between 15 and 60 kilotons 
" 10C. Cit 
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thennonuclear device and questioned whether India! s device had worked as planned. " 
This is factually incorrect. The United States, for example, tested two 
thermonuclear devices in 1953 with yields of 23 and 43 kt. " Dr. Frank Barnaby, writing 
in Jane's Defence Weekly also disagreed, stating that thermonuclear devices did not 
need to be tested at fWl-yield and could be limited to firing the nuclear-fission trigger 
and producing a small amount of fusion energy. " Also, from chapter two of this thesis, 
it has been shown that India had all the components in place for a thermonuclear 
design. " As such, scepticism in this regard seems unwarranted. 
Dr. Barnaby suggests that an operational Indian thermonuclear weapon is likely 
to contain a boosted-fission nuclear trigger giving an explosion of 50kt which would 
produce 500kt in the fusion stage. He further suggests that a variable yield nuclear 
weapon could be produced in this way, allowing a yield of 5K 50kt or 500kt to be 
chosen . 
21 An Indian nuclear scientist claimed that the device tested was athird- 
generation! fusion device. ' Moreover, it has also been suggested that if India! s stocks of 
weapons grade plutonium are used to make triggers for thermonuclear weapons instead 
17 One of the most misleading statements was made by T. S. Gopi Rethinaraj, 'India! s blasts surprise the 
world, but leave fresh doubts, p. 22 in Jane's Intelligence ReWew. July 1998. He states that the Pokhran test range 
is big enough to carry out megaton sized explosions. This is not correct. There was significant damage to 
surrounding villages even from the 43 kt device. A device of even I 00kt might well have leveled the villages. 
" These were tests SadgeeandSimon' conducted as part of test series Upshot-Knothole'see 
http: //www. fas. org 
F. Barnaby, Trials provide data for range of weapon yields', Jane's Defence Weekly: 27 May 1998, p. 3 
See Chapter Two pp. 62-63 
Bamaby, Trials provide data for range of weapon yields' 
Wian Erpress. May 31 1998 - Latest News section 
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of normal fission weapons, then Indian could conceivably manufacture as many as 500 
thermonuclear weapons. " This is not to say that India will manufacture this number of 
weapons, but that it could should it so decide. 
The fact that three of India! s tests were in the sub-kiloton range is very 
significant. These tests would considerably enhance India! s computer simulation 
capabilities. " However, these tests are very sensitive to physical parameters such as the 
amount of fissile material present, the degree and uniformity of compression and the 
nuclear properties of the materials. There is a good chance of these devices 
overshooting or undeshooting their intended values, but the data they provide would be 
invaluable for computer simulation. " 
These sub-kiloton devices now give India the ability to make truly small tactical 
nuclear weapons suitable for artillery shells or for use against troops in unprotected 
positions. However, one very significant point about these tests, from a nuclear weapons 
design point of view, is that India may have experimented with deuterium-tritium 
boosting of fission devices. ' These can be used for manufacturing light, efficient, pre- 
detonation proof primaries for thermonuclear weapons, of the kind suggested by Frank 
Bamaby above. " 
Since gas-boosted primaries are immune to predetonation problems, weapons- 
" India! s Nuclear Mghe in Foreign Report June 11 1998 
"India goes Tbermonucleae Pp. 9-10 
25 JOC. Cit 
ibid PAO 
Ths technology has been adopted by all five of the nuclear weapons states. 
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grade plutonium need not be used. Reactor-grade plutonium thus becomes a viable 
alternative. With this in mind, India could make many more nuclear weapons than is 
sometimes assumed. There is enough separated plutonium for 400 weapons and enough 
discharged plutonium for 1200. " This means that India could potentially be a larger 
nuclear power than even China. 
Chami-I 
After that somewhat lengthy analysis of India! s nuclear tests, Pakistan's tests are a 
good deal easier to examine. Much of what has been said regarding yield analysis of 
India's nuclear tests can be applied in the case of Pakistan. 
Pakistan claimed to have conducted a total of six tests between May 28 and May 
30 1998. Dr A. Q. Khan claimed that the largest test had a yield of 30-35 kilotons and 
was a boosted fission device, while four others were tactical weapons with a low-yield. " 
There was also allegedly another 12 kiloton fission device. 30 
Once again, the seismic data showed major variations, with an indication that the 
total explosive yield was between 7 and 8 kilotons. " The alleged boosted-fission tested 
apparently gave a seismic reading of only 2-3kt. -" Given that Pakistan has been in 
possession of a viable nuclear weapon design from China, with a yield of 20-25 kt, it is 
" India goes Thermonucleae p. 10 
" W. P. S. Sidhu, Ugh price exacted for Pakistan's one-upmanship', Jane's Intelligence Review: July 
1998, p. 29 
" http: //www. fas. orgWde/pakistan/nukermdex. htmi Ibere is some discrepancy here since two 12 kt 
weapons are fisted and only 3 instead of four low-yield devices. 
" F. Bamaby, 'Discrepancies claimed in Islarnabads nuclear tests'-http: www. jdW. janes. com: 9 June 
1998 
11 loc. cit 
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rather surprising that the seismic readings were so low. " 
However, just as there were many factors that rendered the seismic analysis of 
India! s tests somewhat suspect, the same would probably hold true for Pakistan as well, 
though Pakistan's scientists have not come out as vociferously in defence of their claims 
as India! s. Dr. Frank Bamaby points out that the yield discrepancies may be due to the 
fact that Pakistan conducted its test in a horizontal tunnel rather than a vertical shaft and 
that this would reduce the detectable yield. m 
Moreover, there is no reason to doubt that Pakistani nuclear-weapons designers 
could produce a boosted-fission weapon. As discussed in chapter two of this thesis, 
Pakistan has been trying, apparently successfully to obtain tritium -a key component in 
boosted fission weapons . 
3' Dr. Bamaby estimates that a Pakistani operational boosted 
fission weapon would have a yield of about 150kt. 16 
Unlike India! s case, Pakistan's tests do not actually enhance the nuclear weapons 
production or stockpile level. Pakistan, unlike India, uses enriched uranium rather than 
plutonium. Pakistan cannot, therefore rely on reactor-grade rather than weapons-grade 
material the same way India could. However, when Pakistan's new Chinese designed 
nuclear reactor and reprocessing plant come on line, Pakistan may be able to produce 
about three nuclear weapons per year from plutoniUM. 37 
" W. P. S. Sidhu, Ugh price exacted for Pakistan's one-upmanship'p. 28 
3' Bamaby, Discrepancies claimed in Islamabad's nuclear tests' 
33 See chapter two p. 73 
m Bamaby, Discrepancies claimed in Islamabad's nuclear tests' 
37 JOC. Cit 
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Perhaps the last word on the South Asian tests should go to the Federation of 
American Scientists- a reminder that estimates in Washington or London are not always 
best: 
Estimating nuclear explosive power from distant seismogram measurements 
is not a precise activity, an error factor of two or more is not unusual? ' 
The Rationale Behind the Nuclear Tests 
It seems that India! s nuclear test plans go back to at least 1996 when, among the 
only acts undertaken by the fragile 13-day government of Atal Behari Vajpayee, was the 
approval for a series of nuclear tests . 
3' The May 1998 tests were in a real sense a 
continuation of the BJPs long-standing commitment to developing nuclear weapons. 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the 
subsequent Chinese nuclear test in 1964 provided the initial spark for the Indian nuclear 
weapons program. Here again, it was China rather than Pakistan that was used to justify 
the tests. China! s long cooperation with Pakistan in the ballistic missile field and the 
continued American infatuation with China were seen as major concerns by the BJP-led 
coaliton. ' 
Moreover, India's new ( and rather colourful ) Defence Minister, George 
Fernandes, described China as India! s potential 'threat No. V. 41 Pakistan's April 6 1998 
" 7ndia goes Tbermonucleae P. 3 
" M. Joshi, 'Nuclear Waves', p. 14 in In&a Today: May 25 1998 
' ibid pp. 14-15. In a somewhat uncharacteristic display of pique, the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang 
Jiwman, telephoned US. Secretary of State, Madeleine Mbright, on May 14 not only to persuade India to stop 
testing but to dismantle its entire nuclear program. 
"' FLChengappa & M. Joshi, Hawkish India!, p. II in India Today: June 1 1998 
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test of an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile - the Ghauri - with a claimed 1500 krn 
range was the final straw. " India believed that its military position against both China 
and Pakistan was deteriorating. " To restore the credibility of its deterrent, the Indian 
government embarked on the Pokhran-2 test program with the intention of fully 
weaponizing India! s nuclear weapons capability against Pakistan and China. ' 
There was also something of a domestic political agenda. The Vajpayee 
government was plagued with turmoil from one of its South Indian allies. It is possible 
that the government hoped to boost its somewhat battered image by conducting the 
tests. While the majority of Indians supported the tests, some state assembly elections 
held shortly afterwards indicated that voters were more concerned with local issues 
rather than national ones. 
45 
In the case of Pakistan, the rationale is much easier to understand. The Nawaz 
Sharif government was under intense pressure from the Pakistani public to respond to 
the Indian tests in order to prove Pakistan's deterrent. " Though Pakistan was offered 
some incentives from the United States and Japan not to follow India, domestic 
compulsions were much too strong and the incentives much tod small for Pakistan to 
' Joshý'Nuclear Wavesp. 14 
' The Ghauri test was very much the proverbial final straw. For the first time Pakistan could now target 
most major Indian population centres with ballistic missiles. 
" This may take quite a while. India can put tc)gether an effective deterrent against Paidstan without 
difficulty. However, India! s deterrent against China would need to be based on IRBMs and these require both time 
and money before they become fully operational in adequate numbers. 
' ibid p. 15 The BJP carne wider heavy criticism from the Communist patties in India who resented the 
hostility to China. The other parties showed a great deal of confusion in their response with no unified response 
from the Opposition being possible. 
' Z. Hussain & R-Chengappa, Tang for Bane, p. 12 in India Today June 8 1998 
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refrain from testing. " 
As in India, the public overwhelmingly supported the tests. This prompted one 
Indian magazine to say that it was as if Pakistan had rediscovered its identity. " Pakistan 
shrugged off the sanctions that were imposed as it viewed them to be of secondary 
concern after its primary concern of national security. Pakistan offers an excellent 
example of the limits of international influence. The West offered every incentive to 
Pakistan to desist from testing, yet Pakistan followed India! s lead since they thought that 
testing was in their national interest. 
The Mililgiy Implications - Has an3ahing changed 2 
One of the surprising things about the nuclear tests is that very little has 
fundamentally changed in the military situation between India and Pakistan. The nuclear 
threshold has certainly been lowered, but, as this thesis has argued in earlier chapters, 
both countries have lived with defacto nuclearization for more than a decade. Both 
India and Pakistan had to assume that nuclear weapons could be fielded by their 
opponent at very short notice. The nuclear tests only mean that covert nuclearization has 
become overt nuclearization. 
However, some critical questions remain: what will nuclear doctrine consist of; 
who will control the arsenals; what size are the arsenals going to be and will India and 
Pakistan make a large scale deployment of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons ? It is 
' One offer from the United States was to give Pakistan 28 F-I 6s that had been embargoed. Pakistan! s 
response was 'you're giving us what we've already paidfoe. Canada went so far as to offer Pakistan India! s share of 
Canadian assistance while Japan offered aid and loans in the billion dollar range. All were rejected. See footnote I 
of this Chapter 
' Hussain & Chengappa, Bang for Bang', p. 12 
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perhaps too early to make any definite comments on these issues, but there are some 
trends available, especially from India where the Indian government and media have 
commented extensively on India! s nuclear intentions. 
In August 1998, the Indian government began to outline its evolving nuclear 
doctrine. The government stated that India would maintain a credible, minimum 
deterrent without ftirther testing. " India, like China would not use nuclear weapons 
against non-nuclear weapons states and would not be the first to use nuclear weapons 
against another nuclear weapons state. Moreover, India would not be adverse to 
discussions on the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty. " 
Rather surprisingly, Pakistan has kept quiet about its own nuclear doctrine. Dr. 
W. P. S. Sidhu, writing in Jane's Intelligence Review argues that Pakistan has an elaborate, 
doctrine of use that involves targetting civilian and economic targets. " Pakistan is 
unlikely to adopt a no-first use policy since this would negate the deterrent effect of 
nuclear weapons against India. 
The issue of nuclear doctrine leads to the extremely important question of 
nuclear command and control. As mentioned at the end of chapter three of this thesis, 
there are serious concerns regarding the command and control of nuclear forces in both 
India and Pakistan. Since the nuclear tests, neither country has been sufficiently 
forthcoming with information on their proposed command structures to allay these 
' India evolves Nuclear Doctrine'in Times ofIndia: August 5 1998 
-, 10C. Cit 
" W. P. S. Sidhu, ? aldstan puts its nuclear cards on the table', p. 27 in Jane's Intelligence ReView: MY 
1998 
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fears. The only comments made on the matter have been from India! s Defence Minister. 
George Fernandes has consistently stated that control of India! s nuclear arsenal would be 
in the hands of the political leadership and that the command and control systems were 
now being worked out. " A chain of command is also being established as it is 
understood that a national command post is being set up outside Delhi with the capacity 
to survive a direct hit. 
53 Moreover, a consensus seems to be building in India on a 
system of divided control where warheads are kept by a separate establishment in order 
to reduce the risk of accidental launch. -54 Pakistan, however, has said virtually nothing 
regarding its nuclear command plans, this means that the concerns raised at the end of 
chapter three are still valid and addressing these concerns will go a long way towards 
allaying fears about accidental launches or unauthorised use. " 
The sizes of nuclear arsenals planned by both sides is still classified. However, 
India seems to be moving towards a minimum deterrent based on IRBMs (Agni), 
SRBMs (Prithvi) and manned aircraft with a total of about 100 warheads. " India has 
initiated work on an extended range variant of the 'Agnil IRBM with a range exceeding 
30OOkm, thus enabling practically all major Chinese cities within range of Indian 
delivery systems. " 
"Govenunent will control India! s nuclear establishmenein Me Deccan Herald. August 9 1998 
R-Chengappa, Worrying over Broken Arrows' in India Today: July 13 1998 
loc. cit 
See chapter three pp. 113-121 
Chengappa, Worrying over Broken Arrows' 
"' W. John, 'New Agni's range will be double of Ghauri'in Yhe Pioneer August 21 1998 
It has also been revealed that the initial version of the Agni had a CEP of 40 metres at 15OOkm 
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In the inital stages, some Indian defence analysts have argued that a fast-track 
approach could be taken for deploying a total of 60 warheads on 20 'Agnis, 20 'Prithvis- 
on mobile platforms as well as 20 aircraft gravity bombs and a command and control 
system within five years. " There has also been some assessment of the costs involved. 
This 60 warhead force would cost only Rs. 5,000 crore ( Rs. 50 billion ) over five years 
which is by no means excessive. " General Sundadi, writing in 1996, came up with a 
cost of Rs. 2,760 crore - Rs. 600 crore for 150 warheads, Rs. 360 crore for 45 Trithvis' 
and Rs. 1,800 crore for 90 'Agnis. " As long as India does not get too ambitious ( such as 
building nuclear submarines with SLBMs), the costs are not going to be excessive in the 
short term. 
In Pakistan's case, a limited number of nuclear warheads is probably already 
available. Estimates made in July 1998 gave the numbers of Pakistani nuclear weapons 
as between six and twenty-five before the May tests. If the May tests are factored in, the 
size of the Pakistani arsenal comes down to between a dozen and eighteen. "' Pakistan 
probably has around thirty M-1 I missiles and possibly as many as a dozen'Ghauri' 
IRBMs. 62 
To equip all its missiles with warheads, Pakistan would need at least forty 
warheads. It currently has probably around a third of what is required. Given the fact 
M. Joshi, 'Marginal Costing'in India Today. June 1 1998 
10C. Cit 
10C. Cit. 
61 Sidhu, ? akistan puts its nuclear cards on the table!, p. 26 
' ibid p. 27 
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that PakistaWs nuclear weapons production capacity, as mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, is between two to five nuclear weapons per year, it might take a few years 
before Pakistan is capable of arming all its missiles with nuclear warheads. 
One factor that lowers the costs of nuclear weaponization in both India and 
Pakistan is the fact that a substantial number of the components necessary are already in 
place. For example, both countries have aircraft that can accept nuclear gravity bombs 
without difficulty and both have SRBMs in production and IRBMs on the verge of 
production. If, as is suspected, India and Pakistan have a covert arsenal, then the costs of 
warhead production will be further reduced. So long as neither country decides to 
develop and deploy hundreds of nuclear warheads or intends to develop extremely 
expensive systems such as ballistic missile submarines, then the costs of nuclearization 
are not going to be excessive. However, nuclear weaponization tends to acquire a 
momentum all of its own and anything can happen. 
The other issue that needs to be addressed is whether India and Pakistan intend 
to develop low-yield tactical nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield. This thesis has 
argued that neither India nor Pakistan is moving towards a tactical nuclear warfighting 
doctrine in part because of the fact that neither side could deploy the very low-yield 
nuclear devices employed by the former Warsaw Pact and NATO. 
The May 1998 tests have forced a partial reevaluation of this argument. In 
chapter four of this thesis, it was pointed out that the fortified defences that dominate 
the South Asian battlefield - from Southern Jammu and Kashmir to North/Central 
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Rajasthan - are practically invulnerable to attacks by weapons of up to 20 kilotons. " 
Therefore, tactical sub-kiloton weapons would have no tangible impact on these 
fortifications. 
Against mass armoured formations, sub-kiloton atomic devices would have a 
very limited effect, owing to the protection afforded by armour against blast and 
radiation effects. However, should either country begin moves to develop and deploy 
enhanced-radiation weapons -neutron bombs'- then there is a real possibility that such 
weapons could be very successfully employed against possible breakthroughs by enemy 
armour. With this in mind, the statement by Dr. Santhanam that India could develop 
enhanced radiation weapons must assume great significance. " 
In Jammu and Kashmir, it is unlikely that these weapons would be used by either 
side for fear of alienating the local population. This is politically unacceptable to both 
countries. Therefore, as argued in chapter four, there is little chance of either country 
making a large scale deployment of tactical nuclear weapons since their utility would be 
severely limited. If enhanced-radiation weapons are developed, the previous statement 
may no longer hold true. 
India may make a limited deployment of sub-kiloton tactical weapons, despite 
their limited utility, not to deal with Pakistan, but to cope with India's other main 
adversary - China. In fact, one Indian analyst has written that the real significance of 
India! s tests was not so much the ability to develop thermonuclear weapons, but in the 
" See chapter four pp. 146-149 
" India capable of making neutron bomb: Santhanam' in Indian Erpress: September 10 1998 
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enhanced computer simulation ability provided and in the capability to finally match 
China! s tactical nuclear weapons capability. 
65 
India's problem has been that China might be tempted to use tactical nuclear 
weapons in the event of a Chinese assault on Indian positions meeting fierce resistance 
or in the event of Indian special forces upsetting the time-table of a Chinese assault. 66 
The sparsely populated Sino-Indian battlefield is ideal for the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons without fear of collateral damage. India's newfound ability to produce sub- 
kiloton tactical nuclear weapons now serves as a credible deterrent to any Chinese 
moves to use similar weapons. ' Had this thesis been on the Sino-Indian conflict, this 
new development would hace severely affected any conclusions. However, as this thesis 
deals with the India-Pakistan confrontation, the conclusions reached have not been 
severely affected by the May tests 
The Political/Economic Impact and Intemational Reaction 
In chapter six of this thesis, it was argued that neither India nor Pakistan would 
test nuclear weapons for fear of sanctions. It is clear that the fear of sanctions was not 
enough to deter either country. International reaction followed the patterns outlined in 
chapter six. The United States was compelled by law to impose the stringent sanctions 
outlined in chapter six. Japan, Australia, Canada and some European countries imposed 
' P. Sawhney, India! s nuclear tests: the military dimension'This was an article submitted to the 
International Defence Review in late May 1998, but was never published. 
66 JOC. Cit. 
61 10C. Cit 
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sanctions of one kind or another and the G-8 agreed to block non-humanitarian loans 
from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. " However, the United States 
and other countries were still keen to do business in India and as such the sanctions 
were not nearly as severe as they might have been. India's liberalization policy of the 
1990s, created a fairly powerfid business lobby in the United States against rigid 
imposition of sanctions. " India! s traditional friends in France and Russia, and 
surprisingly, Germany, refused to impose trade sanctions and France and Russia 
continued to woo India for the sale of nuclear power reactors and conventional 
weapons. 70 
The impact of sanctions on India have been limited. There are signs that the 
Indian economy will post a growth rate of at least five percent this year. " Compared to 
the economic meltdown that has currently engulfed Asia, this is a very creditable 
performance. Moreover, the sheer size of the Indian economy renders it relatively 
secure. 
In the case of Pakistan, there are serious fears of an economic collapse. Pakistan's 
economy has always been much more fragile than India! s and Pakistan's external debt 
burden is staggering. Pakistan's debt burden stands at $ 36 billion or 72% of its Gross 
' S. Chakravarti & M. Joshi, The Indian Roadshov/, India TodW- June 22 1998, pp. 14-17 
" loc. cit As far as World Bank loans are concerned, India will receive less than it seeks, but still over $2 
billion per year. 
' Russia signed a $2 billion dollar deal for two power reactors with India while obtaining orders for 
several inore weapons systems from India. 
" See Economic Times: 23 November 1998 - online edition http: //www. economictimes. com. This quotes 
the Confederation of Indian Industry predicting a GDP growth rate for India of 5.5% this year 
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Domestic Product (GDP) and the prospect of no IMF loans would mean that Pakistan 
would have enormous difficulty in meeting its debt service payments. ' 
As mentioned earlier, there was considerable domestic support for the nuclear 
tests in both India and Pakistan and this continues, despite the sanctions. However, 
India and Pakistan represent two fine examples of the limits of foreign influence when 
pitted against strong domestic concerns. The BJP believed it needed to carry out the 
tests in spite of the consequences, while the Pakistani government caved into domestic 
pressure and tested despite strong pressure to desist. 
The five established nuclear powers now have to contend with two overtly 
nuclear nations. The calls for nuclearroll-bacle that came from the United States, China 
and the United Kingdom sound somewhat hypocritical. India and Pakistan took 
decisions regarding their national security based on their own assessments. No outside 
power can ever dictate these issues to South Asia. As such, foreign influence in this 
region will continue to be very limited. 
The nuclear tests have possibly, however, paved the way for an honest dialogue 
between India and Pakistan. As mentioned in chapter six, this dialogue was always 
shrouded in deceit because of the inability to talk about nuclear stabilization. No 
progress has yet been made, but the tests do remove a major obstacle to honest dialogue 
between the two rivals. This honest dialogue is now more necessary than ever since the 
close. proximity of the two countries could lead to misunderstandings over military 
manuevres and missile tests 
I Hussain & Chengappa, 'Bang for Bang, pp. 14-15 
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Conclusion - Was there any waming 
One of the fascinating things about the Indian nuclear tests is that they were not 
entirely unexpected. The BJP has never made any secret of its intention to develop 
nuclear weapons and in the past has indicated that it would test nuclear weapons if it 
came to power. It is amazing that few people expected them to actually do it. ' 
South Asia has been steadily weaponizing for a number of years. That nobody is 
certain if or when they actually weaponized is a testimony to the intense security that 
has surrounded the nuclear weapons programs in both countries. Now a covert weapons 
program has become an overt one and the World goes into a panic. This thesis has 
argued that India and Pakistan have been defacto nuclear powers for some time. No 
nuclear exchange has taken place, nor has there been a major conventional war 
(although there were some close calls ). These two nations have never even deliberately 
bombed a civilian target in any of their previous three wars. 74 These are not the acts of 
insane national leaderships. Panic accomplishes nothing and neither do sanctions. 
It has been feared that South Asia! s test would lead to increased proliferation, this 
may yet come to pass. However, the South Asian tests send a message to the five 
established nuclear powers that they cannot hold a monopoly on nuclear weapons 
forever. After nearly five decades of preaching disarmament, India and Pakistan seem 
to have decided: 'if you cant beat them -join them. ' 
73 On Januaty 23 1998, the author interviewed a New Delhi based journalist - MrA: - who told me that 
LKAdvani, a principal figure in the BJP, had clearly stated that the BJP would conduct nuclear tests within two 
months if elected. My reaction was to laugh since I was extremely sceptical of this claim at the time. 
11 Look at Time Magazine's coverage of the 1971 war for some insight into this aspect More people were 
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